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Informational Redundancy and Resource Bounds in Dialogue
Abstract
This thesis investigates the relationship between language behavior and agents' resource bounds by examining
the use of INFORMATIONALLY REDUNDANT UTTERANCES (IRUs) in problem-solving dialogues.
The content of an IRU is a proposition that the conversants already know or could infer. Since communication
is a subcase of action, the existence of IRUs is a paradox because IRUs appear to be actions whose effects have
already been achieved. The explication of the paradox of IRUs has ramifications for models of action in general
and of dialogue in particular.
I argue that IRUs can only be explained by a processing model of dialogue that reflects agents' autonomy and
limited attentional and inferential capacity. The central thesis is that the communicative function of IRUs is
related to the cognitive properties of resource-limited agents. In order to investigate this interaction the thesis
relies on two empirical methods: (1) distributional analysis of IRUs in a large corpus of naturally occurring
dialogues, and (2) dialogue simulations in the Design-World environment which supports the
parameterization of the dialogue situation, the task definition, and agents' cognitive properties.
The distributional analysis provides support for the claimed communicative functions by showing that IRUs
demonstrate agents' autonomy and are used to support deliberation and inference. IRUs help autonomous
agents coordinate on a collaborative task given their resource limits. The Design-World simulations show that
discourse strategies that include IRUs are beneficial when agents are attention and inference limited or when
the task is fault intolerant, inferentially complex, or requires a high degree of agreement. While some types of
IRUs are beneficial simply as a rehearsal strategy, the general result is that IRUs are most beneficial when
targeted at specific requirements of the communication situation.
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ABSTRACT
INFORMATIONAL REDUNDANCY AND RESOURCE BOUNDS IN DIALOGUE
Marilyn A Walker
Aravind K Joshi and Ellen F Prince cosupervisors
This thesis investigates the relationship between language behavior and agents resource bounds
by examining the use of informationally redundant utterances IRUs in problemsolving
dialogues The content of an IRU is a proposition that the conversants already know or could
infer Since communication is a subcase of action the existence of IRUs is a paradox because IRUs
appear to be actions whose eects have already been achieved The explication of the paradox of
IRUs has rami cations for models of action in general and of dialogue in particular
I argue that IRUs can only be explained by a processing model of dialogue that reects agents
autonomy and limited attentional and inferential capacity The central thesis is that the com
municative function of IRUs is related to the cognitive properties of resourcelimited agents In
order to investigate this interaction the thesis relies on two empirical methods  distributional
analysis of IRUs in a large corpus of naturally occurring dialogues and  dialogue simulations in
the DesignWorld environment which supports the parametrization of the dialogue situation the
task de nition and agents cognitive properties
The distributional analysis provides support for the claimed communicative functions by showing
that IRUs demonstrate agents autonomy and are used to support deliberation and inference IRUs
help autonomous agents coordinate on a collaborative task given their resource limits The Design
World simulations show that discourse strategies that include IRUs are bene cial when agents are
attention and inference limited or when the task is fault intolerant inferentially complex or requires
a high degree of agreement While some types of IRUs are bene cial simply as a rehearsal strategy
the general result is that IRUs are most bene cial when targeted at speci c requirements of the
communication situation
v
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Chapter  
Informational Redundancy
   Introduction
While the view of language as action is wellentrenched in theories of discourse little attention
has been paid to the fact that agents resourcebounds must aect their language behavior just as
it does every other type of action in which agents engage Equally unrecognized is the fact that
agents dialogue behavior reects their belief that their conversational partners like themselves
are resourcelimited In addition surprisingly little work has focused on how agents coordinate in
dialogue given these limitations
This thesis explores the interaction of resourcebounds and language behavior through an examina
tion of the function of informationally redundant utterances utterances de ned informally
as those in which a conversant restates information that is already shared informationally re 
dundant utterances henceforth IRUs will be de ned more precisely in section  For now
consider the simple example of one type of IRU in  below
 Frieda YOURE A PSYCHOLOGIST What do you think about this case of a ten year old
boy kidnapping a two year old fg 
In  both the speaker and the addressee already believed the proposition that Frieda is a psycholo 
gist and mutually believed that they did so Therefore it might seem that asserting this proposition
is pointless
However one function of the IRU in  is to constrain the set of propositions relevant to answering
the question to those related to the belief expressed by the IRU IRUs also demonstrate that the
interpretation of an utterance is highly context dependent The same proposition realized in a

dierent context can mean dierent things and by becoming part of the context itself can change
the meaning of other propositions in that context 
This is because the way that cognitive agents process language determines the meanings that an
utterance can have For example consider the fact that a speaker cannot rationally intend a hearer
to interpret an utterance with a meaning that is dependent on an inference if that inference would
take the hearer too long to derive Thus language its use and structure and the contribution of
these to meaning reect processing constraints
    Resource Limits in Attention and Inference
This thesis explores the eects of two types of resource limitations on conversants behavior in
dialogue limited attentional capacity and limited inferential capacity It is widely known that
human agents are limited in both their attentional capacity and their inferential capacity Miller

 Tversky and Kahneman  Sperber and Wilson 
 JohnsonLaird  Attentional
capacity is de ned by a limit on the number of propositions that can be held at one time in working
memory Propositions and other discourse entities currently held in working memory are salient
Chafe 
 Prince b While the exact limit on how many items can be salient at one
time is not clear and depends on the nature of the material to be remembered Baddeley 

previous research suggests that the limit is somewhere around  primitive propositions or  to 
sentences Miller 
 Kintsch  Chapter  introduces a model of working memory that will
operationalize the concept of discourse salience
Reasoning can be either timelimited or datalimited A key assumption of the theory presented
here is that the process of deliberating about beliefs or deriving inferences from previously held
beliefs is constrained to operate on propositions that are currently discourse salient This relation
between discourse salience and inference is encapsulated in the discourse inference constraint
given below
discourse inference constraint
Inferences in dialogue are derived from propositions that are currently discourse salient
in working memory
Previous research suggests that inferences from salient propositions are drawn automatically while
inferences on propositions that must be retrieved from long term memory are the result of more
 It is well known that a sentence with indexicals such as I am here can mean di erent things when uttered in
di erent situations This is a stronger claim namely that most aspects of interpretation are constrained by the
context and that this is partially because agents are resourcelimited

strategic inference processes McKoon and Ratcli  Thus if a belief is not currently salient is
required for reasoning a process must be invoked to retrieve it and thus make it salient In contrast
inferences from propositions that are already salient are made without any special strategic inference
process
The discourse inference constraint means that attentional capacity provides a major con
straint on which facts are used in deliberation and in reasoning in addition to the commonly
assumed limits based on time or the number of derivation steps Konolige 
 Thus one func
tion of IRUs is to manipulate context by bringing propositions back into the listeners working
memory hence making them available for inferences
   The Eect of Resource Limits on Mutuality
An additional focus of this thesis is the eect of resource limits on the process of achieving the
mutuality of certain beliefs and intentions in dialogue Dialogue can be characterized as a coor
dination game between two resourcelimited agents Schelling 
	 Lewis 
 Axelrod 
who wish to achieve a level of mutuality that is dependent on their goals in the dialogue but who
must do so with a limited amount of resources Agents do not assume that mutuality is automati
cally achieved Because other agents are autonomous an agents assertions and proposals are not
automatically accepted This is reected in the following attitude assumption
attitude assumption Agents deliberate whether to accept or reject an assertion
or proposal made by another agent in discourse
That mutuality is not automatic means that agents have to work at achieving mutuality This is
represented by coordination assumption 
coordination assumption 
Achieving mutuality of beliefs and intentions is a coordination problem for conversants
The required level of mutuality or coordination varies according to the type of dialogue and the
individual purposes of the agents involved Again in contrast to agents physical actions which
are observable the mental objects of another agents beliefs preferences and intentions are not
observable Because of this mutuality is achieved primarily when agents look for and give public
evidence of the eects of utterance actions on their beliefs and intentions Whether particular
strategies are required to achieve this mutuality is dependent on the likelihood that agents can
make dierent inferences and on the level of agreement required to achieve the purposes of the
dialogue

   The Communicative Functions of IRUs
The motivation for IRUs is based on the two factors discussed above  the role of the attentional
and inferential limitations in deriving meaning and  the need to achieve mutuality These factors
give rise to IRUs with three communicative functions
  Communicative Functions of IRUs
 Attitude to provide evidence supporting beliefs about mutual understanding and ac
ceptance
 Attention to manipulate the locus of attention of the discourse participants by making
a proposition salient
 Consequence to augment the evidence supporting beliefs that certain inferences are
licensed
Example  was an Attention IRU The IRU in  made the proposition salient that Frieda is a psy 
chologist and making this proposition salient set the context for the interpretation of the question
that followed Below I will briey give examples of some of the other types of IRUs each commu
nicative function given above is represented by a number of subtypes that will not be represented
by these examples The following chapters will discuss a range of examples of each type
An Attitude IRU said with a falling intonation typical of a declarative utterance is given in 
where M repeats what H has said in 

  H That is correct It could be moved around so that each of you have two thousand
 M I see

 H Without penalty
 M WITHOUT PENALTY
 H Right
 M And the fact that I have a an account of my own from a couple of years ago
when I was working doesnt aect this at all
The IRU provides evidence supporting beliefs about mutual understanding and acceptance because
Ms repetition shows that she heard exactly what H said In addition according to the account
There are also cases of repair IRUs where it is clear that the speaker is reattempting the same action because
some evidence has been provided by the addressee that the utterance has not been understood While there are
repairs IRUs in the corpus their analysis seems fairly straightforward and can be handled directly by the account
of context incrementation using defaults given in Chapter 
This example is from a talk show for nancial advice which was taped from a live radio broadcast and originally
transcribed by Julia Hirschberg and Martha Pollack Pollack Hirschberg and Webber 	
 I am grateful to Julia
Hirschberg for providing me with the tapes of the original broadcast

that will be supported in Chapter 
 Ms response supports the default inference that she accepts
and therefore believes what H has asserted because she provides no evidence to the contrary at this
point in the dialogue Attitude is mainly motivated by the need to achieve mutuality and is de ned
to be directed at demonstrating to other conversants what is assumed to be mutually understood
or accepted
Consequence and Attention IRUs are motivated by both processing constraints and the need to
achieve mutuality This is because processing constraints introduce uncertainty about what will be
retrieved frommemory or retained in working memory Attention or what will be mutually inferred
Consequence Consequence and Attention IRUs reduce this uncertainty by directly addressing
these processing limitations A Consequence IRU is given in  where  provides a biconditional
inference rule 
 instantiates one of the premises of this rule and  realizes an inference that
follows from  and 
 for the particular tax year of  by the inference rule of modus
tollens
  H Oh no I R As were available as long as you are not a participant in an existing
pension

 j Oh I see Well I did work I do work for a company that has a pension
 H ahh THEN YOURE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR EIGHTY ONE
The Consequence IRU in  augments the evidence supporting beliefs that certain inferences are
licensed by making the inference explicit in the context
Each communicative function proposed above is related to a noncontroversial cognitive property of
human agents The need to achieve goals related to Attitude follows from the fact that agents are
autonomous with their own preferences beliefs and goals If addressees always understood and
accepted whatever a speaker asserted then there would be no need for Attitude IRUs However
addressees do not necessarily believe what they are told or adopt the goals that are suggested to
them Chapter 
 will discuss Attitude in more detail
The need to achieve goals related to Consequence follows from the fact that agents are not logically
omniscient They might not have time to make all the relevant inferences and might not know all
A distinction is made here between utterances who purpose is to demonstrate ones own mental state which
contributes to achieving mutual belief Clark and Schaefer 	 Brennan  and utterances whose purpose is
to a ect anothers mental state Attitude IRUs are dened to be primarily about demonstrating ones own mental
state but cases of Attitude IRUs which say demonstrate that a certain inference was made can simultaneously
function to ensure that another agent made the same inference At times the prosodic realization indicates that the
speaker treats the information as part of the context and so is merely demonstrating hisher understanding Walker
c However in many cases our understanding of the role of prosody is not far enough advanced to provide
denitive arguments about utterance function Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg  McLemore 

the relevant inference rules Konolige  Time and processingretrieval eort are key factors
given the heavy planning and processing requirements of producing and interpreting speech in real
time Clark and Brennan 	 Thus agents may make relevant inferences explicit indicating
to other agents that a certain inference was made Agents also can provide support for their
conversational partners inference process thus increasing the likelihood that another agent will
make the desired inference Chapter  will discuss Consequence in more detail
Since human agents have limited attentional capacity the need to manipulate Attention also follows
from agents resourcebounds One aspect of agents coordination in dialogue is tracking and
manipulating the locus of attention of other agents IRUs can be used to set the context for
interpretation and reasoning and ensure that the agents involved are jointly attending to the same
concepts Chapter  will discuss Attention in more detail
While there is a distinction between Consequence and Attention the discourse inference con 
straint means that making propositions salient that are premises for inferences also supports
inferential processes This illustrates a relationship between Consequence and Attention One rea
son an agent can have for making a proposition salient is that it is a premise for an inference If all
the premises for an inference are discourse salient then that inference is easily derived Further
more if an inference is made explicit then its content is salient which means that other inferences
can be derived from it I will distinguish between Consequence and Attention by the use of the
distributional parameters discussed in chapter  but the reader should keep in mind the fact that
they are strongly related
Another hypothesis about the function of IRUs is that they are a rehearsal mechanism ie agents
repeat propositions to help themselves and their conversational partners remember them In ad
dition it is always possible that an IRU makes a proposition salient Even if the proposition is
already relatively salient we might have many degrees of salience The possibility that IRUs can
function for rehearsal and salience is considered for each class of IRUs in the following chapters
The model of AttentionWorking memory that will be presented in chapter  will ensure that the
DesignWorld simulations will show rehearsal and salience bene ts whenever they exist
This demonstrates a general fact about the interpretation of IRUs and utterances in general ut
terances can serve multiple functions simultaneously and any account of utterance function must
allow for this possibility The relationship between discourse function and IRUs is not claimed
to be isomorphic IRUs do not necessarily realize only one discourse function and the discourse
functions discussed here are not realized solely by IRUs This will become clearer in the following
chapters where each function of IRUs will be discussed The relationship between Consequence
and Attention will be discussed further in both Chapters  and 


   Dialogue situations in which IRUs are Benecial
While the functions of IRUs discussed above are very general the occurrence of IRUs in naturally
occurring dialogues are highly situation specic The communicative functions of IRUs proposed
above predict which dialogue situations should lead to an increased frequency of IRUs due to a
greater need to achieve these communicative functions These are
  tasks with high inferential complexity
  situations in which conversants have reduced or low attentional capacity
  situations in which there is uncertainty about whether assertions will be accepted by the other
conversants
  situations in which there is uncertainty about whether understanding will be achieved
In the  rst two of these cases IRUs are used to help other agents simplify processing whereas in
the last two IRUs are used as demonstrations of acceptance and understanding One way of testing
the theory of the function of IRUs is by manipulating the discourse situation in a computational
simulation environment and by demonstrating that IRUs are bene cial in these situations The
DesignWorld simulation environment is developed speci cally for the purpose of providing support
for the theory proposed here and will be discussed in detail in chapter  Another way of testing
the theory is to carefully examine the situations in which IRUs occur in the corpus and see whether
the distribution of IRUs supports arguments about their function The distributional factors that
are used to examine the distribution of IRUs in the  nancial advice corpus will also be discussed
in chapter  The combination of these two methods will provide support for the claimed functions
of IRUs elaborated in the remainder of the thesis
This section has provided a sketch of the theory of the role of IRUs in discourse which will be
elaborated and supported in the following chapters First however Section  will de ne the
concept of an informationally redundant utterance more precisely Chapter  will review
previous analyses of IRUs in discourse Finally Section  then presents an overview of the
remainder of the thesis
  Informationally Redundant Utterances
An IRU consists of information that is already shared between conversants Information can be
assumed to be shared because it was discussed in the current discourse because it was discussed in

a previous discourse or because it is generally assumed to be commonly known Prince calls these
types of shared information hearer old information Thus IRUs consist of information that is
hearer old
To explain how IRUs  t with the representation of hearer old information in general section 
 rst discusses the representation of the discourse situation and how this determines the discourse
model Then in section  I discuss distinctions that have been made in the literature as to the
dierent information statuses of entities in the discourse model Finally in section  I show
that IRUs are are at one end of a continuum of hearer old information that diers from other
types in consisting of the assertion of complete propositions I conjecture that if the functions of
other classes of hearer old propositions were studied they might be similar to the functions of
IRUs Finally in section  I present a brief taxonomy of types of IRUs that will be developed
further in section 
   The Discourse Model
One type of hearer old information is what has been discussed in the current discourse This
information is usually stored in the discourse model The discourse model mediates between
text and the real world Information gets added to a discourse model through the occurrence of
utterance events A discourse situation S is a sequence of utterance events S  U        Un
An utterance event U is represented as a tuple P  P  I   where P is the population
of conversants I is the set of natural numbers representing the sequential locus of the utterance
in a discourse and  is the set of utterance strings Other indices such as the time and place of
the utterance will not be used here although they must be available for semantic interpretation
In addition I am assuming dialogic discourses but it would be simple to extend the treatment
to audiences of more than one addressee For convenience selector functions are de ned on U
SpeakerU  U AddresseeU  U Un  U U  U
The situation S merely represents the sequence of events What each conversant believes the
discourse situation indicates maps S to each conversants discourse model Lewis 
 Con
versants models may vary conversants views of what is shared between the models depends on
whether assertions are accepted or rejected and conversants beliefs about dialogue conven
tions A convenient  ction is that there is one discourse model this is often referred to as the
discourse model For convenience I will talk about a single discourse model in the remainder of
The representation could be extended to include information from the physical environment but that is beyond
the scope of this work

this section In chapter 
 I will return to the discussion of potential dierences in conversants
discourse models
The discourse model minimally consists of the set of propositions P that have been discussed
and accepted either explicitly or implicitly and a set of discourse referents D Stalnaker 
Karttunen 
 Webber  Heim  When an assertion is accepted a predication about
an entity in D is stored in the model Subsequent access to an entity or an accepted belief requires
retrieval from the discourse model
In addition the discourse model includes  a function StructD on discourse referents de ning an
accessibility relation on discourse referents that is used for constraining potential antecedents for
anaphors See for example Grosz  Sidner  Joshi and Weinstein  Walker Iida and
Cote  and  a function StructP de ning a structure on the propositions in the discourse
model StructP restricts the domain of relevant propositions and constrains the availability of
propositions used for inferences Given the current discourse model StructP returns a set of
propositions that are available to constrain interpretation and inference Thus the discourse model
is a  tuple P D StructD StructP
It is possible that StructD and StructP are determined by the same set of discourse structure
constraints but I leave this an open issue Current dynamic semantics accounts assume that
StructP simply corresponds to the sequence of utterances that realize P Groenendijk and Stokhof
 The function StructP is probably at least partially determined by the discourse structure
but the determination of discourse structure is an open problem Hobbs  Polanyi and Scha
 Reichman  Grosz and Sidner 
 Mann and Thompson  Roberts a
StructP will be de ned here based on an operationalization of discourse salience and I will mainly
be concerned with the relationship between StructP and what an utterance indicates Lewis

 This will be discussed in chapter 
In order to clarify the relationship of IRUs to other entities in the discourse model the next section
discusses the dierent information statuses of entities in the discourse model
  Information Status Hearer Old and Salient
Entities in the discourse model can be classi ed according to two orthogonal distinctions whether
they are hearer old and whether they are salient Prince b Prince  hearer old
describes the known status of an entity for referents this means whether or not a  le card for
the entity has already been created in the discourse model The salience status of an entity
determines whether a previously existing  le card is currently in working memory

salience status for propositions is the same as for referents whether or not the proposition is in
current working memory However hearer old and salience are dependent when applied to
discourse referents because it is dicult to imagine a referent being salient unless it exists in the
model In contrast as Horn 
 noted hearer old status for a proposition reects whether it
is being treated by the participants as factive and for propositions this is completely independent
of salience
Usually an utterance consists of some hearer old information along with some new information
For example an utterance may be composed of an open proposition the hearer old information
and a discourse entity the new information that instantiates the variable in that open proposition
Prince 
 For example a introduces the open proposition given in 
 x go agtBarbara locGrand Canyon withx tnspast
 a Who did Barbara go to the Grand Canyon with
b A friend from Slovenia
b Jana
Utterance b instantiates this open proposition with a new discourse entity a friend from Slovenia
Because a presupposes that Barbara went to the Grand Canyon with someone and b doesnt take
issue with this presupposition the open proposition is treated as hearer old information in b
The answer given in b introduces a new discourse referent into the discourse model and provides
the new information that a friend from Slovenia instantiates the variable in the open proposition
The answer given in b presupposes that the addressee already has a discourse referent for Jana
in the discourse model In this case the new information provided is only that Jana is the entity
that instantiates the variable in the open proposition
It is also possible for the hearer old information in an utterance to be a single discourse referent
that is already in the discourse model such as Barbara in 
 below

 Barbara went to the Grand Canyon
Here the predication about the discourse entity Barbara is new but the entity Barbara is already
in the discourse model
It is possible to strongly believe a proposition so that it is nondefeasible without it being currently salient
On the other hand it is possible for a proposition which is not strongly believed to be under consideration and
currently salient
	
  Dening Informationally Redundant Utterances
While the most common situation may be that the hearer old information in an utterance is either
an open proposition or a discourse referent as in  and 
 above a complete proposition can be
hearer old information as well Consider the proposition in a which could be realized as b
 a invite agtphil themeclare tnspast
b Phil invited Clare
The examples in  show some of the many ways that this proposition can be realized in a discourse
 a Phil invited Clare
b That Phil invited Clare must have surprised you
c Phil inviting Clare balanced our table
d Phils invitation to Clare means that we need an extra place setting
e If Phil invited Clare we need an extra place setting
f Sarah invited Kate because Phil invited Clare
g Sarah invited Kate and Phil invited Clare
h Sarah invited Kate but Phil invited Clare
i Grace didnt realize that Phil invited Clare
Complete propositions can be asserted as in a g and h They may also be simply evoked by
nominalized  nite and non nite clauses such as those in b and c by nominalizations as in d
or in subordinate clauses as in e and f A particularly interesting and complex class of cases
is exempli ed by i in which a proposition is an argument of another predicate which expresses
an attitude toward the proposition Section  will discuss in more detail a subclass of these
attitude expressing predicates which treat the propositional argument as presupposed Kiparsky
and Kiparsky 	 Karttunen  Gazdar 
This thesis examines only those cases where a proposition is both reevoked and asserted as in
a g and h These propositions are hearer old A study of all the ways of reevoking a
The inclusion of conjoined propositions makes sense because the logical treatment of propositions realized by a
sequence of utterances in discourse is as conjunction Groenendijk and Stokhof  and because in natural speech
very long sequences of utterances may be explicitly conjoined

proposition as demonstrated in  is beyond the scope of this work The de nition of IRU is given
in 
 Denition of Informational Redundancy
An utterance ui is informationally redundant in a discourse situation S
 if ui expresses a proposition pi and another utterance uj that entails pi has
already been said in S
 if ui expresses a proposition pi and another utterance uj that presupposes or
implicates pi has already been said in S
Presuppositions and implicatures are two types of nonlogical inferences that may be communicated
as part of the nontruthconditional meaning of an utterance Grice 
 Gazdar  Levinson
 I will discuss the basis for these inferences in section 
Just as e f g and h explicitly relate the proposition expressed by Phil invited Clare to another
proposition and just as i is an argument of another predicate IRUs may participate in relations of
causality or explanation with other propositions or can have an attitude of the speaker predicated
of them via their intonational realization See chapter 
 If a more exhaustive examination of the
reevocation of propositions in all the forms shown in  were carried out it might well show that
propositions that are reevoked can have similar functions to those proposed for IRUs in section

The de nition of IRU given in  above depends on the logicosemantic account of the discourse
model in which the function of utterances is to reduce the number of possible worlds consistent with
what has been said In this account  an assertion reduces the context set by eliminating worlds
which are not consistent with the newly added information  propositions are added one at a time
and a sequence of propositions is treated as the logical conjunction of individual propositions and
 all the inferences deriving from the most recently added proposition in combination with all the
previously communicated propositions are automatically derived and added to the discourse model
Stalnaker  Gazdar  Barwise b Groenendijk and Stokhof  While this model
is used to de ne utterances as informationally redundant the remainder of the thesis is devoted to
exploring a richer model of the context for a dialogue in which IRUs are not communicatively
redundant The claimhere is that the discourse representation must take into account conversants
resource limitations
The rst part of the denition is a variation on the denition of redundant given by Hirschberg 	 and used
in her theory of scalar implicature
The automatic derivation of all inferences is an unavoidable consequence of the possible worlds model Partee
	
 Levesque 	 Konolige 	

The de nition of an IRU is based solely on the informational component of an utterance using a
possibly narrow de nition of information Utterances consist of a string that is said the proposition
that is realized by that string in a particular context and an associated utterance intention which
consists of the role of that utterance in the overall structure of the discourse and the conversants
intentions Informational redundancy only refers to the propositional content of an utterance An
IRU does not necessarily realize the same utterance intention as the utterance that originally added
the propositional content of the IRU to the discourse model
  Types of Informationally Redundant Utterances
In what follows it will be useful to have a term to refer to the utterances that originally added
the propositional content of the IRU to the discourse situation Following work on referential
discourse entities I will call this the IRUs antecedent The term antecedent will be used to
refer to both the prior utterance and the proposition realized by that prior utterance but this
should not cause any confusion In the dialogue excerpts given here IRUs will be marked with
CAPS whereas their antecedents will be given in italics An IRU may be explicitly related to its
antecedent eg a repetition which replicates the surface structure of the antecedent or implicitly
related to its antecedent eg inferrable from its antecedents by modus ponens or other deductive
inference rules The types of IRUs examined here are shown in  gure 
TYPE of IRU EXPLICIT Relation IMPLICIT Relation
to Antecedents to Antecedents
Entailment Repetitions Logical Inferences
Paraphrases Mathematical calculations
Presupposition Existential Presuppositions
Factive Presuppositions
Conversational Implicature Scalar Implicatures
Figure  Types of Informationally Redundant Utterances
Thus there are three basic types of IRUs entailments presuppositions and implicatures From a
logical perspective there is no substantive dierence among the dierent types of entailments but
from a cognitive and communicative perspective they may be more or less available 	
 	One motivation for distinguishing repetition from other entailments is that lexical repetition has often been taken
as a key parameter for predicting prosodic deaccenting of given information Cruttenden 	 Walker c

One remaining issue with the notion of entailment and speci cally related to the concept of para
phrase is how propositions are represented For example if one speaker says 	a and the other says
	b it seems that the propositional representation should allow us to say that 	b is an IRU be
cause truly and wonderfully are close enough in meaning Thus the notion of entailment required
here may be closer to what Resnik has called plausible entailment based on measures derived
from lexical collocation indices Resnik  SparckJones 

	 a Juliet is a truly beautiful girl
b Wonderfully beautiful girl is Juliet
For all types of entailment a diagnostic of whether the propositional content of an IRU can plausibly
be denied can be used to test whether the information is already available in the discourse situation
Stalnaker  This diagnostic cannot be used for implicatures since these inferences are in fact
defeasible  
In an examination of redundancy via corpus analysis what counts as an entailment or as inferrable
in general must be strictly de ned for operational reasons This is so that the selection criteria are
replicable In analyzing the radio talk show corpus I assume that lexical knowledge is shared if
it is not domainspeci c Otherwise all the information that an entailment depends on must be
made public in the dialogue although I will assume knowledge of standard deduction schemas such
as modus ponens modus tollens proof by elimination conditionalization etc
On the other hand when the use of IRUs is examined in empirical situations such as taskoriented
dialogues collected experimentally or through simulations it is possible to state in principle what
is already known and what is inferrable This leads to the possibility of a broader characteriza
tion of IRUs in these circumstances which will be discussed in more detail when I discuss these
experimental environments in chapter 
  Overview of the Thesis
Section  sketched the account of informationally redundant utterances IRUs that
will be developed in the remaining chapters I argue that there are three main classes of IRUs
Attitude Attention and Consequence These functions of these classes of IRUs can be explained by
a processing model of dialogue that reects the fact that agents are autonomous and have limited
attentional and limited inferential capacity Section  de nes the set of IRUs analyzed here I
  Reasons for examining these defeasible inferences are discussed in section 



havent said how the theory of IRUs will be supported and tested this is explained in chapters 
 and 
Chapter  will review relevant previous work on redundancy in discourse
Chapter  presents the theory of agents attentional and inferential systems that supports the
analysis of the function of IRUs given here This account builds on the work on resourcebounded
agents of Bratman Israel and Pollack on Galliers theory of belief revision and on Lewiss shared
environment model of mutual belief Bratman Israel and Pollack  Pollack and Ringuette
	 Galliers b Galliers a Lewis 
 Clark and Marshall  Barwise a
Chapters  and  describes the two empirical methods that will be used to support the theory
proposed here corpus based analysis and computational modeling Corpus based distributional
analysis provides support for claims about the relationship of context to function and compu
tational modeling supports claims about processing Chapter  discusses the factors used in the
corpus analysis of IRUs and chapter  presents the DesignWorld simulation environment used to
test the processing claims of the theory Then each of the following chapters will present evidence
for the theory from these empirical bases
Chapter 
 elaborates on the function of Attitude IRUs This chapter proposes an inferential account
of how understanding and acceptance are achieved this account is based on the model of mutual
beliefs presented in chapter  The treatment of Attitude distinguishes between understanding
acceptance and rejection of the previous utterance and discusses cases of IRUs that support the
inference of mutual beliefs about understanding and acceptance A model of this inference process
is proposed and the class of examples explained by this model is demonstrated This model is
then used to explain how agents make plans together DesignWorld simulations of some types of
Attitude IRUs are presented in section 

 The main result of these experiments is that Attitude
IRUs can help agents avoid making mistakes such as putting invalid steps in their plans
Chapter  on Attention IRUs discusses three distributional classes of of Attention IRUs Open
Segment Close Segment and Deliberation IRUs The simulation shows that when both agents
know exactly what the structure of the task is Open Segment and Close Segment statements alone
have little bene t It is only when these Open Segment and Close Segment statements include
other IRUs that a bene t for these can be demonstrated In these cases the function of Attention
IRUs overlaps that of Consequence IRUs Deliberation IRUs are particularly bene cial in reducing
the retrieval of propositions from memory even when agents are logically omniscient because they
obviate the need for search
Chapter  on Consequence IRUs discusses two types of Consequence IRUs Inference Explicit and

and Armation The distributional analysis supports the claim that the premises for inferences are
restricted to those that are currently salient DesignWorld simulations for Consequence IRUs are
carried out in two situations  where agents are logically omniscient and  where agents are
inference limited Consequence IRUs are of some bene t even when agents are logically omniscient
in cases of tasks with high inferential complexity In situations where agents are inferencelimited
Consequence IRUs can provide major bene ts as would be expected
Finally Chapter  discusses the rami cations of the analysis and proposes future work


Chapter 
Previous Research
This chapter reviews previous research related to the treatment of IRUs or work that has speci cally
addressed the discourse functions of IRUs Section  discusses assumptions of previous work as
to the functions of IRUs and some issues that these assumptions raise Section  discusses why
IRUs present a problem for the Gricean distinction between entailment and implicature Section
 discusses proposed analyses of subclasses of IRUs in previous work
  Introduction
There has been little analysis of IRUs in formal theories of dialogue in linguistics philosophy
and computational linguistics and the analyses proposed have been rather uneven Indeed most
logicbased theories of dialogue have rules that forbid the use of IRUs For example Hamblins
formal system for dialogue includes a rule that forbids the speaker to say anything that is already
part of the common ground Hamblin  Stalnaker states that to assert something that is
already presupposed is to attempt to do something that is already done Stalnaker  And
Grices quantity maxim Do not make your contribution more informative than is required has
often been interpreted to mean that asserting the same proposition twice is infelicitous Grice

 Horn 
The view of language as an action on anothers mental state has meant that theories of rational
behavior can be applied to language Austin 
 Grice 
 Searle  This program is
best exempli ed by the application of planning paradigms to language and has produced many
useful insights Bruce  Cohen  Allen  Sidner and Israel  Allen and Perrault
	 Sidner  Cohen and Levesque  Litman  Litman and Allen 	 However
these treatments of language havent considered cases where there might be a reason to communicate

a proposition that is already believed by the hearer Cohens speech act generation axioms rule
out the generation of inform utterances whose propositional content has already been conveyed
because a precondition for an inform is that the hearer doesnt already believe the content of the
utterance Cohen  Similarly speechact planinference heuristics disprefer the recognition of
a plan whose eect has already been achieved and thus disprefer recognizing an IRU as an inform
Allen  Litman and Allen 	
It seems that it is not uniformly recognized that IRUs occur except for certain special types of
IRUs such as tautologies whose treatment will be discussed below Rules that forbid IRUs stem
from both types of formal analyses of language  the logicosemantic account in which the
purpose of utterances is to describe the world and an utterance is informative only if it reduces
the number of possible worlds consistent with what has been said and  the planbased view
in which utterances are actions on the addressees mental state but in which IRUs are actions
whose purpose has already been achieved because the hearer already believes the proposition that
is realized by the utterance
Both of these analyses can treat IRUs as felicitous if they may be interpreted nonliterally In
the logicosemantic analysis this means that the meaning of the utterance bears some indirect
relation to its content which must be derived by access to other information but the details
of this derivation have yet to be speci ed One account in the planbased tradition is that the
nonliteral interpretation comes about from the recognition of the utterance as an indirect speech
act Perrault 	 On this account the recognition that the utterance is redundant means that
it violates the felicity conditions for an inform the hearer doesnt already believe the content of the
utteranceCohen  Based on the assumption of the speakers cooperativity this recognition
then triggers a process which attempts to infer a dierent speaker intention such as a request
If these nonliteral interpretations require that the alternate content or speech act is a complex
function of the content of the IRU and the context of utterance then these other accounts could
end up being quite similar to the one given here Both of these ways of determining an alternate
interpretation will be discussed further below
Similar but not identical to the nonliteral meaning analysis is one in which IRUs are felicitous as
long as they add implicatures to the common ground Gazdar  This is the basis of Gazdars
treatment of tautological utterances such as a which adds the two implicatures in b and c
 a She will either come or she wont
b It is possible that she will come
c It is possible that she wont come

On this view depending on what can count as an implicature IRUs can always add implicatures
they trivially add relevance implicatures based on Grices Relevance Maxim
Make your contributions relevant
The Relevance Maxim is based on the assumption that the speaker must have had a reason for
saying the utterance If these reasons include metalinguistic propositions such as the speaker really
believes P or the speaker has reasons to want to make sure that the hearer doesnt forget that
P then what I would characterize as functions of IRUs with a cognitive basis might possibly be
treated as types of relevance implicatures However this seems contrary to the spirit of Grices
account which was primarily concerned with contentbased inferences
Note also that by any account where IRUs mean something other than their literal meaning
IRUs are informative via some inferential process Yet this does not distinguish IRUs as a special
case since most utterances communicate more than their literal content Karttunen and Peters
 Gazdar  Grosz and Sidner 
 Hobbs  How can we distinguish the standard
case where the realization of any proposition adds inferences from its content to the context and
the case where IRUs are only felicitous when they do so
One way to approach this is by determining whether or not the interpretation and inferred function
of the IRU depends on recognizing the IRU as redundant and then a special inference process is
triggered because the utterance is redundant One problem with this approach is to say whether or
not this recognition needs to be conscious ie whether the addressee can say upon introspection
that the reason the utterance functioned as it did was because it was recognized as already believed
This is still a problem however because it is dicult to distinguish cases of conscious recognition
from dierential processing due to redundancy For example hearers react more quickly to facts
that they already know rehearsing a fact increases its accessibility and facts that are already
believed may not need to be veri ed through additional processing Baddeley 
 Landauer
 Hintzmann and Block  Shepard 
 Tulving 
 Ratcli and McKoon  If
propositions realized as IRUs are more quickly accessed and processed the hearer may perceive
that arguments that include IRUs are more coherent without necessarily consciously recognizing
their redundancy The question of whether recognition of redundancy is an important part of the
function of IRUs will be discussed for each class of IRUs in the following chapters The following
section will discuss the relationship of IRUs to the Gricean program which in the main has assumed
that IRUs dont exist Section  will then discuss previous research on the function of IRUs in
discourse

 A Classication of IRUs according to Grice
  The Reinforceability and Defeasibility Diagnostics
The Gricean program greatly simpli ed the job of providing a semantics for natural language
by distinguishing those aspects of meaning that are truthconditional entailments from those
that arise only in particular conversational contexts conversational implicatures According to
the classical Gricean view there are two logical properties that distinguish presuppositions and
implicatures from entailments Levinson  Sadock 
  Reinforceability whether the inference can be made explicit without redundancy
  Defeasibility whether the inference can be defeated by additional information or depending
on the discourse situation when the utterance is made
The way in which the types of IRUs given in Figure  are classi ed by these properties is shown
in Figure  Gazdar  Bridge 
Reinforceability Defeasibility
Entailment no no
Presupposition order dependent by context
Conversational Implicature yes yes
Figure  Properties of dierent types of Information Antecedents
It is clear that IRUs are a problem for the Gricean program since felicitous reinforceability is the
main diagnostic for distinguishing implicatures from entailments In the remainder of this section
I will present examples that exemplify the claims of the classical Gricean view and contrast them
with examples from my corpus that are counterexamples to this view but which however seem
perfectly felicitous
 IRUs include Entailments
As an example of the infelicity of attempting to reinforce or defeat entailments consider a and
b
 a  My sister is older than I am and I am younger than my sister
b  My sister is older than I am but Im not younger than my sister
	
Example a conjoins two clauses where the second is entailed by the  rst b conjoins two clauses
where the second attempts to defeat the  rst Because entailments are neither reinforceable nor
defeasible a and b are anomalous The anomaly occurs independent of the order in which
these clauses are stated However now consider  extracted from a longer naturallyoccurring
dialogue
  H you can stop right there take your money
 J TAKE THE MONEY
	H absolutely
In   is said with falling intonation the H LLL! declarative pattern Pierrehumbert 	
The contour indicates that J is not questioning hs assertion due to beliefs to the contrary Indeed
just prior to  J had asked H whether she should take the money from her pension plan as
a lump sum payment or take an annuity This question under standard circumstances should
convey that J doesnt know whether p Thus neither Js intonation nor the prior context gives any
reason to believe that J is expressing disbelief or surprise at the advice
Entailments also include inferences made via classic inference rules such as modus ponens and
modus tollens Condition  of the de nition of IRU in  means that if a and b are in the
common ground then an utterance that realizes the proposition in c will be an IRU since it
follows from a and b via modus tollens
 a You can buy an I R A  if and only if you do NOT have an existing pension plan
b You have an existing pension plan
c You cannot buy an I R A
This structure is illustrated by  where  realizes the proposition in a 
 realizes the
proposition in b and  makes the inference explicit that is given in c for the particular
tax year of 
  H Oh no I R As were available as long as you are not a participant in an existing
pension

 J Oh I see Well I did work I do work for a company that has a pension
 H ahh THEN YOURE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR 
 An Individual Retirement Account which was a way of deferring tax on income until retirement

Both  and  seem completely felicitous The contrast between these examples and the infelicitous
reinforcement given in a is explained by the theory proposed in the following chapters
 IRUs include Presuppositions
Like entailments presuppositions are supposed to be not reinforceable Karttunen  Gazdar
 Presuppositions are similar to implicatures in that they are not part of the truthconditional
meaning of an utterance There are two types of presuppositions existential and factive These
will be discussed in turn below
Existential presuppositions are often carried by the use of de nite expressions For example an
utterance in which I speak of my sister will carry an existential presupposition that I have a sister

 a I have a sister and my sister is older than I am
b  My sister is older than I am and I have a sister
c I dont have a sister so my sister isnt older than I am
In 
a the presupposition is in the clause before the one that presupposes it Since presupposi
tions can be reinforced as long as the reinforcement comes before the clause that introduces the
presupposition 
a is not anomalous However 
b puts the presupposition after the clause that
presupposes it and is anomalous 
c shows that presuppositions can be defeated by entailments
that are already part of the context Gazdar 
Unlike entailments and implicatures existential presuppositions survive negation Note that the
existential presupposition given in c is presupposed by both a and b
 a The charges will be excessive
b The charges wont be excessive
c There are charges
In contrast with the infelicity of 
b consider the armation of there are charges in 
  B Are there ah  I dont think the ah brokerage charge will be ah that excessive
 H No theyre not excessive but THERE ARE CHARGES

In  B starts out with a question as to whether there are brokerage charges or not but modi es his
utterance to presuppose that there are brokerage charges by using the de nite referring expression
the brokerage charge In  H further presupposes the existence of said brokerage charges by
referring to them with a personal pronoun and then predicating of them that they are in fact not
excessive and then in the second conjunct he arms their existence
Factive presuppositions are introduced into the context as the argument of a factive predicate eg
unfortunate in 
 Its unfortunate that you failed
The emotive factive predicate unfortunate in  presupposes the proposition you failed This
proposition should not be reinforceable according to the classic account However the armation
in 	 is perfectly felicitous Ward  Horn  Ward 	
	 Its unfortunate that you failed but YOU DID
Factive predicates  rst noted in Kiparsky and Kiparsky 	 include odd strange surprising
realize regret manage
 IRUs include Conversational Implicatures
Generalized conversational implicatures such as the inference from some to not all are both rein
forceable without anomalous redundancy as in a and defeasible as in b
 a I ate some of the cookies but I didnt eat all of them
b I ate some of the cookies and in fact I ate all of them
Since such conversational implicatures are reinforceable a possible account of IRUs that have a
conversational implicature as an antecedent is that the IRU is just a reinforcement of the implica
ture However there are two reasons to examine implicatures First such reinforcements appear
to occur in contexts similar to IRUs whose antecedents are entailments Second all the work on
the properties of implicatures such as reinforceability and defeasibility has been based on single
utterances such as those in  where the defeating or reinforcing proposition is immediately ad
jacent to the implicata and said by the same speaker Reinforcements that are not adjacent to their
Wards and Horns analyses of IRUs of this type are based on the concept of rhetorical contrast which will
be discussed further in sections 
 and 	


antecedents may primarily function as Attention IRUs rather than at the logicosemantic level of
reinforcement
An IRU with an implicature as antecedent is shown in  In  D uses the term girlfriend
which implicates by the Quantity Maxim Grice 
 Horn  Hirschberg  that the
woman in question is not his wife
   D Uh my girlfriend and I bought a house in December And uh were both on the
mortgage And were not sure as to how to handle the mortgage or excuse me how to
handle the deductions
Uh every example I see in tax books usually cites a married couple though and WERE
NOT MARRIED
And we uh Im afraid that this year she will not qualify for uh to itemize I will " Ill
be well over it
	 H Who made the payments 
Note that as D continues the description of his problem he makes this implicature explicit by
actually stating that they are not married
In sum while the Gricean program depends on the nonreinforceability of entailments examples
from the corpus show that all types of entailments are reinforceable The infelicity of some rein
forcements is explained by what follows Section  reviews previous analyses of some subclasses
of IRUs which will be extended in the following chapters
 IRUs in Previous Work
In section  I discussed the assumption of no redundancy incorporated in formal theories of dia
logue then in section  discussed Gricean distinctions between dierent types of propositions that
are based on the no redundancy assumption This review gives a somewhat negative characteriza
tion of redundancy This section reviews proposals for the function of various types of IRUs Schier
 Levinson  Heritage and Watson  Sperber and Wilson  Schirin  Sche
glo  Levinson  Ward  Finin Joshi and Webber 
 Schirin  Cohen
 Whittaker and Stenton  Clark and Schaefer  Tannen  Ward 	 Walker
and Whittaker 	 Horn  Ward and Hirschberg 
I nd this inference to be stronger than an implicature since I nd it infelicitous to say My girlfriend  and in
fact were married 
The use of sentential conjunction by D demonstrates the diculties in determining when a proposition linked
to others by conjunction could count as a separate utterance

  Schiers Reminders
Schiers de nition of speaker meaning anticipated the class of Attention IRUs by de ning mutual
beliefs to be those that are mutually activated Schier 
S meant that p by or in uttering x if S uttered x intending thereby to realize a certain
state of aairs E which is intended by S to be such that the obtainment of E is sucient
for S and a certain audience A mutually knowing  or believing  that E obtains
and that E is conclusive very good or good evidence that S uttered x with the primary
intention
 that there be some  such that Ss utterance of x causes in A the activated belief
that pt 
 satisfaction of  to be achieved at least in part by virtues of As belief that x is
related in a certain way R to the belief that p
 to realize E 
By Schiers de nition utterances realize states of aairs that provide evidence for the active
inferences of an audience This evidence has a conventional basis in common knowledge Schier
includes the notion of an activated belief rather than just any belief in order to account for cases
of reminding pointing out etc in which a speaker presumably tells the hearer something that they
already know Schier had in mind utterances such as b
 A Now what was that girls name
B Rose
Thus Schier distinguishes between known facts and their accessibility or salience in terms of
activation There are no examples like this in the corpus and the types of Attention IRUs are
much more varied than Schiers characterization would suggest However it seems that Schier
is making the distinction between hearer old information and that which is both hearer old
and salient at issue in the analysis of Attention IRUs
Another point of interest is that Schier claimed the actual saying of B is the only thing required
for the satisfaction of the speakers intention Presumably this follows from the fact that saying an
utterance makes its content salient and since the proposition realized by the utterance is already
believed this is all that is required No active processing is needed because as long as the literal
p is the response with reasons   and that these are truth supporting reasons is denoted by  t

content of the utterance is understood it achieves the intention of making the proposition it realizes
salient
 IRUs are used in Arguments
Levinson foreshadows the analysis of Consequence and Attention IRUs in noting that IRUs can be
important in argument structure In discussing various types of uninformative utterances including
those in classroom speech he observes that the most natural kind of discourse in which it is
appropriate and perhaps necessary to state things that are already known in a certain order or
sequence is in the presentation of an argument Levinson  This is exempli ed in  from a
courtroom interrogation between an attorney for the defense A and a girl G In  the girls
age is asked even though the facts of the case such as her age are already known to all parties
  A You have had sexual intercourse on a previous occasion havent you
 G Yes
 A On many previous occasions
 G Not many
 A Several

 G Yes
 A With several men
 G No
 A Just one
	G Two
 A Two AND YOU ARE SEVENTEEN AND A HALF
 G Yes
Levinson argues that the point of getting the witness to state what is known to everyone present
is not in the question itself or in its answer but in its juxtaposition with what has gone before
This juxtaposition manages to suggest that a girl of seventeen who has already had relations with
two men is not a woman of good repute
Levinsons notion of juxtaposition anticipates the analysis here in that the interpretation of a
proposition is highly dependent on context and that inferences must be derived from currently
salient propositions As Levinson observes the function of the question in  above is to extract
from the witness one of a series of answers that contribute to forming a natural argument for
the jury Given the fact that the context contributes the meaning of this utterance and that no


two contexts are exactly alike it is surprising that there would be any hard constraints on the
reevocation of a proposition in discourse
Cohens analysis of argumentative discourse also notes the occurrence of IRUs in argument and
claims that using IRUs in an argument reduces hearers processing Cohen  This is because
in her model a hearer must infer whether an utterance is a claim or evidence for a claim in order
to infer the structure of the discourse Since according to Cohen an IRU cannot be used as a
claim it is easy for hearers to recognize that an IRU must be the evidence for a claim
One type of Consequence IRU also related to argument structure is related to a verbpreposing
construction called Proposition Armation Ward  Ward 	 An example of proposi 
tion affirmation henceforth PA is shown in 
 Tchaikovsky was one of the most tormented men in musical history In fact one wonders how
he managed to produce any music at all BUT PRODUCE MUSIC HE DID WFLN Radio
Philadelphia Wards 
 Ward 	
Ward argues these IRUs are felicitous because the armed proposition is doubtful or contrary
to expectation Horn  points out that the surprise condition is not necessary since 
 is
perfectly felicitous

 Its unfortunate that its cloudy in San Francisco this week but CLOUDY IT IS " so we
might as well go listen to the LSA papers
Since everyone knows what San Francisco weather is like there can be nothing surprising or unex
pected about this weather report
Horn proposes replacing Wards surprising or unexpected condition with a constraint of rhetor 
ical contrast noting that whenever the armed clause can be introduced by but armation
is possible Furthermore the basis for contrast can be an opposition in argument structure This
class of IRUs and Horns analysis will be discussed in more detail in section 
Schirin also notes that the cue word but often cooccurs with IRUs She presents a schemata for
the use of but with IRUs Schirin  Schirin  formulated as
  Schirins schemata for IRUs with but
Ralph Weischedel pc 
 points out that the use of repetition in classic poetry depends on the way the
context changes throughout the poem so that the same line repeated in multiple stanzas is interpreted di erently
each time it is said
Cases where the armed proposition is entailed by the context are a subset of all cases of preposed VPs discussed
in Ward 	 Ward 

 information X disclaimer of X but INFORMATION X
 information X information Y but INFORMATION X
Note that I have used my notation of italics for the antecedent of an IRU and uppercase for the
IRU in Schirins schemas The only constraint on information Y in schema  is that it be related
information Example  illustrates schema  with the clause Were not the one to judge as a
disclaimer
 Debby Would you say this is a friendly block
Jack Fairly friendly Wouldnt you say
Were a bit prejudiced I think Ah because uh weve been here so long that we dont even
remember the original groups that were here
So were bad to judge
Were not the one to judge
But I WOULD SAY FAIRLY FAIRLY FRIENDLY
Example  illustrates the second schema According to Schirin the IRU in  is simply related
information However while  isnt a disclaimer of the speaker since disclaimers are always a type
of related information it is similar to one in reecting the speakers reasoning about the truth of
the proposition asserted The IRU in  is armed in the face of this related information
  See this one right here
 Hes smart
 He himself dont think hes smart
 but HES SMART
 He came in rst in plumbing

 out of a hundred thirty  ve
 He was the only Jewish kid
 HE CAME IN FIRST
The IRU shown in  belongs to a class that Schirin identi es as intensi ers The intensifying
eect of  is because  emphasizes the uniqueness of coming in  rst This example will also
be discussed in section 

 IRUs have a Social Purpose
Tannen  analyzes repetition in casual dinner table conversation and emphasizes that IRUs
can be used for social reasons she argues that the overlapping or closely sequential repetition
of part or all of others utterances is used to maintain participation in conversation This use of
IRUs may be one that is peculiar to the discourse situation that Tannen studied however it is also
possible that the general function of Attitude IRUs demonstrating that a belief is mutual would
also explain this participatory function A cognitive function of IRUs could be conventionalized
so that whereas the IRU may reduce uncertainty about mutuality in one situation the same
utterance in another situation can function to rearm the mutuality of a belief and thus achieve a
social purpose
 IRUs can increase Reliability in Communication
In Finin Webber and Joshis 
 work on advicegiving they note that paraphrase is used
in conversation for three reasons all of which are related to reliable communication First if
the hearer notices an ambiguity or vagueness in the speakers utterance the hearer can produce
multiple paraphrases of the utterance each corresponding to and highlighting a dierent alternative
Second even without noticing an ambiguity or vagueness the listener may attempt to paraphrase
the speakers utterance to show how it has been understood looking for con rmation or correction
from the speaker Finally the hearer may paraphrase the speakers utterance in order to con rm
his or her belief that there is a common understanding between them
In the  rst case I would expect the paraphrase to be produced with a phrase  nal rise while the
second and third cases are examples of Attitude IRUs Note that without prosodic marking the
second and third alternatives may be indistinguishable from the point of view of the speaker
Clark and Schaefer also present a theory of dialogue in which repetition and paraphrase provide
positive evidence of understandingClark and Schaefer  Clark and Schaefer  Brennan
	 According to their account there are  ve types of evidence of understanding
  continued attention eg via gaze
  implicit acceptance ie going on with next turn
  acknowledgements such as ok uh huh
  repeat of all or part of what the other said
  paraphrase demonstrate what you understood

The repetitions and paraphrases that Clark and Schaefer discuss are treated as Attitude IRUs here
and the analysis presented in chapter 
 draws on their analysis Heritage and Watson  also
analyze a class of utterances they call reformulations which are in some cases informationally
redundant Their analysis is that these utterances are the participants way of demonstrating to
one another what it is they think they are doing and their level of understanding of the evolving
conversation 
Both of these analyses is consistent with the analysis of Attitude IRUs presented here The need
for participants to demonstrate to one another what they are doing follows from the fact that
conversants are not omniscient are autonomous and cannot read one anothers minds so whether in
fact beliefs are shared is a problem that must be managed among the conversants By demonstrating
their view of what is going on in the conversation conversants facilitate the coordination of their
discourse models
	 IRUs can be used for Irony
Sperber and Wilson present an analysis of IRUs that are used ironically based on the distinction
between the use of a proposition and its mention Sperber and Wilson  This is based on
the standard usemention distinction between talking about the entity denoted by a string in the
language use and talking about the string itself mention In SWs analysis a proposition is
used when it is asserted and it is mentioned whenever the speaker utters it but does not assert
it This distinction is the basis of their analysis of irony as a type of echoic mention It seems
that the basis of this analysis is that speakers can predicate an attitude toward a proposition P
by saying an utterance that realizes P in a certain way in a context in which other interpretations
simpler interpretations of the utterance are not felicitous This function is distinct from that of
IRUs discussed here since none of the IRUs in my corpus are used ironically

 IRUs manage Interaction
Whittaker and Stenton argued that utterances with no new information function at the level of
control of initiative in advisory dialogues Whittaker and Stenton  On their account
prompts adjacent repetitions paraphrases and summaries can all be analyzed as utterances in
which a speaker indicates that she does not wish to maintain the initiative in a mixedinitiative
dialogue In some cases eg adjacent repetitions this leaves the current speaker in control while
in other cases eg end of segment summaries these utterances result in the current initiator
	
abdicating initiative and thus closing the current discourse segment Walker and Whittaker ana
lyzed a range of dialogue types using WSs framework and investigate the relationship between
control and other indicators of discourse structure such as the distribution of anaphora Walker
and Whittaker 	 WW show that IRUs correlate strongly with other indicators of discourse
structure The theory of the function of both Attitude and Attention IRUs presented here draws
on and expands these analyses
 Tautologies and Prompts
The Gricean account of tautology is that tautologies get their communicative import from the ob
vious outing of the Quantity maxim Do not make your utterance less informative than is required
Grice 
 Levinson  Since this requires speakers to be informative some informative
inference must be made to preserve the assumption that the speaker is cooperating Thus in the
case of a Levinson suggests that the inference might be that in b
 a War is war
b Terrible things always happen in war Thats its nature and its no good lamenting that
particular disaster
An important factor in the interpretation of tautologies is that the subject matter of the tautology
must already be up for discussion Consider 	
	 She will either come or she wont
This makes sense only if the participants are currently discussing whether she will come Levinson
suggests that a more general interpretation for most tautologies is that there is nothing more to be
said about the topic This can arise as a natural inference because anybody who says 	 clearly
doesnt know whether or not she will come so no more information can possibly be forthcoming
The nothing more to be said function of tautologies is similar to the close segment IRUs described
in Whittaker and Stenton  to be discussed in chapter  However it is not clear without
access to a number of naturallyoccurring tautologous utterances in their context of utterance
whether in fact tautologies have a conventional use of closing a segment This must be left to
future work
Ward and Hirschberg  provide an account in which the meaning of a tautology is derived
as a denial of the truth or relevance of alternative predications that a speaker might have made

of an entity  WH suggest that these denied alternatives B will often be readily available in
the discourse context at the point where the tautology is said For example  is an equative
tautology schematically characterized as a is a The speakers uttering the equative tautology is
interpreted in the light of a set of alternative utterances de ned as a is b or some a are b for a b 
B None of the IRUs studied here seem at all similar to this denial function
Another type of informationally redundant utterance are prompts such as uh huh which add
no new propositional content to the common ground Like tautologies prompts dont have an
antecedent in the dialogue no matter what has been said previously a prompt can add no new
information These are said to be continuers ie they indicate a choice by the speaker to pass
up a turn while prompting the current speaker to continue talking Scheglo  and they
share a number of properties with Attitude IRUs as to their function in dialogue Whittaker and
Stenton  Walker and Whittaker 	 Hockey  This shared function has been noted
by classi cations in which adjacent repetitions are analyzed as backchannels eg the utterance of
take the money in example  Also like tautologies and closesegment IRUs a prompt adjacent
to another prompt can function as a coordinated closing of a segment Scheglo and Sacks 
The commonality between prompts and Attitude IRUs will be briey discussed in section 

 Summary
This chapter has reviewed previous arguments as to the discourse functions of IRUs While none
of the previous work has focused on the relationship of IRUs to resourcebounds many of the
discourse functions of IRUs have previously been noted The following chapters will extend and
elaborate on these discourse functions and argue that they are related to resource limitations

Chapter 
Limited Attention and Limited
Reasoning
  Introduction
In chapter  I introduced the hypotheses that Attention IRUs are the result of agents limited
attentional capacity that Consequence IRUs are the result of agents limited inferential capacity
and that Attitude IRUs reect the process of coordinating the conversants discourse models given
these limitations
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the analysis of IRUs in the following chapters
The framework is based on an architecture for resourcelimited reasoning Bratman Israel and Pol
lack  a model of belief revision Gardenfors  Harman 
 Galliers 	 Gardenfors
	 and a model of limited attention Landauer  The point of the dierent components
of this framework is to model agents as having the resource limitations related to IRUs limited
attention and limited inference Within this resourcelimited model the cognitive function of IRUs
can be demonstrated
First section  presents the model of limited attentionworking memory The limited attention
model operationalizes the concept of salient information and provides the basis for the function of
both Attention IRUs and some types of Consequence IRUs The model of belief revision presented
in section  represents the dierent kinds of hearer old information needed to support the
analysis of Attitude and Consequence IRUs Both of these components will be integrated into the
IRMA architecture presented in section 

 Limited Attention
Chapter  discussed the distinction between the information that is hearer old known and in
formation that is salient The important distinctions in hearer old information are represented by
the model of belief presented in section  This section describes a model of discourse salience
used as the basis for StructP the structure of propositions in the discourse model I leave open
the question of whether StructP is de ned by the same constraints as StructD the structure of
accessible discourse entities for anaphora resolution and domains of quanti cation
One reason that it is important to have a model of discourse salience is because this thesis argues
for the discourse inference constraint repeated here from chapter 
discourse inference constraint Inferences in dialogue are derived from proposi
tions that are currently discourse salient in working memory  
The idea that some beliefs are more salient than others is well supported in the literature It is well
known that human agents have limited attentional capacity Anderson and Bower  Miller

 Landauer  Furthermore several previous computational accounts of reasoning and
inference have proposed that only a subset of beliefs is used in reasoning at any one time Joshi
 Webber and Joshi  Joshi Webber and Weischedel  Fagin and Halpern 
The role of this subset of beliefs is a reduction in computation that results from reasoning over a
smaller set of facts
The attentional limit on inference plays a crucial role in explaining a pernicious problem in com
putational models of reasoning It is well known that human agents are not logically omniscient
but which factors determine a restricted set of inferences is still an open question The proposal
that inference is restricted by limited attention makes intuitive sense and is supported by empirical
results Kintsch 
However the observation that attentional capacity is limited doesnt provide us with an opera
tionalization of what exactly the limits are and how beliefs become salient and lose their salience
Therefore in order to test the hypothesized discourse inference constraint without solv
ing this dicult open issue section  proposes a simple model of limited attentionworking
memory AWM Attentional capacity can be parameterized in this model thus supporting testing
hypotheses about the eects of dierent limits
 The distributional analysis of Consequence IRUs presented in chapter 	 will provide support for the claimed
relationship between salience and inference
It may also be related to results on the complexity of epistemic reasoning namely that operators that pull
together two facts from memory and juxtapose them via andintroduction or orintroduction rules increase the
complexity of the underlying model Vardi 	

  Landauers Attention Working Memory Model
The attentionworking memory model AWM is a very simple model adapted from Landauers
garbage can model Landauer  In this model AWM consists of a three dimensional space
in which propositions are stored in chronological sequence according to the location of a moving
memory pointer Storage of propositions depends on the chronology of events in the world and
propositions that are encountered multiple times are stored multiple times Retrieval processes
start from the current location of the moving memory pointer and search through memory in a
spreading search pattern with the eect that items stored more recently are found with less search
Landauer suggests that a garbage can is a useful metaphor because items are stored there in
chronological sequence with the eect that coee grounds and orange peels may be found near
one another simply because they are eaten together at breakfast The details of the storage and
retrieval operations will be discussed in the following sections
While the AWM model is extremely simple Landauer showed that it could be parameterized to  t
many empirical results on human memory and learning Hellyer 
 Landauer 
 Old eld
and Wing eld 
 Collins and Quillian 
 Sternberg 
 Tulving 
 Anderson and
Bower  A key aspect of the model for studying IRUs is that it incorporates both recency
and frequency eects The multiple copy aspect means that the model predicts the spacedpractice
memory eect the frequency of rehearsal of a fact improves the subjects ability to recall it This
prediction is one of the reasons that the model is attractive for studying the eects of IRUs
Sections  and  discuss the details of the storage and retrieval operations Section 

will compare AWM with more sophisticated models of Attention in discourse The relation of the
discourse inference constraint to other theories of discourse will be discussed in section 

   Storing Beliefs in AWM
The sequence of memory loci used for storage constitutes a random walk through memory with
each loci a short distance from the previous one This is depicted in  gure  The current memory
pointer is the memory location at the end of the path shown in the  gure Thus propositions which
tend to cooccur in events in the world will also tend to be stored near one another in memory but
the selection of the exact memory location is stochastic If items are encountered multiple times
they are stored multiple times Memory is also wraparound as shown by the path of the pointer
in the  gure
Additional assumptions not made speci c in Landauers original model are that propositions are
stored rather than s and 	s and that there is no overwriting If the path of the memory pointer

Figure  Memory Structure Three Dimensional Store Random Storage
retraces its steps so that the current memory loci already has something stored in it the new item is
simply added Thus memory capacity is unbounded and it is possible for two completely unrelated
items to become associated accidentally by virtue of being stored in the same loci
  Retrieving Beliefs in AWM
When an agent retrieves items from memory search starts from the current pointer location and
spreads out in a spherical fashion See  gure  Search is restricted to a particular search radius
radius is de ned in Hamming distance For example if the current memory pointer loci is 	 	 	
the loci distance  away would be 	  	 	  	 	 	  	 	   	 	  	 	 This limit on the
radius de nes the capacity of attentionworking memory Since memory is wraparound searches
that start near the edge of memory also wraparound as shown in the  gure Because search
starts from the current pointer location items that have been stored most recently are more likely
to be retrieved predicting recency eects Because items that are stored in multiple locations are
more likely to be retrieved the model predicts frequency eects Landauer 
In addition in the version of AWM developed here search can be exhaustive within a radius value
or agents can abort a search as soon as a relevant belief is found Whether search is exhaustive
or not depends on the agents goal at the time of searching memory and the concomitant memory
retrieval pattern One of the parameters that can be measured is the number of memory loci
searched during a particular retrieval or over the course of performing a task
The actual locations are calculated modulo the memory size


Figure  Searching Memory Spreading Search for a Fixed Radius
The point of an explicit model for AWM is to provide an operationalization of discourse salience
Various assumptions about discourse salience can be tested by varying the radius of the search
sphere The radius of the search sphere is the main parameter for the agents resourcebound on
attentional capacity This is a fundamental parameter that is varied in the DesignWorld simulation
environment to be discussed in section  Note that the model is simple in that recency is the
primary determinant of salient Other models of attention in discourse will be discussed in section


  Example of Retrieval in AWM
Figure  illustrates a simple example of the model in operation Note that three dimensions are
collapsed onto two dimensions in the  gure Lets say that propositions PQRSTUVWXYZ
are stored in sequence in memory The storage locations for a particular run are in sequence 
   
      
   
  	   	  	 	     	  
	    Note that each memory loci is within Hamming distance  of the previous two city
blocks At the end of this sequence of storage operations the agents memory pointer is   
A retrieval always starts from the current memory pointer location If AWM radius is set to  the
propositions retrieved are Z Y If AWM radius is set to  the propositions retrieved are Z Y S Q X
W R At AWM radius of  all of the propositions are retrieved However of course since the model
is stochastic this pattern can vary from one run to another On another run at AWM radius of 
only propositions W X Y Z were retrieved

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Figure  Example of Searching Memory Spreading Search for a Varying Radii
  Storing Beliefs as a Result of Cognition
As a departure from Landauers original formulation the version of AWM here treats cognitive
events in which propositions are retrieved and reasoned about as though they were events in the
world Propositions retrieved and reorganized by reasoning are restored in memory at the current
memory pointer location Thus retrieval and reasoning locally reorganizes propositions in memory
Using the garbage can metaphor allowing retrieval and reasoning to restore propositions is anal
ogous to going through the garbage can with a speci c search criteria copying items and putting
them back in the can at the top Allowing this additional way of organizing and storing items in
memory provides a plausible explanation for associative links in memory Anderson and Bower
 Collins and Quillian 

 Summary
This section has presented the AWM model of attention and working memory AWM is a simple
model that  ts a range of empirical results on memory and learning The motivations for AWM
are
 AWM operationalizes the notion of discourse salience
 AWM is parameterizable so that the degree to which attentional capacity is limited can be
varied

 AWM demonstrates frequency eects Because the bene ts of rehearsal in learning are well
known it is necessary to see whether some of the bene ts of redundancy are rehearsal bene ts
 AWMs storage and retrieval model is exible enough to support the development and testing
of additional memory related strategies
 AWM is implementable
Section 
 will compare AWM with other views of attention in discourse In section  I will
discuss in more detail the relationship between the representation of beliefs and AWM Then in
section  once the DesignWorld simulation domain has been described in enough detail I will
show that the AWM model produces a main eect for attention limitations in DesignWorld This
model will support testing the eects of dierent communication strategies
 Belief and Intention Deliberation
Deliberation is the process by which an agent explicitly or implicitly evaluates a set of alternates
in order to decide what to believe and what course of action to pursue Doyle 
There are two deliberation relations support andwarrant The support relation holds between
two beliefs when believing one is a reason for believing the other this relationship can hold at
various endorsement levels to be discussed below The warrant relation holds between a belief
and intention when the belief is a reason for adopting or having the intention eg the belief that
you will make a ! pro t may provide a warrant for an intention to purchase Hewlett Packard
stock These relations are dependent on the right kind of implication entailment or utility relation
holding or being plausible in the domain The use of these relations in what follows is reected in
the following coherence assumption
  coherence assumption Beliefs and intentions that are subject to deliberation are evalu
ated for their coherence with other beliefs via the relations of support and warrant
Agents deliberate about whether as well as how to revise their beliefs and intentions as they
receive new information this is the attitude assumption Galliers a Walker a
  attitude Agents deliberate whether to accept or reject an assertion or proposal made
by another agent in discourse
Evaluation functions utilities for beliefs have a di erent basis than those for intentions
The support relation might be an abstraction of the two RST presentational relations of evidence and justify
The warrant relation might be an abstraction of the two RST relations of motivation and concession See Hobbs
 Mann and Thompson 	 Moore and Paris 	 for more detailed sets of relations

Thus communication is a strategic process aimed at getting other agents to revise their beliefs
Empirical analyses of dialogue informs an account of deliberation because dialogue provides an
explicit protocol of which facts agents believe will aect the acceptance or rejection of an
assertion or proposal An analysis of IRUs in problemsolving dialogues shows that the process
of deliberating about beliefs depends on the type of evidence supporting a belief and that one
of the primary functions of IRUs is to upgrade the strength of the evidence supporting beliefs
Walker and Whittaker 	 Walker b The process of deliberating about intentions also
depends on evidence supporting beliefs that the intention is based on which can contribute to
a perception of risk However there is an additional independent factor that contributes to
deliberating about intentions the utility of the resulting course of action Pollack 	 IRUs
function communicatively to support both deliberative processes
Section  will discuss intention deliberation and section  discussed belief deliberation
  Intention Deliberation
The general rule for intention deliberation is that if one course of action A produces greater
benets than another course of action B pursue A over B Thus intention deliberation relies on
way to evaluate dierent courses of action A theory of intention deliberation should predict when
an agent will reject a proposal made by another agent in discourse
Decision theory is the most widely used theory of how agents evaluate alternate courses of action
and is operationalized through probability and the notion of expected utility The key tenets of
decision theory are that  all possible outcomes are available to be evaluated  a single evaluation
function can be applied to these outcomes and  agents use the results of the evaluation function
to select the best course of action
The problems with this formulation are that agents may not know what all the possible outcomes
are it may be dicult to estimate the probability of the dierent outcomes there may be incom
patible competing evaluation functions and the agent may not have the resources to evaluate all
the possibilities How agents should choose a course of action given these problems is an active area
of research Bratman Israel and Pollack  Pollack and Ringuette 	 Dean and Boddy

The analysis of dialogue presented in the following chapters contributes to a theory of intention
deliberation by providing a protocol of factors considered in deliberating intentions The class of
Deliberation IRUs dicussed in section  show that IRUs are often used to support deliberating
about intentions and beliefs The class of Armation IRUs discussed in section  provide evidence
	
that agents take many types of information into account when deliberating that there are multiple
competing evaluation functions and thus many dierent types of warrants Thus the analysis
contributes to a theory of intention deliberation and supports a simple constraint on intention
deliberation the discourse inference constraint This constraint posits that deliberation is
constrained by an agents attentional capacity
DesignWorld will test the discourse inference constraint and its eect on deliberation The
DesignWorld task simpli es the problem of multiple competing evaluation functions by associating
scores with each course of action so that propositions about scores provide the warrants for
actions
 Belief Deliberation
The account of belief revision used here relies on four assumptions from current theories of belief
revision
  There are three Attitudes with which beliefs can be held Accepted Rejected or Indetermined
  Agents reason autonomously about whether to accept or reject incoming information This
is the acceptance assumption
  Decisions abut acceptance or rejection depends on evaluating sets of beliefs according to a
measure of coherence
  Coherence of belief sets is determined by relationships among supporting beliefs Types of
support are reected in endorsements on supporting beliefs Endorsements are based on
source or hearerold information type
These assumptions are supported by current theories of belief revision In particular the  rst three
are part of Gardenfors theory of Epistemic Entrenchment and the last three are part of Galliers
theory of Autonomous Belief Revision ABR Harman 
 Gardenfors  Gardenfors 	
Galliers 	 Galliers b Galliers a Cawsey et al 
The general process of reasoning about beliefs involves the expansion contraction or revision
of an existing belief set For example imagine that an agent A is entertaining a belief that P A
may decide either to accept or reject P expansion of As beliefs occurs when P is simply added to
As belief database contraction occurs when A decides that he no longer believes  P revision
This perspective focuses on agents attitudes towards beliefs rather than whether the belief is true or false in a
model

is the process of  rst contracting a belief set and then expanding it say for instance if P implies
Q and A accepts that P A must  rst contract his beliefs by  Q and then expand his beliefs by P
and Q
Typically there is more than one way that a set of beliefs can be revised Consider a simple example
suppose you believe P  Q where P is it is raining and Q is Oscar wears a hat In addition you
believe that  P R where R is Oscar might wear a hat If you believe it is raining then you will
come to believe that Oscar is wearing a hat However suppose now that you see Oscar and he is
not wearing a hat Imagine that no other beliefs are related to these Clearly in order to maintain
consistency in your beliefs you must either give up the belief that P or give up the belief that P
 Q What is required is a way of choosing among alternate revisions 
Galliers argues that the endorsement on a belief is a factor that determines its corrigibility ie
how easily it will be given up in a contraction This is supported by the use of IRUs in the corpus
For example perhaps P is strongly believed because it has been asserted by a number of other
agents and P  Q was inferred by default inference Then it will be easier to give up the belief in
P  Q than to give up the belief that P
Endorsement types are discussed in section  Section  discusses how the endorsements
on premises aect the endorsements on beliefs derived from those premises Deliberation must also
take discourse salience into account This will be discussed in section  where a simple model
of evaluation of belief sets is proposed based on these factors
  Endorsements
In Galliers theory endorsements reect both the source of belief and agents preference about
what they want to believe The general idea is that beliefs are tagged with an endorsement type
when they are  rst formed and stored in memory and that these endorsements contribute to the
degree to which a belief is epistemically entrenched ie endorsements provide a qualitative way of
distinguishing between beliefs that are defeasible and those that an agent would rarely change The
types of endorsements used in this thesis are based on the logical types of propositions in discourse
identi ed in chapters  and  and motivated by the distinctions necessary to explain the function
of IRUs These are
Gardenfors proposes that choices among alternate revisions are constrained by a set of logical consistency pos
tulates and an ordering on beliefs   called epistemic entrenchment A   B should be read as B is at least as
epistemically entrenched as A Epistemic entrenchment is meant to reect how easy a belief is to give up and beliefs
that are more epistemically entrenched are harder to give up Gardenfors shows that the postulates and the ordering
provide a way of choosing among alternate revisions and that the ordering also provides desirable properties of a
theory of belief such as being able to say that one belief is a reason for believing another however he leaves open the
question of which factors determine the degree to which a belief is epistemically entrenched Gardenfors 

Ordering on Epistemic Endorsement Types
hypothesis  default  entailment  linguistic  absolute
The type hypothesis is the weakest possible endorsement It is used to endorse assumptions that
have no evidence supporting them at all and default is used for defeasible inferences such as
implicatures and the interactive defaults discussed in section 
 Joshi Webber and Weischedel

 Entailments and presuppositions that have not been explicitly discussed are endorsed as
entailment The type linguistic endorses assumptions that have been made explicit in the
dialogue and absolute refers to assumptions that are incontrovertible as though from divine
authority In addition the same assumption can have multiple endorsements it may be both
entailed by what has been said as well as said explicitly ie it has endorsements of both types
entailment and linguistic
The role of the ordering on the types of endorsements reects the relative defeasibility or corrigibil
ity of dierent assumptions an assumption endorsed as a default may be defeated by linguistic
information For example suppose that the belief is that Madison can swim This is based on
two assumptions  Madison is a dog  Dogs can swim Lets say assumption  is something
that an agent can see with his own eyes so it might be strongly endorsed eg absolute In
the absence of other evidence the agent makes a default inference about dogs and their ability to
swim Assumption  is thus endorsed as a default Since  is only a default it can be easily
defeated If Madisons owner comes along and tells the agent that Madison cant swim they are
likely to abandon their belief that Madison can swim ie the belief that Madison can swim is
defeated
Endorsements on assumptions can also be upgraded and thereby made less defeasible For instance
Madisons owner might come along and tell the agent that Madison is a very good swimmer The
belief that Madison can swim now has an endorsement type of linguistic
 Combining Endorsements
An open issue is the speci cation of how to combine the endorsements on assumptions In other
words if I believe P and P  Q what is the endorsement on Q It seems that this should depend
on the endorsements on P and P  Q In previous work Walker b I adopt a simplifying
rule that a chain of reasoning is only as strong as its weakest link
Endorsement types have also been called bases for belief in Lewis  Schi er 
 Clark and Marshall
	 See also the ranking on hearer old information proposed in Prince 	b Clark and Marshall 	 and
a larger set of endorsement types proposed in Galliers b Cawsey et al 


weakest link rule The endorsement of a belief P depending on a set of underlying
assumptions ai    an is MINendorsement ai    an
This weakest link rule seems intuitively plausible and means that the endorsement of a belief
depends on the endorsements of the underlying assumptions It also means that for all inference
rules that depend on multiple assumptions the endorsement of an inferred belief is the weakest of
the supporting beliefs Since the inference rule itself is one of the supporting beliefs and it has an
associated endorsement this means that some kinds of inferences such as implicatures cannot be
believed as more than defaults no matter how strong the endorsements are on the assumptions
 Evaluating Coherence of Sets of Beliefs
We now have a way of comparing two beliefs and predicting which will be given up in revision
However the idea is that sets of beliefs are evaluated for their coherence with one another rather
than individual beliefs
Galliers addresses this problem by de ning a way of evaluating alternate belief states Belief sets are
evaluated by comparing the coherence of the sets using an ordering of more coherent ie belief
state A is preferred to belief state B if A is more coherent than B Galliers a Galliers
de nes the more coherent relation with a three tiered system which depends on an additional
construct of core beliefs and a combination of deduction and endorsements on beliefs Agents
prefer belief states that support their core beliefs The problem with Galliers de nition of the
more coherent relation is that it depends on checking derivations for core beliefs over complete
belief sets This method is psychologically implausible given the AWM model of limited attention
A solution is to assume that evaluation only operates on salient beliefs so that the discourse
inference constraint constrains both revision and reasoning Solomon  This means that
at any one time belief sets consisting of only a small number of beliefs are compared and thus
belief sets are evaluated by a simple technique of counting how many beliefs are more strongly
supported Galliers 	 This formulation predicts that agents may allow their beliefs to be
globally inconsistent but once these inconsistencies are pointed out they will attempt to revise
their beliefs so as to make them locally coherent
Attitude IRUs provide evidence that default  linguistic and entailment  linguistic as an endorse
ment on mutuality Armation IRUs show what types of beliefs can argue against another belief
Along with other information about inconsistency such as that used by Gardenfors postulates Gardenfors
		

Armation IRUs also show that agents take care to defeat conicting defaults and that repetition
may be used to demonstrate strength of belief or speaker commitment
A problem for the treatment of Consequence IRUs is that both Galliers and Gardenfors models
are based on the assumption that belief sets are closed under logical consequence As discussed in
chapter  theories that make this assumption must be augmented with additional distinctions to
explain the function of utterances which make inferences explicit This can be done by assuming
that there is a dierence between implicit and explicit beliefs Levesque  and that agents
are only aware of their explicit beliefs Thus while epistemic states may be idealized to be closed
under consequence agents reasoning and belief revision processes operate on explicit beliefs
 Belief Deliberation in AWM
The mechanisms proposed above of tagging beliefs with endorsements and the proposed storage
and retrieval mechanisms of AWM has two theoretical rami cations
  principle of positive undermining Harman 
 It has been shown that beliefs persist
when their supports are degraded Harman 
 Tversky and Kahneman  Ross and
Anderson  Galliers 	 By positing a loose association between beliefs and their
supports the AWM model predicts that beliefs can be retained even when their supports are
degraded
  principle of associated support Agents can perceive that they believe a proposition
with various strengths without having access to the reasons why they believe it This is
because the weakest link rule associates a belief with an endorsement at the time the belief
is formed This means that the endorsement on a belief is available even if the supporting
beliefs are not explicitly available
The principle of positive undermining was proposed by Harman 
 to account for data presented
in Tversky and Kahneman  and Ross and Anderson  The principle of associated
support is proposed here as a desirable side eect of the proposed mechanism
In addition the AWM model makes certain predictions The storage and retrieval operations
for AWM means that some of the beliefs that were causal in forming a belief will be retrieved
along with the belief because they were stored in memory at around the same time In addition
sometimes agents can forget that they have changed their beliefs so that deliberation is aected
by the frequency and recency of a belief A belief stored in multiple locations is more likely to be
retrieved and thus available for deliberation A belief that was stored recently is also more likely

to be retrieved and used in deliberation This shows that the formation of beliefs and intentions is
connected with the processes of manipulating attentional state via memory storage and retrieval
The algorithm that agents use for deliberating about beliefs is
 Consider the set of salient beliefs currently in AWM Each salient belief has an endorsement
 If the set of salient beliefs are inconsistent or incompatible then generate alternate belief
states as compatible sets of beliefs
 Evaluate alternate belief states by counting which state has the most strongly supported
beliefs
 Store the results of deliberation at the current memory pointer locus
 Mutual Supposition
Sections  and  examined the cognitive processes of attention and belief deliberation internal
to agents This section examines how these internal processes aect how agents coordinate in
dialogue and how they decide what is mutually believed While it was convenient to talk about a
single discourse model in section  in reality each conversant has hisher own discourse model
Certain conversational processes are aimed at keeping the two models coordinated Thus it is clear
that what has been called shared knowledge common knowledge and mutual belief
is more accurately described as an individual speakers tacit assumptions Prince  or as
mutual absence of doubt Nadathur and Joshi  Joshi  The mutual supposition
account of mutual belief presented here models this absence of doubt quality by representing the
conversants assumptions about mutuality as defeasible depending on the evidence provided by
the other conversants in dialogue By building on the theory of belief revision discussed in section
 beliefs about mutual beliefs can be revised as the discourse proceeds
 Shared Environment Model of Mutual Supposition
The common ground is a set of mutually supposed propositions assumed to be shared between
conversants in discourse based on a number of shared assumptions about conventions of language
and shared background Lewis 
 Stalnaker  Thomason 	 This is modeled by an
explicit schema proposed by Lewis called the shared environment model of common knowledge
Lewis 
 Clark and Marshall  Barwise a What Lewis called common knowledge


will be called mutual supposition here reecting the defeasible and uncertain nature of what is
assumed to be mutual
Because conversants dont have access to the mental states of other conversants mutual supposi
tion must be inferred based on externalized behavior of various kinds The inference of mutual
supposition can be inferred using the mutual supposition induction schema henceforth MSIS
Shared Environment Mutual Supposition Induction Schema MSIS
It is mutually supposed in a population P that # if and only if some situation S holds
such that
 Everyone in P has reason to believe that S holds
 S indicates to everyone in P that everyone in P has reason to believe that S holds
 S indicates to everyone in P that #
The situation S of the MSIS is the discourse situation as de ned in section  If each of the three
conditions given in the MSIS is satis ed then the conversants are justi ed in inferring that a fact
# is mutually supposed Condition  speci es that a public utterance event must be accessible
to all of the discourse participants Conditions  and  state that what is mutually supposed is
derivable from the fact that all participants have access to this public event In other words what
is believed to be mutually accepted is the set of mutual suppositions indicated by the occurrence
of a sequence of utterance events in a discourse situation S
This account of mutual supposition is a weak model of what has previously been called mutual
belief or common knowledge Halpern and Moses  Lewis 
 Schier  Parikh 	
Barwise a McCarthy et al  Fagin and Halpern  Vardi  The mutual
supposition induction schema MSIS allows agents to infer mutual supposition in a  nite
amount of time using the  nite decision procedure of checking three conditions rather than an
in nite list of statements of the form A believes B believes A believes and B believes A
believes B believes 
This  nite decision procedure of checking the three conditions in the MSIS involves some risk for
the agent in the inference of mutual supposition since what a discourse situation indicates can
vary according to assumptions about background information and reasoning processes What S
indicates depends on the participants interpretation of the utterance event and the fact that
this interpretation is mutual may be more or less endorsed Nadathur and Joshi  Fox 
One of the functions of IRUs that will be discussed below is reducing the risk by the use of
discourse strategies that  demonstrate what inferences are made  provide evidence as to

what has been mutually accepted and  make it easier for other agents to determine the relevant
reasoning context and to make inferences that follow in that context Section 
 will explain how
the indicates relation is formalized using the belief model introduced in section 
 Related Work on Belief and Attention Models

  Discourse Structure and Attentional State
The model of attentionworking memory AWM is an explicit model of limited attentional capacity
which models salience and nonsalience by the simple measure that attentional capacity is limited
and as new information comes in old information must go out In addition frequency can have an
eect on salience by making it easier to retrieve a proposition However AWM is extremely simple
it is based solely on recency and frequency eects with no additional structure
In contrast most theories of discourse assume that discourse structure is hierarchical Grosz 
Sidner  Hobbs  Polanyi and Scha  Grosz and Sidner 
 Webber 
 Web
ber  Polanyi  Mann and Thompson  In these hierarchical models sequences of
utterances aggregate into discourse segments with potential embedding among the segments The
embedding relation makes the discourse hierarchically structured
Only Grosz and Sidners GS theory proposes an explicit relationship between discourse structure
and a model of Attention In GSs theory the hierarchical structure determines a stackbased
model of attentional state The point of this section is to compare this model of attentional state
with AWM I point out ways in which AWM may be too simple as well as suggest ways that
AWM might account for phenomena that hierarchical structuring has previously explained I will
also present examples from the  nancial advice corpus that suggest that GSs model should take
recency into account
All of the discourse theories above de ne hierarchical discourse structure via embedding relations
between discourse segments Theories vary as to what determines the embedding relation what
counts as a discourse segment and thus what the embedding relation is de ned on For example
most theories agree that there are two main types of discourse relations coordinating and subor
dinating but dier as to whether these are de ned on text spans or on intentions underlying the
discourse In GSs theory the embedding is determined by the intentions of the conversants The
main intention for the whole discourse is called the discourse purpose DP and the intentions for
the subsidiary segments are called discourse segment purposes DSPs Figure  shows how a
sequence of utterances might be hierarchically structured based on the utterancelevel intentions

that they realize DSPs may be realized more or less directly by an utterance or left to be inferred
this is shown in  gure  by the fact that DSP has no corresponding single uterance In addition
multiple utterances may be required to realize a single intention DSP an example of this is the
fact that DSP is based on the aggregation of U        U Finally utterances that are sequentially
nonadjacent but are treewise adjacent may contribute to the same intention DSP such as U 
and U
 	
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Figure  A Sequence of Utterances Structured into Discourse Segments
In GSs theory the hierarchical discourse structure is reected in the attentional structure Each
intention has an associated focus space the focus space contains those entities objects properties
and relations that are salient either due to explicit mention or because they became salient in the
process of producing or comprehending utterances in the segment While GS state that attentional
state in their theory is a property of the discourse and not a property of the conversants this view of
how entities can become salient in a focus space suggests that aspects of GSs model are modeling
conversants mental states just as the AWM model is a simple model of conversants mental states
However it is important to keep in mind that GS did not intend their model to be a psychological
one
   Stack Model of Attentional State
In GSs model the recognition of intentional structure is what determines the attentional struc
ture As a discourse is processed the recognition of a subordinate intention results in pushing a
focus space onto the attentional stack each intention that contributes to some intention further up
 	This means that there is an issue with determining whether an utterance alone with its utterance level intention
counts as a DSP

the tree further down in the stack results in  rst popping all the intervening focus spaces and
then pushing a focus space for the new intention on the stack Sidner  Grosz 
Thus when the decision is made to attach U at the node just under DP as shown in  gure 
the focus space associated with DSP U  U U is popped o the stack and no longer accessible
The focus space associated with the highest level DP is at the top of the stack and the discourse
entities realized by U are part of this focus space Although U is adjacent to U the referents
and propositions realized by U and stored in the focus space for DSP are not accessible when
processing U
Similarly when U is attached under U  or more properly the intention recognized from U is
inferred to be dominated by that realized by U  the focus space on the top of the stack for DSP 
U U is popped from the stack The focus space for DSP U  is at the top of the stack and
all the discourse entities associated with that focus space are more salient than those that were just
talked about in U by virtue of being on top of the stack
As  gure  shows an utterance U can be added anywhere along the right frontier of the tree
structured intentional structure As the hearer interprets U and attempts to infer the intention
associated with it the hearer also must determine where in the discourse structure this intention
belongs While it seems that hearers may not have to determine this at once ie before they hear
the next utterance according to a hierarchical model of discourse structure they must make this
determination fairly quickly or the sequence of utterances wont make sense but see McKoon and
Ratcli  In addition because utterances may realize multiple intentions it is possible that
the same utterance  ts in multiple locations in the intentional representation Furthermore since
it is possible that StructP and StructD are not identical an utterance may be in one relation to
propositions in StructP and in another relation to referents in StructD
  Approximating the Stack Model with AWM
Because of the strong eect of recency in AWM the closest approximation to the stack model of
attention is that certain utterances and the intentions inferred from them function as retrieval cues
for retrieving entities stored in the discourse model to use in the current context Thus a return to
a prior context such as that illustrated in  gure  by the relation between U and U  could be
achieved if U triggers a retrieval from memory that selects propositions and entities realized by
U  This is encapsulated in the retrieval cue hypothesis given below
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Figure  Adding a new utterance utterance intention to the Hierarchical Discourse Segment
structure  choices
 retrieval cue hypothesis the main function of an IRU is as a retrieval cue It points
back to a previous context and serves as the cue for the retrieval of a set of propositions from
that context
The retrieval cue hypothesis is formulated for IRUs but any type of utterance or the intention
directly inferred from it could function as a retrieval cue Formulating the Popping operation as
retrieval would mean that intentions can be strongly interrelated and directly aect attentional state
without losing the eects of recency and frequency attested to by many psychology experiments on
attention and working memory
The AWM model as currently formulated provides no analog of a second aspect of the Popping
operation ie that entities become no longer accessible This might be emergent from the  rst
aspect that retrieval would displace other previously salient entities In addition a plausible analog
might be that when conversing about a particular intention or topic agents continually use certain
propositions so these get continually restored in AWM If it is clear that a proposition will no longer
be needed this rehearsal process stops and the proposition quickly becomes no longer salient An
extension of the current AWM mechanism to model popping in this way along with evaluating
whether it would have the desired eect is beyond the scope of this work

  The Stack Model doesnt Limit Attention
One advantage of AWM is that there are utterances that dont  t very well with a stack model of
attentional state For example consider the two IRUs in  in the excerpt in  Here E has
been telling H about how all her money is invested and  nally poses a question in 
     E 
And I was wondering  should I continue on with the certicates or
   H Well it	s di
cult to tell because we	re so far away from any of them  but I would suggest
this  if all of these are   month certicates and I presume they are
   E Yes
   H Then I would like to see you start spreading some of that money around
   E uh hu
   H Now in addition how old are you

 discussion and advice about starting an IRA

  E uh huh and
 a H But as far as the certicates are concerned
 b I	D LIKE THEM SPREAD OUT A LITTLE BIT 
 c THEY	RE ALL  MONTH CERTIFICATES
  E Yes
  H And I don	t like putting all my eggs in one basket  and I would suspect that February
 would be a good time to put it into something that runs for  and a half years That rst one
that comes due Call me on the others as they come due 
Note that all of abc are part of Hs turn Here the relation of the IRUs in  to the structure
of the previous discourse is similar to that of utterance U in  gure  which is related to the
intention topic of U  In  gure  the intervening material that was discussed was in U and
U in excerpt  the intervening material started with  and extended to 
In GSs stack mechanism the utterance of but as far as the certicates are concerned could have
the eect that intervening focus spaces would be popped so that the focus space representation
of the previous segment from  to  would be on the top of the stack after a Grosz
 Sidner  It would seem that the propositions realized by the IRUs should be salient
since they are on the top of the stack But then it is dicult to see why they would be said again
in the current segment
However if as in AWM the propositions from the previous segment must be retrieved then the
IRUs can function to save the hearer the retrieval time Furthermore if all the propositions from
the previous segment arent relevant in the current segment then the IRUs select only what is
relevant

Example  shows that the stack model makes some nonintuitive predictions about how attentional
state changes as a result of embedded segments In addition consider 
  C Ok harry Im have a problem that uh my  with todays economy my daughter is
working
 H I missed your name

 C Hank
 H Go ahead hank
 C as well as her uh husband
They have a child
and they bring the child to us every day for babysitting

H interrupts Cs narrative at  but in  C continues as though  had just been said 
contains both an anaphoric referent and an anaphoric property and realizes the proposition My
daughters husband is working as well The interpretation of the proforms in  depends on the
recoverability of  In a hierarchical model of discourse this is explained by positing that 
       is an embedded segment and presumably then the utterance of  closes the embedded
segment and pops it o the stack When  is interpreted the focus space with the representation
of  is at the top of the stack and supports the interpretation of the proforms
We might expect then that continuations of this kind are possible over any embedded segment
However consider the following invented variation on 
  C Ok Harry I have a problem that uh my  with todays economy my daughter is
working
 H I missed your name

 C Hank
H Havent you called me before
C Yes I called you last week
H Okay thats what I thought
 H Well Go ahead hank
 C As well as her uh husband
They have a child
and they bring the child to us every day for babysitting


In the variation given as   is either very hard or impossible to interpret Whether the hearer
can access the utterance before the embedded segment may depend on the number of intervening
utterances the number of intervening topics or some other factor The invented variation in  is
similar to the naturally occurring example in  which includes an IRU as 
  E Well however this is my question I am a single woman and retired I have about
	 M and Ill tell you how its broken down and perhaps you can advise me
 H How old are you Elsa
 E I am seven six alright

 H I got you
 E uh 				 in CDs 				 
 H When are they due
 E Pardon
	 H When are they due
 E Well theyre due right now every month one is due until June
 H Theyre due one a month
 E Yes sir
NOW THATS 	
Now another 	 in lowincome CDs at ! " the long term ones you know
 H When are they due 
After an interruption by H starting at  E in  tries to continue her enumeration of how
her money is invested The IRU in  summarizes the extent of the investments that E had
accounted for so far at the time of the interruption The IRU is marked with a cue word now that
indicates the beginning of a new segment in GSs theory and the following utterance also begins
a new segment Here E apparently did not feel as though she could continue her narrative without
reevoking propositions that had been said before the interruption
The stack model makes no predictions about when we might expect propositions to get reevoked
In contrast AWM is too simple it uses only a recency criterion For the purpose of exploring
IRUs AWM produces the desired results by predicting that certain limits on attention capacity
will have the eect that the speaker may want to produce an IRU to save the hearer retrieval or in
the worst case because otherwise the hearer may not retrieve the relevant proposition at all The
retrieval cue hypothesis as a way of formulating hierarchical structure in a model like AWM will
be discussed further in chapter 


 Propositional Relations and the Discourse Inference Constraint
In Hobbs and Mann and Thompsons theories of discourse structure each utterance must be
related to the prior utterance by a coherence relation or rhetorical relation Hobbs  Mann
and Thompson  These relations can hold between the content of utterances or between the
utterances themselves eg the speakers right to make a particular assertion at this point in the
discourse In Grosz and Sidners theory each utterance must be related to the prior utterances on
the intentional level by either the generate relation that holds between actions or the support
relation that holds between beliefs
None of these accounts have noted that IRUs are frequent in contexts where the speaker intends
the hearer to infer that a particular relation holds between two propositions However much of
this previous work has claimed that certain critical inferences in discourse rely on the adjacency
of discourse segments Hobbs  Cohen  Mann and Thompson  Polanyi 
While I leave open the question of how these relations are inferred the discourse inference
constraint is similar to the segment adjacency constraint
It seems that it would be dicult to distinguish between these two accounts since what is adjacent
is certainly salient However the accounts do make dierent predictions because adjacent discourse
segments are de ned on the hierarchical structure of a discourse For example in  gure  U  and
U are adjacent This means that two utterances that are not be sequentially adjacent they may be
adjacent at some level in the hierarchical structure and the inference of coherence relations could
occur at this level The AWM model used here would not allow these inferences to arise unless the
propositions realized by the utterances themselves were salient at the same time In addition the
inferences that arise from IRUs in the corpus are all cases of immediate juxtaposition and dont
depend on hierarchical structure Furthermore recent experiments by McKoon and Ratcli also
suggest that inferences between distal parts of a text are not automatically derived McKoon and
Ratcli 
 Summary
Chapter  provides the theoretical framework used throughout the rest of the thesis Section 
introduces a model of limited Attention called AWM AttentionWorking Memory The purpose
of AWM is to model the posited resource bound of attention and thus provide the functional basis
for Attention IRUs
Because AWM is so simple the question arises as to whether it can model Attentional State in

discourse Most discourse theories assume that discourse is hierarchically structured and Grosz and
Sidner have proposed a model of Attentional State in discourse that is parasitic on this hierarchical
structure Section 
 compares the AWM model with GSs stack model and suggests a simple
reformulation of it in terms of AWM so that it is more psychologically plausible
Section  briey reviews accounts of belief deliberation and explains the theory underlying the
Attitudes of acceptance and rejection The theory of belief deliberation is dependent on the
model of limited attention because only salient explicit beliefs are subject to belief revision and to
reasoning in general Following Galliers I propose that the corrigibity of a belief is dependent on
the endorsements on the belief and it supporting beliefs I introduce a set of endorsement types
needed to explain the types of beliefs that occur in the corpus and show how these can be used to
predict preferred belief states
These endorsement types are then used as part of the explanation of how agents infer whether
another agent accepts a belief The basis for the account of these inferences of acceptance is
Lewiss theory of common knowledge presented in section  as a theory of mutual supposition
The dierent endorsement types reect the fact that inferences about what other agents accept
are defeasible and can be more or less supported by evidence in the discourse situation Prince
 Nadathur and Joshi  The account of mutual supposition will be used in chapter 
 as
part of a theory of the function of Attitude IRUs


Chapter 
Empirical Method  Distributional
Analysis
  Introduction
In chapter  I proposed that IRUs have three general functions
  Attitude to provide evidence supporting beliefs about mutual understanding and acceptance
  Attention to manipulate the locus of attention of the discourse participants by making a
proposition salient
  Consequence to augment the evidence supporting beliefs that certain inferences are licensed
Whether an IRU has one of these functions in a naturally occurring discourse is not apparent
from simple observation supported by introspection thus it seems clear that any theory about the
function of IRUs must be supported by some empirical evidence The theory proposed here relies
on two methods  corpusbased distributional analysis of IRUs and  computational modeling
to formalize and test the theory of the function of an IRU in a particular context In this chapter
I will discuss the distributional analysis Section  discusses the parameters of the distributional
analysis and shows how each parameter can be used to argue for one IRU function or another
Corpusbased distributional analysis is a method of the functional school of pragmatics Kuno
 Ward  Prince 
 Birner  A prototypical study using this method consists
of  selecting a particular identi able form  collecting a large number of tokens of this form
along with the discourse context in which each token occurs and  justifying using multivariate

analysis which variables of the discourse context constrain the relation between the distribution
and discourse function of the designated form
The bene ts of this method are that we get an overall picture of the distribution and discourse
function of a form in many dierent discourse contexts This is important to provide a general
empirically grounded theory In addition the analysis provides a set of predictions about similar
forms that we might expect to have the same or related discourse functions Furthermore the
criteria for selecting the data set and the variables used in coding the discourse context are explicit
and thus replicable This means that the predictions and claims of the account provided can easily
be tested and extended to other corpora representing other speech situations This seems preferable
to basing a theory on a few examples or one speakers intuitions
 Distributional Analysis	 The Function of IRUs
INFORMATION
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Figure  Summary of Parameters used in Distributional Analysis
A distributional analysis uses distributional parameters to identify certain subclasses of IRUs Then
these distributional subclasses are claimed to realize particular discourse functions The discourse
functions are supported by the correlation of other distributional parameters that were not used to
identify the class in the  rst place
The data set for the distributional analysis consists mainly of a corpus of a radio talk show for

 nancial advice consisting of  dialogues collected over a period of a week of hourly shows  	
IRUs were analyzed in the distributional analysis
The advantages of a talk show genre are that  the conversants typically do not previously
know one another so the analyst has access to most of the information relevant for the discussion
since it must be made explicit in the conversation  the conversations are directed toward an
explicit purpose which provides some constraints on what is relevant An additional argument for
this particular talk show is that its longevity indicates that the callers and audience have found it
useful A possible disadvantage is that because the conversation is not just between the talk show
host and the caller but includes the audience as well there may be aspects of the conversation
that are speci c to this genre which are not being accounted for by an analysis of it as a two
person conversation Another source of tokens in this research are examples in the literature and
opportunistically collected tokens
The application of the functional method depends  rst on de ning a way to select a form and
then determining which contextual variables might possibly have a bearing on the distribution and
function of this form The de nition of IRU repeated here from chapter  delimits the data set
that the analysis is based on
An utterance ui is informationally redundant in a discourse situation S
 if ui expresses a proposition pi and another utterance uj that entails pi has already
been said in S
 if ui expresses a proposition pi and another utterance uj that presupposes or
implicates pi has already been said in S
Remember that as discussed in chapter  IRUs only describe a subset of redundant propositions
in discourse Also that the utterance uj which originally added the propositional content of the
IRU to the discourse situation is called the IRUs antecedent A diagnostic of defeasibility can
be used to test whether the proposition pi expressed by an utterance ui is already entailed Section
 discussed how presuppositions and implicatures are often linked to lexical items In order
to determine whether the proposition pi is presupposed or implicated the analyst must rely on
standard accounts of presupposition and implicature such as those given in Horn  Karttunen
 This corpus was originally taped from a live radio broadcast and transcribed by Julia Hirschberg and Martha
Pollack I am grateful to Julia Hirschberg for providingme with the tapes of the original broadcast This allowed me
to segment pitchtrack and retranscribe the IRUs that this analysis is based on using programs generously supplied
by Mark Liberman
While it is possible that other informationwill be shared between a speaker and hearer the denition below typ
ically must be used in corpus analysis since observers cannot reliably determinewhen both speakers in a conversation
have access to this other information

and Peters  Gazdar  Hirschberg  where the process of how the implicature or
presupposition is derived has been described in detail
The second step of the distributional analysis is to select a number of contextual variables which
can be reliably coded for and which support the analysis of the function of IRUs There are
three classes of distributional parameters  information status  utterance intention and 
discourse correlates Since one of the functions of IRUs is to manipulate attention by making a
proposition salient that isnt currently salient one goal is to  nd a way to determine the salience
of the antecedent of the IRU Since the function of consequence IRUs is to increase the evidence
supporting mutual beliefs about what is inferrable it is important to know the logical basis for the
belief in the antecedent
These factors have historical precedent in factors considered relevant to the determination of the
function of other forms in discourse It is well known that discourse entities including both referents
and propositions vary in terms of the degree to which they are hearer old Prince b Clark
and Marshall  Horn 
 Moser  and this variation determines both syntactic form
and prosodic realization
One cue is to utterance intention is whether the IRU is prosodically realized with a phrase  nal
Low Mid or High tone Prosodic realization also shows whether the speaker is treating a particular
item of information as hearer old
A  nal set of parameters are the discourse correlates of IRUs These discourse correlates are
indicators of discourse structure such as cue words the occurrence of salient sets and conicting
default inferences all of which can support arguments for both attention and consequence
functions Schirin  Horn  Prince a
The overall structure of the distributional analysis and the way it is organized is shown in  gure
 The meaning of each coding factor will be discussed in detail in the remainder of this section
Factors related to information status and are discussed in sections  and utterance intention
is discussed in section  Discourse correlates are discussed in section 
 Information Status Parameters
Variation in information status can be classi ed along two independent dimensions logical status
and salience These dimensions reect Princes distinction between hearer old information and
salient information as discussed in section  Prince b Prince  First I discuss types
of hearer old information and then salient information

	
  Hearer Old Information
On the hearer old dimension the  rst point to note is that all entailments are not created equal
There is a primary distinction between what has been said and what is inferrable fromwhat has been
said This is reected both in the distinction between evoked entities and inferrable entities in
Princes taxonomy of hearer old and in Levesques distinction between explicit and implicit
beliefs Levesque  Here I make a number of  ner distinctions relevant to propositions and
their logical status in the discourse There are  ve categories of hearer old status for propositions
based on the relation of the IRU to its antecedent
  Repetition the IRU is a partial or complete repetition of its antecedent except for potential
mappings of indexicals such as I to you
  Paraphrase the IRU is a syntactic or semantic paraphrase of its antecedent resulting from the
application of simple syntactic transformations such as topicalization or semantic mappings
based on lexical semantics McKeown  Mel$cuk 
  Entailment the IRU follows from a logical inference rule such as modus ponens from a set of
antecedents
  Implicature the IRU is an implicature from a set of antecedents based on lexical items or
sets as described in Horn  Gazdar  Hirschberg 
  Presupposition the IRU is presupposed by its antecedent based on existential or factive
presuppositional forms Kiparsky and Kiparsky 	 Karttunen  Gazdar  Bridge

The distinction between Repetitions and Paraphrases and other Entailments reects the distinction
between explicit and implicit beliefs and between evoked and inferrable discourse referents
Prince b Of course both Repetitions and Paraphrases are entailed by their antecedents
but Repetitions are explicitly related to their antecedents Paraphrases rely on semantic relations
between propositions these relations are more explicit than Entailments because they can usually
be derived by substitution of lexical de nitions or by simple syntactic transformations Joshi

 McKeown  Mel$cuk 
Like Entailments Presuppositions and Implicatures are implicit in what has been said Thus
saying them can have a function of making them explicit ie supported by a linguistic endorse
ment
While any set of propositions can be thought of as a single proposition by just conjoining the set members I
prefer to talk about sets of antecedents since they may not all be introduced into the discourse at the same time
and producing the conjunction may have processing consequences Vardi 	


A  nal category of hearer old information is what was called unused information in Prince b
This is information which is old to the hearer but not old to the discourse The examples of this
type of IRU that I have are ones that I heard in conversation where I could use my own knowledge
of the conversants to determine that the information in the IRU was already mutually believed
Examples of these dierent categories will be presented after the next section
 Salient Information
Discourse salience is coded with a textual basis consisting of parameters based on the location of
the IRUs antecedent This is an approximation since salience is supposed to reect what is in the
hearers consciousness Chafe 
 but like all categories based on mindreading approximations
are necessary There are four categories of salience relations between an IRU and its antecedent
  Adjacent the IRU sequentially follows its antecedent utterance ie the IRU is Un
  and
its antecedent is Un Speakers dont normally say the same thing twice in sequence so this
usually only happens when the antecedent was just said by the Other speaker
  Same the IRU is in the same turn as its antecedent and therefore said by the current speaker
However it is normally not Adjacent
  Last the antecedent is in the last turn of the current speaker ie there is one intervening
turn by another speaker
  Remote the antecedent is remote from the IRU said by either speaker in a turn that was
prior to the last turn of the current speaker
The  nal relevant information status parameter is the Speaker of the antecedent of an IRU Speaker
information is coded because it is possible that a speakers own utterances are more available than
what someone else said In addition an IRU whose antecedent was produced by another speaker
may serve a dierent function than one whose antecedent was produced by the speaker of the IRU
The speaker parameter has two values
  Other the speaker of the antecedent of the IRU is dierent than the speaker of the IRU
  Self the speaker of the antecedent of the IRU is the same person as the speaker of the IRU
The speaker parameters and the location salience parameters are not orthogonal in one instance
Same location entails Self as Speaker


 Examples of Information Status Parameters
Consider  and 

 H Thats right as they come due give me a call about a week in advance But the  rst
one thats due the th lets put that into a two and a half year certicate
E PUT THAT IN A TWO AND A HALF YEAR Would 
H Sure we should get over  percent on that

  H Oh no I R As were available as long as you are not a participant in an existing
pension

 J Oh I see Well I did work I do work for a company that has a pension
 H ahh THEN YOURE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR EIGHTY ONE
In example  the hearer old status is a Repetition e produces a partial repetition of what H
has just said In example 
 the hearer old status is an Entailment via the logical inference rule of
modus tollens Since 
 is an Entailment it can have a Consequence function of demonstrating
that an inference was made or making sure that the other agent makes the inference Because
Repetitions are explicitly related to their antecedents the function of the Repetition in  cannot
be Consequence
Because both  and 
 are Adjacent to their antecedents the proposition they realize is already
salient and they cant have the Attention function of making a proposition salient The Speaker
parameter for both  and 
 is Other in  E uttered the IRU and H said the antecedent Because
they are both Adjacent and their antecedent was said by the Other speaker they can be Attitude
IRUs they can demonstrate acceptance of the previous speakers assertion
 Utterance Intention Parameters
The distributional analysis relies on one prosodic cue to utterance intention phrase  nal intonation
  Phrase Final Prosodic Realization
IRUs occur with a phrase  nal Low Mid or High tone Final High marks interrogative force
uncertainty or new informationPierrehumbert and Hirschberg 	 McLemore  Final
See Walker c for a discussion of the other prosodic correlates of IRUs


Mid marks continuation and hearer old or predictable informationLiberman  Ladd 	
I will argue that  nal Mid is used to mark nonassertion Final Low marks assertion or  nality
Phrase  nal intonation indicates whether the speaker is treating the current utterance as a question
an assertion or as hearer old information
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
250
69.75 70 70.25 70.5
without penalty
marsha47
Figure  Fundamental frequency over time Final tone is a phrase  nal Low
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Figure  Fundamental frequency over time Final tone is a phrase  nal Mid
An example of a phrase  nal low fall is given in Figure  Figure  shows a phrase  nal mid
Figure  shows a phrase  nal high Low and Mid de ne two dierent falls falls to Mid and falls
to Low Phrase  nal highs de ne rises
Since all the tones are interpreted with relation to tones in context there is no objective fundamental
frequency F	 which counts as a High Mid or Low Figure  shows however that if  nal tone is
plotted as a function of the F	 of the previous High we get three distinct distributions for the three


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Figure  Fundamental frequency over time Final tone is a phrase  nal High
tones This argues that these tones can be reliably identi ed by conversants and by analysts cf
Liberman and McLemore  McLemore 
 Examples of Prosodic Realization Parameters
Consider again example  repeated here for convenience
 H Thats right as they come due give me a call about a week in advance But the  rst
one thats due the th lets put that into a two and a half year certicate
E PUT THAT IN A TWO AND A HALF YEAR Would 
H Sure we should get over  percent on that
Remember that the salience status of the IRU in  is Adjacent and its hearer old status
is a Repetition As shown in  gure 
 it was prosodically realized with a  nal Mid which as
mentioned above marks both continuation and hearer old or predictable information Since
as the transcript shows E intended to continue before she was interrupted by H there is no basis
for concluding whether the Mid here is related to the fact that the proposition conveyed is both
hearer old and salient or Es intention to continue
However consider the dierence between the phrase  nal realization of  and  The two
contexts for the two utterances are below Figure  is 
 and  gure  is  The dialogue
excerpt is given in 
  H that is correct it could be moved around so that each of you have 			
 M I


F0 of Final Tone as a function of F0 of Previous H
F0 previous H -BOUNDARY TONE
F0
 o
f F
in
al
 T
on
e
80 100 140 180 220 260 300 340
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
35
0
40
0
m
l
m
m
m
m
l
l
l
m
m
m
l l
m
l
l
lm l ll
l
l
l
mm
l
l
m
l
l
l
l
l
m
l
m
m m
l
m
l
l
m
m
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
m
l
m
l
l ll l
mm
l
m
m
m
m
m
m m
l
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
h
h
l
m
m
m
h
m
m
h
h
h
hh
h
h
l
l
h
m
l
Figure  Distribution of Final Tones as a function of previous High

 H Without penalty
 M WITHOUT PENALTY
 H Right
 M And the fact that I have a an account of my own 
Although it isnt clear from the excerpt above both utterances are IRUs 
 also had an
antecedent in the dialogue shown below in  and 
  M Anyway what happens if in the future I should get a job where I could uh
contribute to my own I R A The local bank person indicated that that would mean we
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Figure 
 Eleanor  Phrase Final Low
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Figure  Marsha  Phrase Final Mid
would pay a penalty on anything that had ever been put in the spousal account
 H nope not so 
As  gure  shows the phrase  nal tone for 
 is a Low In contrast the phrase  nal tone for
 is a Mid In this case it seems reasonable to argue that  is marked as hearer old or
nonassertive while the speaker treats 
 as newly asserted information
As a  nal case of  nal Mid consider  gure  The dialogue excerpt is given in 	


	  M So I just put that on the little part there on that new form there

 H Well youll have to list that as interest earned and then you can knock that
amount o somewhere on schedule b
theres a line for it I dont remember what the line number is but ITS THERE
The phrase  nal Mid on the its there in 	 shows that H is perfectly cognizant of the fact that
the proposition is currently salient predictable information Thus it would be hard to support an
analysis of the IRU in 	 as an Attention IRU a speaker cannot both intend to make a proposition
salient and believe that it is currently salient Note the contrast between hearer old and salience
here in that the IRU shown in  has a phrase  nal Low
As a  nal example of the use of phrase  nal tones consider the utterance shown in  gure  which
is  in the excerpt below
  A I have uh some money accumulated I really dont feel as though Im using it to its
best advantage I have 	 thousand dollars in CDs I have 	 thousand in an Allsavers 	
thousand in a money market fund
 H Money market fund
 A Yes
 H Right

 A And 			 in stocks 
The  nal rise of  can be used to argue that  has interrogative force What H is apparently
questioning here is whether he heard correctly
 Discourse Correlate Parameters
One discourse correlate is provided by discourse markers Discourse markers are claimed to both
indicate discourse structure and indicate relations between propositions in discourse Polanyi and
Scha  Reichman  Schirin  Grosz and Sidner 
 Hirschberg and Litman 
Discourse markers such as so and then mark propositions as inferrable in the context and thus
provide supporting evidence for the function of consequence IRUs Discourse markers such as
now but and ok mark the beginning of a new segment of discourse and thus may correlate with
attention IRUs
Another discourse correlate is intended to track when IRUs occur in contrastive environments


Ward  Prince 
 Horn  Ward 	 Walker b The inference of rhetorical
contrast is licensed in two situations  a salient set is evoked in the dialogue Prince 
 or
 there is opposition in the argument structure An example of  is provided in example 	
Salient Set and Argument Opposition are binary coding parameters with values of yesno in order
to track both whether an IRU occurs in an environment of potential contrast and what the basis
for the contrast is Typically these contrastive IRUs also cooccur with the discourse marker but
and are analyzed here as a type of consequence IRU as will be explained more fully in chapter

The  nal discourse correlate is related to the intuition that the function of some IRUs is to manip
ulate attentional state or indicate discourse structure Whittaker and Stention analyzed discourse
structure in problemsolving dialogues and noted that IRUs tend to occur at the end of discourse
segments Based on the analysis of the  nancial advice dialogues it appears that IRUs occur both
as part of openings and as part of closings of discourse segments
The problem with exploiting this intuition is that segmenting discourses is dicult and its opera
tionalization is an open problem In studies in which judges were asked to segment discourses only
a small number of the discourse segment boundaries were agreed upon by all judges Whittaker and
Stenton  Passonneau and Litman  The most successful examples are those in which
the discourse structure closely parallels a well de ned task structure Grosz  Sibun 
The diculties include determining when one segment ends and another begins de ning the level
of granularity of a segment and with the perception that some utterances simultaneously belong
to two disjoint segments
I have not attempted to completely segment the dialogues in the corpus but have constructed
some operational criterion for judging whether an IRU is at the opening or closing of a discourse
segment Many of these critera are based on observations made in the literature but they may not
be fully general An IRU U is an Open Segment IRU if
  U is part of a turn that starts with a cue word use of now
  U is part of a turn that starts with a topic marking construction such as as far as the Z on
the subject of Y presentational there sentences etc
  U and U  have no discourse entities that are related by coreference inferential dependency
or poset relations
An IRU U is a Close Segment IRU if


  The dialogue ends after U or any utterances after U and before the end of the dialogue are
like Okay Thanks Harry Youre great or the rest of the dialogue consists of IRUs and the
above
  U
  starts with cue word use of now
  U
  consists of an utterance such as Yeah I gured or Okay that was my question followed
by an utterance that starts with a cue word use of now or a topic marker like as far as
  U
  is like Okay second question or as far as the certicates are concerned or Another
alternative would be to X or a presentationalthere sentence with a new discourse entity
  U
  represents a shift in initiative ie U ends a sequence of utterances ie at least two or
three turns by one speaker and the next sequence of utterances is by another speaker The
cases which occurred in the corpus all correspond to the end of problemdata description by
the caller or client or apprentice which is typically followed by an initiative shift in which
the talk show host expert takes over initiative for the rest of the dialogue as described in
Whittaker and Stenton 
  U ends an embedded narrative eg a storyanecdote set in the past and temporally distinct
from what is under discussion now
The following section provides examples of IRUs coded with the discourse correlates
	  Examples with Discourse Correlate Parameters
Consider the example given in 
 J I also have ten thousand in a C D six month C D
H Oh uh hang on do you have anything else
J That thats it thats it
H Well now were talking about something slightly dierent
YOU ALREADY HAVE SOME MONEY IN A C D
Have you anyone dependent on you
The arguments that this is an Attention IRU include the fact that salience status of the IRU is
Remote In addition the discourse marker now at the beginning of the turn classi es the IRU as
an Open Segment IRU Furthermore the IRU is prosodically realized with a phrase  nal Low so
it is not explicitly marked as hearer old or predictable information
	
As an example of Argument Opposition consider again the example in  repeated for convenience
from section 
  M So I just put that on the little part there on that new form there

 H Well youll have to list that as interest earned and then you can knock that
amount o somewhere on schedule b
theres a line for it I dont remember what the line number is but ITS THERE
This example is a case of Argument Opposition because the assertion of I dont remember what the
line number is could support the inference that there isnt a line number after all The assertion
that its there argues that there is a line number The discourse marker but prefaces the IRU and
provides a further correlate for Argument Opposition Horn 
As an example of SalientSet consider the excerpt given in 
  H well the medical and dental care you can deduct provided you can establish that
you have provided more than half support
	 R uh huh
 H BUT THE DEPENDENCY YOU CANNOT CLAIM
 R um hm breath I see ok uhh alright the second question
The complete example showing the antecedent for the IRU given in  will be given in chapter
 Here the IRU would be coded as having a salient set because the dependency is being compared
with the medical and dental care both are ways to get tax deductions Selection from salient sets
provides another way to make contrasts and as noted by Ward and Horn Ward  Ward
	 Horn  and discussed in section  IRUs are prevalent in environments of contrast
This utterance also ends a discourse segment as shown by the  where r goes on to a new
question
 Summary of Corpus via Distributional Parameters
Figure 
 shows how the corpus is distributed by the hearer old and salience coding factors
These two factors are used to de ne Attention IRUs the row with Remote and a subclass of
Consequence IRUs called InferenceExplicit IRUs the column with Infer The Remote parameter
de nes Attention IRUs based on the assumption that an IRU can be used to make a proposition
salient if and only if that proposition is not currently salient

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Figure  All IRUs by Hearer Old Status and Salience Status
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Figure  Contrastive IRUs Argument Opposition
The hearer old Inference factor is the combination of Entailment and Implicature The Inference
category de nes a class of IRUs which make inferences explicit which is one way of achieving the
Consequence function of supporting beliefs that particular inferences are licensed
The other subclass of Consequence IRUs Armation IRUs are not de nable by the hearer old
and salience coding factors Armation IRUs are de ned by the SalientSet and Argument Op
position discourse correlates and by the use of the particle but to preface the IRU The distribution
of these with respect to the total number of IRUs shown in  gure 
 is given in  gure 

The class of Attitude IRUs is de ned by a combination of salience and Speaker coding factors
Figure 
 shows how the Adjacent row in  gure 
 is distributed between AdjacentOther and
AdjacentSelf Chapter 
 will argue that IRUs that are Adjacent to their antecedents where the
antecedent was said by the Other speaker are used to demonstrate Attitude
These categorizations on the basis of purely distributional factors have two eects  functional
categories may be overlapping and  some IRUs are left out of the categorization An example of

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Figure 	 Adjacent IRUs by Speaker and Hearer Old Status
overlapping categories can be seen in  gure 
 by the fact that  IRUs are in both the Remote row
and the Inference column Whether these IRUs function as Attention IRUs or InferenceExplicit
IRUs or both is discussed in chapter  Similarly  gure 
 shows that there are  Attitude IRUs
that are also InferenceExplicit IRUs I argue that these IRUs function both for Attitude and
Consequence in chapters 
 and 
The IRUs that are left out of the categorization are  IRUs in the Last salience category Of these
 are repetitions and  are Paraphrases These IRUs are reattempts by the speaker to achieve the
intention of the antecedent of the IRU Either the antecedent wasnt heard so the speaker repeats
it or the speaker paraphrases it because it wasnt understood or as a way to elaborate on what
was said The  AdjacentSelf IRUs shown in  gure 
 which are not Armation IRUs are also
used to elaborate or summarize what the speaker was just saying These are all cases where the
speaker continues because they are not sure that they have communicated what she intended
Being unsure may be related to the lack of a response of an expected type from the hearer or due
to some other reason Thus these may not actually be redundant and are not discussed in the
remainder of the thesis
 Summary	 Distributional Analysis
This chapter discussed distributional analysis as one of two complementary empirical methods used
in this thesis to support the theory of the function of IRUs Distributional analysis is a good method
for determining the function of IRUs by examining their occurrence in multiple contexts Section
 discusses the parameters used in the distributional analysis Each parameter can be used to
argue for a speci c communicative function of IRUs as the following chapters will show
While the distributional analysis of IRUs provides a primary empirical basis for the theory presented
here it should be obvious that there are certain claims that are dicult to support by a distribu
tional analysis namely those about the relationship between IRUs and limited processing This is

because  there are no performance measures for the dialogues in the  nancial advice corpus
It is also impossible to objectively assess the impact of the IRU on the communication because
we would need control dialogues for similar tasks in which IRUs were not presented Furthermore
such comparisons are not possible because the participants in each  nancial advice dialogue were
attempting to solve dierent  nancial problems  It is impossible to distinguish potential con
ventional uses of IRUs from ones that result from cognitive limitations such as limited attentional
capacity or limited inferential capacity  It is impossible to tell what inferences were made and
how long participants retain discourse information in memory because we have no access to the
mental states of the participants as they are carrying out the dialogue
Because of these limitations of distributional analysis computational simulation is a complementary
method Chapter  presents the DesignWorld experimental simulation environment which will
provide another source of empirical evidence about the function of IRUs
One possible performancemeasure would be time or length of the dialogue but this measure ignores the quality
of the solution as well as the fact that di erent problems take di erent amounts of time to solve

Chapter 
Empirical Method  DesignWorld
  Introduction
DesignWorld is an arti cial domain which consists of the oor plan for a house and a number of
pieces of furniture The task involves two agents who must carry out a dialogue to come to an
agreement about how to arrange some of the pieces of furniture in the rooms on the oor plan
Each agent starts out with a set of pieces of furniture which must be selected from to accomplish
the task Each piece of furniture has an associated point value which contributes to a performance
measure for the task and the agents attempt to maximize the points achieved by their design
The task while arti cial is based on cooperative design tasks used for experiments on distributed
cooperative work Suchman  Bly  Tang and Leifer  Whittaker Geelhoed and
Robinson 
The following section sketches the goals of DesignWorld simulations Section  introduces the
domain and the task for the simulation Section  presents the IRMA architecture for resource
bounded agents also used in the TileWorld simulation environment Bratman Israel and Pollack
 Pollack and Ringuette 	 Section 
 discusses the particular instantiation of the IRMA
architecture used in the simulation Section  discusses the discourse actions that the agents can
engage in Section  discusses the way the domain and the task limits the range of discourse
strategies available and discusses in detail which task parameters and cognitive parameters can
be varied in order to explore the interaction of a cognitive limitation with a particular discourse
strategy The way in which performance is measured in order to determine the eects of the
strategies will be discussed briey in section  and then more fully in section 	

 Design
World Goal	 Testing the processing eects of
IRUs
DesignWorld is a highly parametrizable simulation environment based on the cognitive architecture
presented in chapter  The simulation parameters are
  Search radius of AWM which determines the extent to which an agent is attention limited
  Number of inferences agents can make This is done with three distinct parameter settings
none half all
  Number of memory retrieval operations
  Discourse strategies for communication The Baseline strategy will be discussed here Each
communicative function has its own associated strategies
  Task Diculty the task can be varied to increase inferential complexity by introducing extra
goals to match colors of pieces or to require that agents never make a mistake or to require
that agents agree on the reasons for their actions
The idea is to parametrize agents with communication strategies that do or do not include IRUs and
then test for a cognitive bene t for strategies that include IRUs in terms of improved performance
or decreased amount of inference or retrieval Thus DesignWorld provides empirical support three
dierent aspects of the theory  it provides a testbed for the shared environment model of mutual
beliefs  it supports the exploration of the interaction of limited attention and inference with
communication strategies and  it allows claims about the eects of IRUs to be tested in terms
of global performance measures such as eciency of task execution
 Design
World Domain and Task
The basic DesignWorld task consists of a pair of agents achieving a design for a oor plan with two
rooms Figure  shows a potential initial state Furniture items are of  types couch table chair
lamp and rug Each furniture item has a color and point value A design for a room consists of any
four pieces from these types The points associated with a furniture item supports the calculation of
utility of including that item in the design plan and provides the basis for an objective performance
measure for the DesignWorld task


ROOM # 1 ROOM # 2
FUCHSIA LAMP 13
FUCHSIA CHAIR 11
G
55
P 55
G
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P
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G
53
F 55
G
F
AGENT B’s PIECES:
FUCHSIA TABLE 51
BLUE LAMP  20
BLUE COUCH 20
FUCHSIA RUG 52
FUCHSIA COUCH 55
GREEN RUG 56
GREEN COUCH 54
GREEN CHAIR 53 
YELLOW TABLE 15
YELLOW CHAIR 15
AGENT A’s PIECES: 
BLUE CHAIR 15
GREEN TABLE  12
GREEN LAMP 55
PURPLE CHAIR 54
PURPLE LAMP 10
PURPLE TABLE 51
PURPLE RUG 52
PURPLE COUCH 55
RED RUG  20
RED COUCH  30
YELLOW COUCH  15
52
56
Y 15
Figure  Initial State for the DesignWorld Task
The agents in DesignWorld communicate with an arti cial language which will be described in
more detail in the following sections An example gloss of a dialogue excerpt for DesignWorld is
shown in  
 BILL Lets put the green couch in the study
KIM No instead lets put the blue lamp in the study
BILL Putting in the green couch is worth 
BILL No instead lets put the green couch in the study
KIM Putting in the blue lamp is worth 	
KIM No instead lets put the blue lamp in the study
BILL Then lets put the red couch in the study
The dialogues are mixedinitiative since either agent can make a proposal and there is no enforced
collaboration since both agents reason about whether to accept another agents proposal At the end
of a dialogue the agents have agreed on which four pieces of furniture should go in each room This
is called a collaborative plan for achieving the intention DesignHouse A collaborative
plan will be de ned more precisely in section 
 Figure  shows a potential  nal state
The main advantage of an arti cial world like DesignWorld is that it is simple and conceivably
simulable by robots there is a limited amount of domain knowledge and only a limited number
of actions to reason about Yet despite this it provides a natural set of inferences in terms of
 This dialogue is produced from the articial language by adhoc methods
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Figure  One Final State for DesignWorld Standard Task Represents the Collaborative Plan
Achieved by the Dialogue  points
calculations to maximize utility and the subgoals remaining to complete the design for a room
Another advantage over a real domain is the ease with which the complexity of the domain and
the task are varied 
 IRMA Architecture for Resource
Bounded Agents
The agent architecture used in the DesignWorld simulation environment is based on the IRMA
architecture for resourcebounded agents shown in  gure  Bratman Israel and Pollack 
Pollack and Ringuette 	 The IRMA architecture has not previously been used to model
the behavior of agents in dialogue For the purpose of exploring the eects of resourcebounds
on attention this architecture has been extended with the model of limited attention that was
discussed in section  and the model of belief deliberation discussed in section  The basic
components of the version of the IRMA architecture developed in this thesis are
There are a number of variations that could be constructed in this domain For instance the complexity of the
task is easily varied by manipulating constraints or restrictions on the sequencing of actions eg the couch must go
in the room rst Extra constraints or conicts could be added by giving agents preferences for putting a particular
piece of furniture in a particular room If the simulation included both a planning and an execution phase these
could be interleaved or done in two phases and it would be possible to explore which parts of the collaborative plan
were best determined at planning time and which at execution time
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Figure  DesignWorld version of the IRMA Agent Architecture for ResourceBounded Agents
with Limited Attention AWM
  AttentionWorking memory AWM the limited attention module constrains working mem
ory and the retrieval of current beliefs and intentions that are used by the meansend rea
soner It provides a level of discourse structure that supports modeling the eects of discourse
salience
  Beliefs a database of an agents beliefs This includes beliefs that an agent supposes are
shared These are stored in an agents AWM along with intentions
  Intentions a database of an agents intentions This includes intentions that an agent sup
poses are shared These are stored in an agents AWM along with beliefs
  Plan Library what an agent knows about plans as recipes to achieve goals As a matter of
convenience the plan library is not constrained by AttentionWorking Memory so that agents
always know what the next step in their plan is

  Meansend reasoner reasons about how to  ll in existing partial plans proposing options that
serve as subplans for the plans an agent has in mind Means end reasoning will be discussed
further in section 
  FilteringMechanism checks options for compatibilitywith the agents existing plans Options
deemed compatible are passed along to the deliberation process
  Intention Deliberation decides which of a set of options to pursue Intention Deliberation
will be discussed further in section 
  Belief Deliberation when there are conicts in beliefs decides what to believe This is based
on the belief revision model discussed in section 
Note that the beliefs and intentions used by the meansend reasoner must be in AttentionWorking
Memory Thus what is used in reasoning and deliberation is a subset of agents beliefs and intentions
that are currently salient Also in the DesignWorld simulation environment the action types that
are reasoned about include both dialogue actions and domain actions This will be explained in
more detail in section 
 Means
End Reasoning and Intention Deliberation
Meansend reasoning is the process by which an agent considers how it can best achieve a given
intention For example if the intention is C to make coee an agent might meansend reason
that it can do so by option A of boiling water and using instant coee or by option B of using
the percolator
In the IRMA architecture shown in  gure  meansend reasoning is limited by attentional
capacity Only the options identi able from premises currently salient are possible means Options
can also be generated by communication and correspond to proposals that other agents make
Once the options for how to achieve a goal eg make coee are generated by either means
end reasoning or by communication they must be evaluated This is the process of intention
deliberation As discussed in section  deliberation is often dicult in real life because there
are multiple incompatible evaluation functions that can be applied to competing intentions because
The lteringmechanismpresented in Bratman Israel and Pollack 		 and used in Tileworld is more complex
than that presented here because BIP were interested in how current intentions act as a lter on intention formation
and when current intentions get overridden This use of intentions as a lter is not part of what is to be explained
here
The only limit imposed in DesignWorld is this limit on the availability of premises for meansend reasoning
Another way to limit meansend reasoning is by limiting the time for reasoning so that an agent can act in real
time Thus an agent might stop meansend reasoning after guring out methods A and B because it doesnt have
any more time to reason about other methods for achieving C
	
the probability of particular outcomes is not clear and because agents may not be able to calculate
all possible courses of action
An adequate account of intention deliberation that takes agents cognitive capabilities into account
awaits future research so DesignWorld has a simple evaluation function associated with the points
associated with a plan Agents can evaluate each proposal by  rst retrieving the score proposition
associated with the piece of furniture in the content of the proposal and then checking for additional
optional goals that the action might contribute to Agents evaluate each higher level goal such as
DesignRoom by simply summing the value of the actions that contribute to the DesignRoom goal
 Design
World Agents Initial Beliefs Intentions and
Plans
The dimensions of the dimensional space for AttentionWorking Memory is set to be 
x
x

Each agents memory is initialized with private beliefs as to what pieces of furniture it has and
what colors these pieces are Both agents know what pieces of furniture exist and how many points
they are worth The domain state predicates that form the content of beliefs are
  HasAvailable Agent Furniture
  Points Furniture Value
These belief predicates are annotated as to their positive POS or negative NEG polarity in the
belief database They are also annotated with their endorsements So the actual structure of what
is represented  ts one of the schemas below
  Polarity HasAvailable Agent Furniture Time
  Polarity Points Furniture Value
In other words what is shown in  gure  as Agent As piece of furniture such as a red couch
worth 	 points would be represented by two beliefs in As belief database POS HasAvailable
A RedCouch POS Points RedCouch 	
In DesignWorld there are two types of intentions utterance intentions and domain intentions
Utterance intentions will be discussed in section  The domain intentions are intended acts such
as putting a particular furniture piece into a particular room in the schema below
The IRMA architecture allows for intentions to be overridden subject to the lteroverride In DesignWorld
intentions that are already agreed to are never overridden Thus there is no need for an inverse action to Put such
as Remove

  Put Agent Furniture Room Time
The only plan in DesignWorld is design house which has two subgoals design room  and
design room  Each of these subgoals consists of  put acts For each putact the agent
who has the furniture instantiates the agent variable Agent The simulations are not concerned
with actual execution if execution were to be added agents would want to reason about whether
two agents are needed for execution in which case a pair of agents would instantiate the Agent
variable The Time variable for each action and state can be either now or later but since no
execution is performed is instantiated as later and is not changed throughout the course of the
simulation
Some versions of the task include additional optionalmatched pair goals A matched pair consists
of two pieces of furniture of the same color Matched pair is set up as a task parameter in order
to vary inferential complexity The MatchedPair version of the task is described in more detail in
section 
 Discourse Actions and Discourse Structure
There are four aspects of communicative actions  the utterance level intentions that an agent
can achieve  the propositional content of these utterance level intentions  the discourse level
acts that these utterance intentions contribute to and  the way in which these intentions are
reasoned about I will discuss the  rst two of these in the remainder of this section The way
in which these intentions are reasoned about is encapsulated in agents communicative strategies
These strategies will be briey discussed in section 	 and in more detail in the following chapters
In DesignWorld the overall structure of the discourse is completely determined by the task structure
Power  Grosz  Sibun  Agents in DesignWorld communicate via  utterance
intentions Open Close Propose Accept Reject Ask and Say See also Carletta  Sidner

Agents take turns sending messages but each turn may consist of more than one utterance intention
The schema of discourse actions shown in  gure  controls how the utterance intentions are
composed  For example an opening may consist of an open utterance but may include
This is implemented with agents in the same process with a controller to switch control between them This is
a common way of simulating individual processes and has been used in the Tileworld simulation in Powers robot
world and in Carlettas JAM system Pollack and Ringuette  Power  Carletta 

It would be possible in this domain to leave these intentions implicit and only communicate propositional content
Then hearers would need to infer whether an utterance counts as one of these actions If this were done additional
inference procedures would be needed to identify the utterance intention Allen 	 Sidner 	 Litman and
Allen  and in particular it would be important to distinguish implicit acceptance from rejection
This schema is probably not adequate to describe all discourse action transitions in every type of dialogue

 May be IMPLICIT
CLARIFICATION
Speaker Change
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Figure  Discourse Actions for the DesignWorld Task
assertions that set the context of the discourse These variations are determined by an agents
strategy for opening
The form of the openings closings proposals and acceptances shown in  gure  depend on the
dialogue strategies Variations in strategies include whether or not an action is explicitly realized
For example as the  gure shows opening and closing discourse acts are not always explicitly
realized A proposal can be followed by an acceptance a clari cation or a rejection Rejections
always include counterproposals Other variations in openings acceptances proposals and closings
will be discussed further when I discuss the range of possible strategies in section 
Utterance intentions are all communicated explicitly and each communicative act of an agent  ts
the schema below
UtteranceIntention Agent Agent Pred Vars 
Possible predicates to instantiate the Pred of the content of the utterance are  the domain
Levinson  Levinson 	 Scheglo  	 but is a useful abstraction for the simulation This abstraction
facilitates the investigation of the e ects of resourcebounds which operates independently of the range of utterance
level intentions and other strategies available to an agent

intention predicate of Put which corresponds to proposals that the speaker is making  the state
predicates Points Has For instance agent A might say
Propose A B Put AB RedCouch Room Later
Agent B can either accept reject or ask for more information about this proposal For example B
could reply with an acceptance in the form of a repetition
Accept B A Put AB RedCouch Room Later
B can also clarify the proposal by asking for more information
Ask B A Points RedCouch 
Remember that each agent starts out with beliefs about the points associated with each furniture
item but the model of limited attentionworking memory means that they can forget what these
values are
B can also reject the proposal
Reject B A Put AB BlueCouch Room Later
The predicate clause in a rejection is a counterproposal that encodes the reason that B rejects
the proposal that A made B compared As proposal with other options that B knows about and
in this case B believes that putting the BlueCouch in Room is a better option because it is of
higher utility
The utterance intention of Say is used to communicate beliefs about the current state and to reply
to questions For instance if B asks A
Ask B A Points RedCouch 
A can reply with
Say A B Points RedCouch 	
In addition each of these utterance acts has an eect on the beliefs intentions or state of the agents
when they are processed
The production of a counterproposal is a common but not the only way that rejections are done in human
human dialogues Whittaker and Stenton 		 Walker and Whittaker 

  Implicit Acceptance
  Store MS Intended A B ACT as a default
  Store ActEects Act as an default weakest link
  Explicit Acceptance
  Store MS Intended A B ACT as linguistic
  Store ActEects Act as an entailment
  Implicit Open Find a discourse segment in task structure that matches the current proposal
and mark its status as Open
  Explicit Open Open the discourse segment that matches the explicit Open
  Implicit Close Close the current discourse segment
  Explicit Close Close the current discourse segment
  Say Store the content of the Say in AWM as linguistic
  Proposal
  Check whether Proposal is compatible with current beliefs eg that no current beliefs
contradict its preconditions
  Infer that Has Agent Piece and store in memory as entailed
  MeansEnd Reason MEReason about Intention the proposal contributes to
  Deliberate by evaluating the proposal against other options generated by MeansEnd
reasoning
  Decide whether to Accept or Reject
  Rejection
  Evaluate the proposal that constitutes the content of the rejection
  Accept the rejection proposal if it is better than your current proposal
  If you decide to reject the rejection proposal then reject with reason for rejection
When I discuss particular dialogue strategies below I will use the eects of each utterance act as
de ned above to illustrate the relationship between the strategy and underlying cognitive processes
The dialogue actions in combination with agents meansend reasoning and deliberation lets agents
achieve a collaborative plan In chapter 
 I will discuss making plans in more detail In Design
World a sequence of a proposal followed by an acceptance means that agents agree on that step

of the plan For example the plan for Design Room requires that the agents both know that a
room design consists of any  pieces of furniture The agents have to agree that  they intend to
put each piece of furniture into a room  these actions of putting furniture into a room contributes
to achieving Design Room and  the actions they have chosen have the maximum utility as
far as they know at the moment they agree The dialogue actions shown in  gure  represent a
cycle in which
 individual agents perform meansend reasoning about options in the domain
 individual agents deliberate about which options are preferable
 then agents make proposals to other agents based on the options identi ed in a reasoning
cycle about actions that contribute to the satisfaction of their goals
 then these proposals are accepted or rejected by the other agent based on calculating
whether they maximize utility
For example Ann conducts meansend reasoning for a set period of time deliberates on the options
generated by her reasoning selects putting the red couch in room as the best option to pursue and
then proposes to Bob that they put the red couch in room Deliberation requires calculating the
point value associated with an option Bob deliberates about the proposal based on the calculated
utility and compares it with other options he knows of Then Bob may accept the proposal reject
the proposal or leave the proposal on the table by requesting additional information
Since collaborative plans are established through dialogue agents discourse strategies when
carrying out the dialogue can aect how eciently a collaborative plan is established how good
the plan is and how robust it is to changes in the environment or to changes in agents intentions
The remaining section briey discusses discourse strategies that DesignWorld agents can use that
aect how good their collaborative plans are and describes how the performance of the agents in
DesignWorld is evaluated
 Possible Strategies
Remember that the main goal of DesignWorld is to demonstrate that IRUs are motivated by agents
cognitive limitations Demonstrating this hypothesis involves varying the way that agents open
and close dialogue segments make proposals and communicate acceptance There are a limited


number of possible strategies  structure for a discourse segment related to a particular Design
World intention is limited and  the domain limits what kinds of inferences can be made and
what facts are relevant to performing the task
	  The AllImplicit Baseline Strategy
The simplest strategy is when only proposals and rejections are said explicitly and all the other
actions for a segment are inferred to have occurred This strategy is AllImplicit and is the
baseline against which more complex strategies are compared
Figure  shows the discourse action protocol for AllImplicit agents
ALL IMPLICIT STRATEGY
KEY:
PROPOSAL
ACCEPTANCE
CLOSING
REJECTION
CLARIFICATION
OPENING
IMPLICIT
NO SPEAKER CHANGE
SPEAKER CHANGE
Figure  Discourse Action protocol for agents using the AllImplicit strategy
The AllImplicit strategy is exempli ed by both agents Bill and Kim in the complete dialogue given
in 

  BILL Then lets put the green rug in the study
 propose agentbill agentkim option putact  agentbill green rug room
KIM Then lets put the green lamp in the study
 propose agentkim agentbill option putact  agentkim green lamp room
BILL Then lets put the green couch in the study

Agent A Agent B
PROPOSAL 
PROPOSAL 
PROPOSAL 
REJECTION 
PROPOSAL 
 
PROPOSAL N
Figure 
 Sequence of Discourse Acts for Two All Implicit Agents in Dialogue 

 propose agentbill agentkim option putact  agentbill green couch room
KIM No instead lets put the purple couch in the study
 reject agentkim agentbill option putact  agentkim purple couch room
BILL Then lets put the green couch in the study
 propose agentbill agentkim option putact  agentbill green couch room
KIM Then lets put the purple chair in the living room
 propose agentkim agentbill option putact  agentkim purple chair room
BILL Then lets put the fuchsia couch in the living room
 propose agentbill agentkim option putact  agentbill fuchsia couch room
KIM Then lets put the purple rug in the living room
 propose agentkim agentbill option putact  agentkim purple rug room
BILL No instead lets put the green chair in the living room
 reject agentbill agentkim option putact  agentbill green chair room
KIM Then lets put the purple rug in the living room
 propose agentkim agentbill option putact  agentkim purple rug room
Note that acceptance is never communicated explicitly in 
 agents infer that another agent
accepted its proposal from the fact that nothing was said to indicate rejection In addition opening
and closing statements are left implicit and no IRUs that might function to reduce inference or
retrieval are included Figure 
 abstracts from the dialogue in 
 to the discourse acts and  gure
 shows the cognitive processes that correspond to each utterance
	 Communicating Rejection
Some dialogue behaviors are used by all of the agents for particular situations For example every
agent has a way to resolve conicts that involves IRUs If an agent makes a proposal and another
agent rejects its proposal and if the  rst agent wants to reject the counter proposal then she makes
her reasoning explicit as to why she is committed to her original proposal Remember that the

Discourse Act Utterance Act A PROCESS B PROCESS
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Propose All Imp
PROPOSAL propose A B option	
Infer Open Put
MEREASON Put
Check Preconds 	
Deliberate
Decide to Accept
Store MS intend 	
Store ActEects 	
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Propose AllImp
PROPOSAL propose B A option
Infer Acceptance 	
Store MS intend 	
Store ActEects 	
Infer Close Put
Infer Open Put
MEREASON Put
Check Preconds 
Deliberate
Decide to Accept
Store MS intend 
Store ActEects 
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Propose
  
Figure  Cognitive Processes for Sequence of Discourse Acts in Dialogue 
 Agent A and B are
All Implicit Agents
point values of furniture items are known to both agents at the start of the dialogue but agents can
forget due to limits on AWM The conict resolution strategy is to produce an IRU reminding the
other agent of the value of the piece in the current proposal This is shown in example  below
where Bill in 
 and  presents his reason and repeats his proposal
 BILL Then lets put the green couch in the study
propose agentbill AgentKim option putact agentbill green couch room
Kim No instead lets put the green lamp in the study
reject agentkim agentbill option putact agentkim green lamp room

BILL Putting in the green couch is worth 

say agentbill agentkim bel	 score option putact agentbill green couch room

BILL No instead lets put the green couch in the study
reject agentbill agentkim option putact agentbill green couch room
Another strategy that all the agents use is to reject a proposal when according to their own beliefs
the preconditions for the proposal are not met In other words the rejecting agent believes that
the furniture item is not available An example of a rejection like this is shown in 
 BILL Then lets put the green chair in the living room

propose agentbill agentkim option putact agentbill green chair room
KimAgent Bill doesnt have the green chair
say agentkim agentbill bel		
 has nt agentbill green chair 
Kim No instead lets put the purple chair in the living room
reject agentkim agentbill option putact agentkim purple chair room
	 Range of Strategies that include IRUs
For the purpose of showing the range of strategies and explaining the general strategies I will
assume that there are no costs for communication and processing In sections  and 	 I will
discuss ways of evaluating performance that take both task de nition and processing costs into
account I will use the term raw score to refer to the number of total points the agents achieve
on the task without any consideration of costs to achieve those points Thus in the remainder of
this section the agents score on a task is simply their raw score ie the sum of the pieces used
in the plan For dialogue 
 Bill and Kims AWM was set to  and their raw score is 
points Bill and Kim got the highest possible raw score even without being able to search all of
memory
To see what the range of possible strategies are consider the dialogue actions that can make up
a single discourse segment as shown in  gure  and schematized here in  gure  The way
that rejection and clarification are communicated is the same for all agents so the places
where variations in strategy can occur is in the opening proposal acceptance and closing
discourse acts
	
The types of IRUs in general are the types of hearer old information such as repetition
paraphrase entailments implicatures and presuppositions The only types of IRUs that
are used in the simulation are repetition and entailment ie repeating something that is
already known or making an inference explicit
Thus considering the places where variation can occur and the types of IRUs in the simulation
it is possible for each of opening proposal acceptance and closing to include one or more
repetitions or entailments Attention strategies are de ned as those in which a repetition occurs
in either an opening proposal or closing In addition the Attention strategies vary as to whether
only one fact is repeated or multiple facts are repeated Consequence strategies are those where an
inference is made explicit in either an acceptance or a closing Attitude strategies are those where
a repetition occurs in an acceptance These possible variations are shown in  gure  and their
instantiations will be discussed in the following chapters
OPEN
PROPOSAL
ACCEPT/REJECT
CLOSE
SEGMENT
SEGMENT CONSEQUENCE STRATEGY
CONSEQUENCE STRATEGY
ATTITUDE STRATEGY 
ATTENTION STRATEGY
ATTENTION STRATEGY
Figure  Schema for the Primary Eect of Dialogue Strategies on Dialogue Structure
 Parameters for Cognitive Capabilities and Tasks
This section discusses the range of parameters for agents cognitive capabilities related to limits on
attention and inference I also introduce a variation in the basic task that increases the inferential
complexity of the task In addition to the cognitive and task parameter variations discussed here
another way to eectively vary the task is by varying the way that performance is evaluated These
task variations will be discussed in section 	 These parameters will be used to show that the
bene ts of discourse strategies are situation speci c

	  Limited Attention Eects

For every strategy type discussed above the parametrization of AWM provides a major limitation
on how agents perform For example consider the dialogue given in  where Bill and Kims AWM
is set to 
  BILL Then lets put the green couch in the study
 propose agentbill agentkim option putact  agentbill green couch room  
KIM Then lets skip the next one
 propose agentkim agentbill option putact  agentnobody 
BILL Then lets skip the next one
 propose agentbill agentkim option putact  agentnobody 
KIM Then lets put the red rug in the study
 propose agentkim agentbill option putact  agentkim red rug room 
BILL Then lets skip the next one
 propose agentbill agentkim option putact  agentnobody 
KIM Then lets skip the next one
 propose agentkim agentbill option putact  agentnobody 
BILL Then lets skip the next one
 propose agentbill agentkim option putact  agentnobody 
KIM Then lets put the purple couch in the living room
 propose agentkim agentbill option putact  agentkim purple couch room  
In  because AWM is set to  Bill and Kim cannot perform as well When they cannot come up
with an option for a plan step they propose that they skip that step As with other proposals this
proposal can be accepted or rejected by the other agent With limited AWM the agents cannot
remember which pieces they have and what their values are The raw score for the task is 
points
As discussed above limited attention is modeled in DesignWorld by manipulating the memory
radius parameter The value of this parameter can range from  to 
 so that agents have limited
attention at lower values This provides an operationalization of the eect of salience
Figure  shows how the parametrization of limited attention aects performance on the Design
World task As shown in  gure  scores increase as attentional capacity memory search radius
increases
The highest raw score achievable for the task is  points Note also that the raw score is optimal
at a certain point depending on the number of facts stored in memory and the complexity of the
task For the particular version of the task executed here  gure  shows that the agents achieve

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Figure  Baseline Two Attention Implicit Agents
the maximal raw score when the search radius is set to 
 but are near optimal by AWM of 
This means that if a particular level of performance is required agents resource parameters can
be set so that that level of performance is guaranteed However if action is required at low levels
of resources reasonable behavior can be produced Dean and Boddy  	
	 Varying Inferential Capacity
Another parameter that can be varied in DesignWorld is whether agents are inference limited
While it is widely agreed that human agents are not logically omniscient there is currently no
adequate theory of which inferences are made and what factors are involved in determining that
these inferences and not others are the ones that are derived Levinson  Konolige 

DesignWorld implements limited inference in a straightforward way because there are only a limited
number of possible inferences
One source of inference limitations is provided by the fact that inferences can only be carried out
on beliefs that are currently salient This is the discourse inference constraint The primary
 	Note that what is reasonable behavior depends on the denition of the task If the task denition requires that
agents put  pieces of furniture in every room in order to complete the task then clearly as shown in gure  they
could not accomplish the task at low attention values

eect of this is to limit which premises can be using in reasoning about how to achieve goals ie
meansend reasoning about putacts and about achieving matchedpairs to be discussed below
All agents are inference limited via this data limit on what can be used as premises in inferences
by the parameter setting for AWM as discussed in section 
A second set of inference limitations is to limit inferences based on actions that agents agree on
in the domain These are primarily acteect inferences of the form If A has just agreed to use
the red couch in room then A no longer has the red couch available If A cannot make this
inference then A might believe that the red couch could be used again to satisfy another intention
DesignWorld supports parametrizing agents as to whether they consistently draw these acteect
inferences or not While this is a trivial inference it provides a reasonable testbed of the eect of
not making critical inferences
Agents can be all inference agents ie they are logically omniscient and always make all the
acteect inferences Agents can also be parametrized to be no inference agents ie they draw
no inferences about the eects of proposals that they make or that they agree to Finally agents
can be half inference agents which means that half the time they draw the acteect inferences
Figure 	 shows the scores for dialogues between two no inference agents As one would expect
they do very poorly on the task because they dont infer that once they have decided to use a
piece of furniture then it is no longer available to use
Figure  shows the scores for dialogues between two agents who make half of the valid inferences
These agents perform much better than the no inference agents
	 Varying Inferential Complexity Matched Pairs
Another set of parameters vary inferential complexity For example another version of the task
includes optional goals to try to get matched pairs in each room at the same time as agreeing on
the design for the house A matched pair is worth the points for each furniture item used in the
matched pair plus an 	 point bonus for each matched pair In this version of the task Bill and
Kim evaluate each proposal to see whether it can also achieve a matched pair Compare 
 with
	 Again Bill and Kim both have AWM at 
  BILL Then lets put the green rug in the study
 propose agentbill agentkim option putact  agentbill green rug room
KIM Then lets put the green lamp in the study
 propose agentkim agentbill option putact  agentkim green lamp room
BILL Then lets put the green couch in the study
 propose agentbill agentkim option putact  agentbill green couch room

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KIM No instead lets put the purple couch in the study
 reject agentkim agentbill option putact  agentkim purple couch room
BILL Then lets put the green couch in the study
 propose agentbill agentkim option putact  agentbill green couch room
KIM No instead lets put the purple chair in the study
 reject agentkim agentbill option putact  agentkim purple chair room
BILL Then lets put the green couch in the living room
 propose agentbill agentkim option putact  agentbill green couch room
KIM Then lets put the green table in the living room
 propose agentkim agentbill option putact  agentkim green table room
BILL No instead lets put the green chair in the living room
 reject agentbill agentkim option putact  agentbill green chair room
KIM Then lets put the purple rug in the living room
 propose agentkim agentbill option putact  agentkim purple rug room
BILL Then lets put the fuchsia rug in the living room
 propose agentbill agentkim option putact  agentbill fuchsia rug room
KIM No instead lets put the purple table in the living room
 reject agentkim agentbill option putact  agentkim purple table room
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In 	 Bill and Kim get a raw score of 	 points for the DesignRoom task but get additional
points for the MatchedPair optional task Because the point of matched pair inferences is to
test the value of agents coordinating on what inferences they make a matched pair is only achieved
if both agents make the inference that two intended actions will constitute a matched pair If
one agent makes the inference and the other doesnt they do not get any additional matchedpair
points In the dialogue shown in 	 Bill and Kim achieve  matched pairs
 intended putact agentkim green lamp room intended putact agentbill green
rug room
 intended putact agentkim purple chair room intended
 putact agentkim
purple couch room
 intended	 putact agentbill green chair room intended putact agentbill
green couch room
 intended putact agentkim purple table room intended
 putact agentkim
purple rug room


Since these matched pairs use all actions that the agents agreed on the matched pair total is 	
plus 		 incentive points for a total of 
	 The incentive points allow the performance measure to
clearly show whether a strategy makes it easier to make matched pair inferences
For each strategy it must be possible to evaluate the bene t of that strategy The bene ts of
a strategy depend on how the task is de ned and what the costs are to achieve the raw scores
Here I assumed that the costs involved in achieving raw scores could be ignored but in general
communication inference and retrieval will cost something The range of evaluation functions used
to judge the ecacy of a strategy will be discussed in section 	 First in section  I will
de ne ways in which the basic DesignWorld task can be varied
	 Varying the Denition of Task Success
The DesignWorld task is simple and straightforward but can be parametrized to make it more
dicult to perform or so that dierent aspects of the task weigh more heavily in performance
evaluation There are  variations in the task de nition
The Standard task is de ned so that the raw score that agents achieve for a particular dialogue
consists of the sum of all the furniture pieces for each valid step in their plan The point values for
invalid steps in the plan are simply subtracted from the score ie agents are not heavily penalized
for making mistakes due to trying to use the same piece twice
Additionally there are two other factors related to the quality of a solution the degree of match 
ing beliefs required and the eect of mistakes The reason to explore the eect of the degree of
matching beliefs required is that dierent collaborative tasks require dierent levels of agreement
The reason to explore the eect of mistakes is that this eect varies depending on the interdepen
dency of dierent subparts of the problem solution It is simple to vary the task de nition in the
arti cial DesignWorld task to reect these very real dierences between tasks in the real world
Below I will discuss two variation on the Standard task  ZeroInvalids in which agents get no
points for their plan if it has any invalid steps in it and  ZeroNonmatchingBeliefs in which
agents get no points for their plan if the have dierent reasons underlying each plan
Another task variation is whether agents are supposed to get matched pairs as discussed in
section  Another issue is how the achievement of matched pairs is de ned to contribute to the
score I will discuss two variations of this  MatchedPair MP raw score consists only of the
points that agents get for achieving matchedpairs and the points they get for the standard task
are ignored  MatchedPairAll MPALL raw score consists of both the points that agents
get for achieving matchedpairs and the points for the standard task


  Zero Invalids Task Denition
KEY: I = INVALID PUT(A,F,R,T)
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Figure  Evaluating Task Invalids for some tasks invalid steps invalidate the whole plan
One of the task de nition parameters is related to the the eect of mistakes A mistake results in
an invalid step in a plan where an invalid step is one that cannot actually be executed The eect
of making a mistake in a plan depends on how interdependent dierent subparts of the problem
solution are For some tasks a mistake can invalidate the whole solution for other tasks partial
solutions without the invalid step may be adequate For example in a task like furnishing a room
it may be desirable to have both a couch and a chair but if the agents dont manage to agree on
which chair to put in the room or assume they can use a chair that will end up in a dierent room
the room is still partially furnished and usable On the other hand in a task such as building a
tower each step depends on the successful execution of the previous step and the whole plan may
be invalid if a step to put down a foundation block cannot be executed
In DesignWorld it is simple to de ne the level to which the substeps of the task are interdependent
Figure  shows what the choices are for the eect of invalid steps for the DesignWorld task
The score for invalid steps mistakes can just be subtracted out this is how the Standard task is
de ned Alternately invalid steps can propagate up so that a room that isnt completely furnished
doesnt contribute to the  nal score In other words if the plan for a room has an invalid step in
it then the plan for the whole room is invalid Finally mistakes can completely propagate to the
top level of the plan so that the whole plan is invalid if one step is invalid
The ZeroInvalids task de nition reects task situations in which invalid steps invalidate the whole
plan

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Figure  Tasks can dier as to the level of mutual belief required Some tasks require that W
a reason for doing P is mutually believed and others dont
The ZeroNonmatchingBeliefs task de nition is designed to investigate the eect of dierent task
requirements on the level of agreement that agents must achieve It is easy to see that there are
dierent degrees of agreeing in a collaborative task It may be necessary for agents to agree on
every aspect of the task but it is not always necessary for agents to agree on eg the reasons for
carrying out a particular action
For example in the negotiation between the union and the management of a company any agree
ment that is reached is agreed to by each party for dierent reasons An agreement for a shorter
work week is supported by the union because more overtime pay is possible for those who want to
work more and is supported by the management because the companys insurance premiums will
be lower
If two agents agree on a plan but have dierent reasons for doing so they may change their beliefs
and their intentions under dierent conditions The most stable longterm collaborative plans
will be those in which agents agree on both the actions to be performed as well as the reasons for
doing those actions Under these conditions the agents will be more likely to change their goals in
a compatible way
Figure  shows the structure of beliefs about intentions and warrants in DesignWorld De
pending on how the task is de ned the level of agreement required varies As shown in  gure

 the DesignWorld task could be de ned so that W a reason for doing P must also be mu
tually supposed The variation in task de nition for level of agreement is formulated as to whether
agents have to agree on the warrant for an action under discussion
In DesignWorld a warrant W is a belief about the points proposition associated with a piece of
furniture In terms of the de nition of a collaborative plan to be given in section 
 agents A and
B can mutually suppose that they have maximized utility without necessarily agreeing on what
that utility is Evaluating performance in DesignWorld can reect these dierent task situations
simply by changing the way that raw score is tabulated If the task de nition requires W to be
mutually believed then the function zero nonmatching bels is applied to the raw score The
new raw score is then modi ed further by taking into account the costs of achieving that score
This will be discussed in section 	

 Matched Pair and Matched Pair All Task Denition
Finally the task de nition can be modi ed speci cally for the MatchedPair tasks discussed above
that increase inferential complexity The MatchedPair MP task tallies only the points achieved
frommatchedpair goals and ignores the goals for the standard task This is used to reect situations
in which it is desirable to see whether a strategy helps make a particular type of inference possibly
at the expense of performance overall
In the MatchedPairAll MPALL task the raw score is the sum of the points achieved from
matched pair goals and the points achieved in the Standard task This task de nition is used to
model situations in which an inference is only valuable as long as it doesnt disrupt any other aspect
of the agents performance
		 Summary
In sum the variations in the task de nitions are
  Standard the raw score for a collaborative plan is simply the sum of the furniture pieces in
the plan with the values of the invalid steps subtracted out
  ZeroInvalid give a zero score to a collaborative plan with any invalid steps in it reecting a
binary division between task situations where the substeps of the task are independent from
those where they are not See  gure 
  ZeroNonmatchingBeliefs give a zero score to a collaborative plan when the agents disagree
on the reasons for having adopted a particular intention These reasons are the warrants
		
for the intention The way this dierence is reected in DesignWorld is to check whether the
agents agree on the value of each piece of furniture in the  nal plan See  gure 
  MatchedPair MP tabulate only the scores for the matchedpair optional goals of the
MatchedPair and MatchedPairTwoRoom task
  MatchedPairAll MPALL tabulate the scores for both the standard task and the matched
pair optional goals of the MatchedPair and MatchedPairTwoRoom task
  Evaluating Performance
The term raw score refers to the number of total points the agents achieve on the task without
any consideration of costs to achieve those points The term costs refer to retrieval inference
and sending and receiving messages and performance is used to describe raw score with costs
subtracted
The DesignWorld task provides an objective measure of bene ts that is based on summing the
values of the pieces of furniture used in the  nal plan or summing these along with the points
achieved for matchedpair inferences In addition every solution has certain costs associated with
it The costs that must be weighed along with the objective measure of the quality of the solution
are  costs of communication based on number of messages  costs of inference based on
tracking the number of inferences required to complete the task and  costs of retrieval based
on tracking the number of steps required to retrieve needed facts from memory These costs are
highly relevant when agents are resourcebounded if agents have limited resources then a solution
that is too expensive cannot be achieved
	   Composite Cost Evaluation Function
The goal of the composite cost evaluation function is to vary evaluation of the resulting design
under dierent assumptions about the relation between  commcost cost of sending a message
 infcost cost of inference and  retcost cost of retrieval from memory performance
is calculated as
performance  Task De ned raw score
" commcost  number of messages
" infcost  number of inferences for both agents
" retcost  number of memory retrieval steps for both agents
	
The way performance is de ned reects the fact that agents are meant to collaborate on the task
The raw score for each individual agent is simply the raw score that they achieve together
The costs that are deducted from this raw score are the costs for both agents processing The
total amount of communication is the sum of both agents messages Total inferences is the sum of
both agents inferences Total retrieval is the sum of both agents retrieval Thus the composite
cost function gives a measure of collaborative effort and reects the assumption that agents
want to achieve the least collaborative effort Clark and WilkesGibbs 
 Clark and
Schaefer  Brennan 	
Varying costs reects assumptions about dierent kinds of processors or dierent kinds of com
munication situations In some situations communication may be very inexpensive or free for
example picking up the telephone and making a local call In other situations say if messages can
only be sent via a keyboard or an agent can only type with his toes communication may be costly
Inference costs may vary from one agent to another Retrieval costs could be varied to demonstrate
dierences between human and arti cial agents Most humans are limited as to the amount of
retrieval they can do but fast parallel machines can retrieve considerably more at less cost Thus
there is no right answer as to what these costs might be
The approach here is to make these costs parameters of the model and explore what the eects
are of dierent assumptions about costs All of the simulations in the following chapters have been
evaluated in each task situation for a range of cost parameters
There are two limitations of the current de nition One is that all inferences are counted the same
and thus is dependent on the domain model and how much information each inference contains It
is possible to limit the amount of dierence between dierent types of inferences by setting infcost
very low in order to reduce the eect of inference overall However it would be necessary to add
other parameters to the evaluation function to reect the fact that some inferences may be more
costly than others
A second limitation is that it might be desirable to demonstrate dierent assumptions about mem
ory access In this implementation retrieval is linearly related to overall performance by some
factor determined by retcost In order to simulate parallelism one would want to de ne total
retrieval cost as eg logretrievalsteps This would mean that each memory radius is accessed
serially but all the loci at each memory radius value are accessed in parallel Using a retrieval
cost function like this would be closer to Landauers original formulation of the model Landauer

	
Independent of particular assumptions that are used to calculate performance the goal is to be able
to compare dierent strategies and to test whether the dierences in performance are signi cant
How signi cance is determined will be discussed in section 	
	  Evaluating Statistical Signicance
This section discusses issues with evaluating the statistical signi cance of dierences in performance
in the simulations First the number of samples required to approximate the theoretical distribution
was determined Second the KolmogorovSmirnov two sample test was identi ed as an appropriate
test for comparing the distributions of the two samples
   Raw Score approximates Beta Distributions
Sample distributions from runs of two AllImplicit agents for each AWM setting are shown in  gure
 The distributions in  gure  demonstrate the increase in raw score that we would expect
with increases in AWM These distributions approximateBeta distributions and this approximation
was used to determine the number of runs necessary for stable results  
The Beta distribution with the largest variance for parameters R and S greater than or equal to
 is the uniform distribution This largest variance distribution would require approximately 
samples Since none of the variances were that large see  gure  sample size was set at 		
An empirical evaluation of the adequacy of this sample size for three dierent strategies was tested
to see if any dierences showed up in alternate runs of 		 no dierences were found 
  KolmogorovSmirnov TwoSample Test
Generally we are interested in how the performance of one pair of agents compares to the per
formance of another pair of agents on a particular version of the task The point of the dialogue
strategies is to see whether performance can be improved across several AWM settings simply by
varying the dialogue strategy while holding everything else constant Thus particular strategies will
be shown to bene cial for inferencelimited agents others for attentionlimited agents and others
dependent on the task situation
  I am indebted to Max Mintz for consultancy on the best way to determine the number of runs required for stable
distributions and for guidance on the development of a program to calculate di erences in distributions using the
KolmogorovSmirnov twosample test
 We will see below in section  that changing the denition of the task transforms these distributions so that
they are no longer Beta distributions However since these transforms are applied after the initial sample collection
I assume that a sample size of  is adequate
	
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Figure  Histograms of Score Distributions for Dialogues between two AllImplicit Agents for
all AWM settings
Because the approximation to Beta distributions is not exact and because various transforms
change the distributions in nonpredictable ways a nonparametric test was required The dier
ences in performance are evaluated using the KolmogorovSmirnov twosample test henceforth KS
Siegel 
 Wilks 
 The KS twosample test is a test of whether two independent samples
have been drawn from the same population or from populations with the same distribution The
results below use the twotailed version of the test The twotailed test is sensitive to any kind of
dierence in the distributions from which the two samples were drawn eg dierences in location
central tendency in dispersion in skewness etc
	
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Figure  Comparing the Score Distributions for Dialogues between an ExplicitAcceptance
Agent and an AllImplicit agent EIIKIM and two AllImplicit Agents BILLKIM for AWM of
  and 
 for Standard Task for commcost  	 infcost  	 retcost  	
The twosample test is concerned with the amount of agreement between two cumulative distri
butions If the two samples have in fact been drawn from the same population distribution then
the cumulative distributions of both samples are expected to be close to each other If the two
sample cumulative distributions are too far apart at any point this suggests that the samples come
	
from dierent populations Thus a large enough deviation between the two sample cumulative
distributions is evidence that they are not from the same population
In terms of DesignWorld simulations this means that if the distributions between the cumulative
distributions of two samples are dierent enough for a particular AWM setting task de nition
cost setting and strategy then we can assume that agents using dierent strategies perform dif
ferently under those parameters For example consider a strategy to be introduced in chapter

 of always explicitly indicating both acceptance and rejection of a proposal This is the
ExplicitAcceptance strategy
Figure  shows the distributions for dialogues in which one agent uses the ExplicitAcceptance
strategy as compared with dialogues in which both agents are AllImplicit Histograms are given
for AWM of   and 
 under the assumption that all processing costs are free The KS test will
show that the dierences in the distributions at AWM of  are signi cant at the p  	 level and
at AWM of  and 
 at the p  	 level
To apply the KS test we normalize performance measures to values between 	 and  and make
a cumulative frequency distribution for each sample of observations using the same intervals for
both distributions For each interval then we subtract one step function from the other The test
focuses on the largest of these observed deviations
Let Sn X  the observed cumulative step function of one of the samples that is Sn  X  Kn 
where K  the number of scores equal to or less than X Let SnX  the observed cumulative
step function of the other sample that is SnX  Kn The KS test focuses on the maximum
absolute value of the dierences
D  maximum j Sn  X  Sn X j
Critical values for D can be calculated from the sample size and the level of signi cance desired
see Table M in Siegel 
 Here sample size is 		 for both samples If D   then the
dierence is signi cant at the p  	 level and if D   then the dierence is signi cant at the
p  	 level
Now we are in a position to specify when a strategy is beneficial
A strategy A is beneficial as compared to a strategy B in the same task situation
with the same cost settings if the dierence in distributions using the Kolmogorov
Smirnov two sample test is signi cant at p  	 in the positive direction for two or
more AWM settings
	

The converse of beneficial is detrimental
A strategy A is detrimental as compared to a strategy B in the same task situation
with the same cost settings if the dierence in distributions using the Kolmogorov
Smirnov two sample test is signi cant at p  	 in the negative direction for two or
more AWM settings
Strategies need not be either beneficial or detrimental there may be no dierence between
two strategies Also with the de nition given above a strategy may be both beneficial and
detrimental depending on the range of AWM that the two settings are selected from This is
because the KS test compares distributions for each AWM setting at a time but whether a strategy
is beneficial is de ned over all the AWM settings
The next section shows how dierent assumptions about costs and the task de nition determines
whether or not a strategy is bene cial
	  Eects of Task Denition and Changes in Costs
Task Costs AWM  AWM  AWM 
Standard 			 	  	
Standard 		  	 
Zero Invalids 			 	 	
 
Zero NonMatching Beliefs 			   	
Figure 
 Sample means of 		 runs for each evaluation function for AllImplicit agents at 
dierent AWM settings
One way of seeing how the evaluation function costs and task de nitions change the scores for
a particular strategy is to examine the performance means In  gure 
 performance means
are shown for dierent AWM settings and dierent assumptions about costs In the  rst row
composite cost is run with commcost and infcost set to  and retcost to 			 while in
the second row commcost is set at 	 infcost at  and retcost at 	 In the nonstandard task
situations we assume that all processing is free
Each task de nition and cost combination produce dierent results for dierent strategies and allow
us to explore which situational parameters determine whether or not a communication strategy is
beneficial Remember that when using the Standard task invalid steps in the plan are simply
substracted out the raw score whereas in the ZeroInvalids task agents that make mistakes get
	
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Figure  Comparing the Performance Distributions for Dialogues between an Explicit
Acceptance Agent and an AllImplicit agent EIIKIM and two AllImplicit Agents BILLKIM
for AWM of   and 
 for Standard Task for commcost   infcost   retcost  			
Dierences are signi cant at AWM of  and 

a raw score of 	 In the ZeroNonmatchingBeliefs task agents must agree both on the actions
to be performed as well as the reasons for performing these actions
As shown in  gure 
 the performance means give a good indication of how agents perform with
	
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Figure  Comparing the Performance Distributions for Dialogues between an Explicit
Acceptance Agent and an AllImplicit agent EIIKIM and two AllImplicit Agents BILLKIM
for AWM of   and 
 for Standard Task for commcost   infcost   retcost  	 No
Sign cant Dierences
a particular strategy They show that performance is highly situation speci c For example the
AllImplicit agents strategy does well at avoiding invalid steps row  does reasonably well when
	
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Figure  Sample Dierence Plots Dierences using KS at 
 are signi cant
retrieval is not too expensive row  and does rather less well when matching beliefs for warrants
must be achieved row 
Another way of depicting dierences in performance is the performance distribution plots such
as those presented in  gure  Lets examine how communication costs alone eect changes
in distributions Keeping strategy dierences constant note that  gure  showed performance
distributions when all processing costs were assumed to be free Figure  shows the performance
distributions for the situation in which commcost is  infcost is  and retcost is 			 Figure
 shows the performance distributions for the situation in which commcost is  infcost is  and
retcost is 	 The dierences in the distributions are signi cant for AWM of  and 
 when
processing is free  gure  When retcost is at 			 the distributions are attened slightly but
we still get signi cant dierences at AWM of  and 
 As we increase the cost of retrieval the
dierences in distributions is attened so that when retcost is 	 there are no signi cant dierences
in performance for any of the AWM values shown  gure 
	  Dierence Plots Comparing Performance
	
We have seen two ways of examining performance looking at means for particular parametertask
settings and looking at performance distributions In what follows I will use a third way of
visualizing performance Dierences in performance will be shown with dierence plots A
dierence plot compares two strategies strategy  and strategy  A sample dierence plot is
shown in  gure  The idea of dierence plots is to give an overview of the dierences between
two strategies at all AWM settings without depicting histograms If strategy  is better than
strategy  the curve plotted will be above the 	 xaxis line in the plot If strategy  is better
than strategy then the curve is below the plotted line The actual distributions that correspond
to the dierence plot in  gure  are also shown in the Performance distributions in  gure 
for AWM of   and 

The motivation for dierence plots is that while presenting histograms of distributions doesnt
lose any information presenting these distributions in the remainder of the thesis may be overly
complex For example presenting performance distributions requires visual comparisons between
two sets of histograms such as those given in  gures   and  In other words 
performance distributions are needed to present the same information encapsulated in a dierence
plot such as that shown in  gure 
The problem is that there is no guaranteed correspondence between the dierences in means pre
sented in dierence plots and the dierences in distributions used by the KS test to calculate
statistical signi cance for performance dierences However in practice here since the evaluation
of performance is always over a bounded interval in most cases when the distributions are sig
ni cantly dierent the means are also look signi cantly dierent However the converse is not
always true For example the dierences shown in  gure 	 for AWM of  and 
 are not
signicant
Despite these issues it seems that presenting dierence plots does not seriously misrepresent the
results In each case KS is used to calculate signi cance for each AWM setting for each strategy
and the signi cance values will be presented with each plot
   Related Work
DesignWorld was inspired by the TileWorld simulation environment a rapidly changing robot
world in which an arti cial agent attempts to optimize reasoning and and planning Bratman
Israel and Pollack  Pollack and Ringuette 	 TileWorld was designed to test a theory
of resourcebounded reasoning and deliberation Unlike DesignWorld TileWorld is a single agent

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Figure 	 Visual Dierences in Means are not always signi cant Dierences using KS at 

here are NOT SIGNIFICANT
world in which the agent interacts with its environment rather than with another agent Design
World uses similar methods to test a theory of the eect of resource limits on communicative
behavior between two agetns
DesignWorld is also similar to the method used in the Edinburgh Dialogue Programs Power 
Houghton and Isard  Carletta  This method is distinct from other computationally
oriented research on discourse by attempting to provide a theory and a testbed for the roles of both
the speaker and the hearer in a dialogic interaction rather than for one role alone Each of these
Dialogue Programs tests out dierent aspects of a theory of dialogue For example Power developed
a computational simulation environment for dialogues between two arti cial agents conceptualized
as robots who must converse in order to be able to carry out actions to achieve their goals in an
arti cial world Carlettas work focuses on variations in dialogue strategies between agents who
may be risktakers and methods for agents to recover from the errors engendered by taking such
risks Carlettas methods are the closest to those presented here and will be discussed in more
detail below

The bene ts of the Edinburgh method are that a number of hypotheses can be tested by a simu
lation that would be dicult to test in other ways The method also forces the operationalization
of goodness of  t between the discourse strategies used by the speaker and the interpretation
strategies used by the hearer in an extended dialogue Furthermore extensions of the Edinburgh
method developed in this thesis provide empirical support for claims about processing which are
extremely dicult to judge either through introspection or by distributional analysis 
DesignWorld is most similar to Carlettas JAM simulation for the Edinburgh MapTask Carletta
 Carlettas simulation is based on the MapTask Dialogue corpus where the goal of the task
is for the planning agent the instructor to instruct the reactive agent the instructee how to get
from one place to another on the map The instructor has a map with a number of landmarks and a
route on it The instructee must draw the route on his version of the map but his maps landmarks
may not exactly match that of the instructor This de nes one dierence between DesignWorld
and the JAM system DesignWorld simulates mixedinitiative dialogues while JAM simulates an
expertapprentice type dialogue and all of the MapTask dialogues are single initiative except for
the clari cation requests of instructees
Carlettas simulation parametrizes agents according to their communication strategies and recovery
strategies The simulation explores many issues that are relevant for this thesis including high risk
dialogue strategies and methods of recovering from these strategies when failure occurs Agents
can take risks with respect to whether or not they make the context explicit what Carletta calls
context articulation This is similar to the explicit Attention strategies to be discussed in chapter
 However Carletta notes that in the MapTask context articulation doesnt serve any function
because the context is always obvious
A more critical high risk strategy involves de nite references to locations that may not appear on
the instructees map eg the big river The low risk version of achieving the same goal might
involve asking the instructee whether or not they have a big river on their map before producing
an instruction that refers to it High risk strategies produce failures in communication that must
be recovered from The instructor then initiates one of several recovery strategies using a notion
of utility to select between them The recovery strategy selected is based on calculations of the
expected cost of repairing the current plan or replanning from scratch
Based on her simulationCarletta argues that high risk strategies are more ecient where eciency
is a measure of the number of utterances in the dialogue Here I have argued that the number of
 Processing claims can of course be partially judged by psycholinguistic experiments which have the advantage
of studying real humans but the parameters that are investigated here cannot be varied as easily with real humans
Also reaction time is a blunt instrumentwhen it comes to providing support for a theory about the tradeo s between
inference retrieval from memory and producing and processing messages

utterances is just one parameter for evaluating performance In addition if we wanted to have a
more precise performance measure there are problems with de ning a performance measure for
the MapTask The human subjects who carried out the task were not told that their performance
would be measured by any particular criteria and some of the subject pairs produced routes that
barely approximated the one they were supposed to draw Thus the only measure of eciency
possible is the length of the dialogue or time to solution but these measures ignore the quality
of the solution This means that the MapTask dialogue corpus cannot be used to explore the
eciency tradeos of dierent dialogue strategies
In contrast DesignWorld is set up so that there is a clear notion of maximizing the utility of the
collaborative plan The fact that the value of an accepted plan is easily calculable means that
DesignWorld provides an objective measure of the success or failure of various strategies
  Design
World Summary
This chapter discussed DesignWorld as one of two complementary empirical methods used in this
thesis to support the theory of the function of IRUs DesignWorld provides a method of testing
the function of IRUs and claims about processing which are impossible to test with a distributional
analysis DesignWorld provides an objective performance measure for dialogue strategies and ways
to measure various cognitive costs This allows us distinguish a strategy that makes it possible for
an agent to do something as compared with one that makes it easier for an agent to do something
In the following chapters results from DesignWorld will be used along with the distributional
analysis to argue for each communicative function of IRUs Each communicative function has a
number of associated strategies implemented in DesignWorld Sections  and 
 described the
DesignWorld domain and the task Section  presented the discourse actions that agents use
to communicate these actions are the primitives out of which the communicative strategies are
created
Evaluating the performance of agents using various strategies depends on other parameters of the
communication situation Dierent task de nitions were considered in section  and section
	 de ned a performance measure composite cost that is used to evaluate the eectiveness of
these strategies depending on the dierent costs as de ned in the communication situation Design
World results for Attitude strategies will be presented in chapter 
 for Consequence strategies in
chapter  and for Attention strategies in chapter 

Chapter 
Attitude
  Introduction
The communicative function of attitude IRUs is to demonstrate the hearers attitude to an
utterance just contributed by a speaker to the discourse situation S Previous work has noted
that whether a proposition is added to the discourse model does not follow automatically just from
the fact that a speaker made an assertion the hearer has the opportunity to reject the assertion
Stalnaker  Gazdar  Clark and Schaefer  The hearers demonstration of attitude
constrains whether and how the propositional content of the utterance and any inferences that
follow from this content are added to the discourse model
While speakers can display various attitudes to a proposition conveyed such as understanding
acceptance surprise dismay or rejection this chapter focuses on the less emotive attitudes central
to problemsolving dialogues understanding acceptance and rejection Acceptance is not
automatic even when agents are cooperating This is reected in the attitude assumption
  attitude assumption Agents deliberate whether to accept or reject an assertion or
proposal made by another agent in discourse
The attitude assumption means that agents have to work at achieving mutuality This is
represented by coordination assumption 
coordination assumption 
Achieving mutuality of beliefs and intentions is a coordination problem for conversants
Furthermore whether an utterance counts as an acceptance or rejection must often be inferred

because speakers dont make their propositional attitudes explicit by saying I agree or I dont
believe you Often the way listeners interpret which attitude is conveyed depends on the prosodic
realization of an utterance An example of an Attitude IRU prosodically realized with a phrase
 nal fall is given in  where M repeats what H has said in 

  H That is correct It could be moved around so that each of you have two thousand
 M I see

 H Without penalty
 M WITHOUT PENALTY
 H Right
 M And the fact that I have a an account of my own from a couple of years ago
when I was working doesnt aect this at all
The repetition in  conveys the fact that M heard and understood the verbatim content of
what H said in 
 Clark and Brennan 	 In addition Ms utterance conveys that she
accepts Hs assertion both because it is realized with a  nal fall and because M passes up an
opportunity to say anything more about what H has asserted Scheglo  Whittaker and
Stenton  Thus M has demonstrated her attitude to Hs assertion
Section  presented the framework for representing what is mutual called mutual supposition
The mutual supposition of understanding is treated separately from acceptance and rejec 
tion Section 
 examines the intention to achieve understanding and then section 
 extends
the treatment of understanding to support the inference of acceptance Previous work has as
sumed that rejection must be conveyed by denial or logical contradiction In section 
 I will argue
that neither denial or contradiction are necessary to communicate rejection and that certain types
of IRUs may convey rejection Section 
 builds on the analyses in the earlier sections to explain
how agents can achieve collaborative plans
The theory presented here is supported by two empirical bases a distributional analysis of At
titude IRUs and DesignWorld experiments that vary how Attitude is demonstrated Aspects of
the distributional analysis that support the theory are presented throughout The DesignWorld
simulations presented in section 

 show that Attitude IRUs make interaction more robust and
help agents avoid making mistakes even when communication is not uncertain
 Mutual Understanding
mutual understanding is the mutual supposition that an utterance has been understood as


intended and is usually inferred rather than communicated directly Since the minimal purpose
of any dialogue is that an utterance be understood this goal is a prerequisite to achieving other
goals such as another agent believing the proposition conveyed or committing to a future action
described by that proposition
According to the shared environment model an utterance event U in a discourse situation S
licenses the inference of certain mutual suppositions depending on what U indicates in S To
formalize the indicates relation it is useful to augment the representation of utterance events
with two additional constructs assumptions and endorsements The endorsement types were
discussed in section  Assumptions are beliefs that support a mutual supposition
Let % be a function on utterances that represents the set of defeasible assumptions associated
with each utterance event The indicates function will be represented as leadsto where % gives
the set of associated assumptions For utterance events % always includes a set of assumptions
about understanding Clark and Schaefer  Walker b
 attention the addressee B is attending to U
 complete hearing the addressee hears U correctly
 realize the addressee believes that U said in discourse situation S realizes a proposition
& and that the speaker intended to convey &  
 license the addressee believes that U said in discourse situation S realizes a proposition &
and that the speaker intended the addressee to infer # which follows from & as an entailment
or by nonlogical inference
The realize and license assumptions reect the interpretation process of conversants as they
attempt to determine what the utterance U indicates in a discourse situation S For convenience
I will de ne two functions associated with these assumptions The function R SU P returns
the proposition that the speaker of an utterance U in discourse situation S intends to realize and
which the addressee must identify The function L SU P returns the proposition licensed as
an inference by an utterance U in a discourse situation S which again the addressee must identify
The realize function R and license function L are relativized to both the conversants through the
utterance event U and to the discourse situation S This captures the fact that what an utterance
means can depend on shared assumptions between two conversants as well as properties of the
discourse situation
 Of course the addressee may believe that U in S realizes some other proposition besides the one that the
speaker intended to convey The realization assumption represents the fact that  is not conveyed directly Reddy
 Scheglo   Brennan 

The defeasibility of the assumptions in %U is represented by associating an endorsement with
each assumption from the set of endorsement types discussed in section  All of the assumptions
start out with an endorsement of hypothesis One of the roles of Attitude IRUs discussed in
more detail in the next section is that of upgrading the endorsement for a mutual supposition To
illustrate here how Attitude IRUs can aect endorsements consider example 
 A The number is  
B  
Bs repetition in b means that the complete hearing assumption now has an endorsement
type of linguistic After Bs utterance B would be inconsistent to assert later in the dialogue
that I didnt hear what the number was Without Bs utterance a later assertion of this type would
be acceptable it would simply defeat the default assumption that B did hear as long as no other
beliefs contradicted this later assertion
The understanding inference rule UIR represents the fact that inferences about what S
indicates depend upon the assumptions above This rule represents how the mutual suppositions
are updated based on agents behavior in discourse Let A and B represent arbitrary members of a
population of conversants P i an arbitrary element of sequential indices I  an arbitrary member
of the set of sentences 
Understanding Inference Rule
An utterance event U  A B i    MSP understandB RSU
This rule says that given an utterance event U it is possible to derive a mutual supposition that the
addressee understood the content of the utterance The rule is based on the fact that an utterance
U demonstrates a public hypothesis that it will achieve its purpose The fact that things do not
always go as planned is represented by the assumptions %U de ned for each utterance event
Each assumption   %U associated with U underlying the inference of mutual supposition is
initially endorsed as a hypothesis as shown below
This lets all members of P start supporting the mutual supposition simultaneously Halpern and Moses 	
but this mutual supposition is very defeasible

%U Endorsement
attend B U hypothesis
hear B U hypothesis
realizeB U RS U hypothesis
If the speaker intends # to be inferred where # is an inference from & the content of U the license
assumption is included in %U
%U Endorsement
licenseB U LS U entailment  default
Since the addressee is never in a position to know for sure what the speakers intent is she must
determine what the likely intended inferences are
Utterance Ui
  operates directly on the assumptions %Ui underlying utterance Ui For example
since the assumptions associated with the UIR are very defeasible when they are only hypotheses
subsequent events can easily defeat these assumptions and if an assumption is defeated the mutual
supposition is defeated Subsequent events can also upgrade the strength of these assumptions
The eect of Ui
  on the assumptions underlying Ui depends on showing that conventionally the
next utterance position is the attitude locus Evidence that this is so will be provided in section


Both the content and the form of Ui
  determine whether the assumptions %Ui are defeated or
upgraded For example the complete hearing assumption of Ui can be defeated via conventional
means by a Ui
  of What
 This adds  hear B Ui to the discourse model with an endorse
ment of linguistic which defeats the hypothesis endorsement on the complete hearing assumption
and thus defeats the mutual supposition of understanding
If a mutual supposition is defeated its negation becomes mutually supposed and the endorsement
on the negated belief is based on whatever kind of evidence defeated the positive supposition
For example each of not attending not hearing not knowing what the utterance realizes or not
knowing what the utterance licenses supports the mutual supposition of not understanding
The distributional analysis shows that the repair strategy of the speaker in response to the defeat of a mutual

Prosodic realization of an Attitude IRU is critical to interpretation a phrase  nal rise on an Attitude
IRU question intonation can defeat the realize andor the license assumption depending
on whether the IRU is a repetition a paraphrase or makes an inference explicit Attitude IRUs
with phrase  nal falls serve a dierent function that of upgrading the endorsements on the
assumptions underlying the inference of mutual understandingWalker c I will call this
subset of Attitude IRUs which communicate understanding and which may license the inference
of acceptance Attitude Acceptance IRUs These will be discussed in the next section

  Attitude Acceptance IRUs
This section discusses the eects of Ui
  on the attention hearing realize and license assumptions
underlying the inference of mutual understanding of the content of Ui Each type of Attitude
Acceptance IRU the assumption addressed and the endorsement provided is shown in  gure 

The inferences about what is mutually supposed licensed by the addressees following utterance
are conversational defaults Joshi Webber and Weischedel 
 They are implicatures
that arise from norms of interaction and have the diagnostic properties of implicatures of being
both reinforceable and defeasible Sadock 
NEXT ASSUMPTION ENDORSEMENT
Utterance Type ADDRESSED TYPE
REPETITION attention hearing linguistic
PARAPHRASE attention hearing realize linguistic
ENTAILMENT attention hearing realize license linguistic
IMPLICATURE attention hearing realize license linguistic
ANY Next
Utterance attention hearing realize license default
Figure 
 How the Addressees Following utterance upgrades the endorsement for assumptions
underlying the inference of mutual understanding
supposition is di erent in each case For the attend and hear assumptions speakers repeat their utterance For the
realize assumption speakers paraphrase their utterance and for the license assumption speakers paraphrase or make
inferences explicit Thus speakers repair strategies are directed toward failed assumptions as would be expected
This function of phrase nal rises is probably specic both to the sequential position of the utterance the fact
that it is an IRU and possibly other aspects of the discourse situation codied by the HG corpus Other research has
demonstrated a more general function for rises that of soliciting a response of some kind from the hearer McLemore
 McLemore 

	
As detailed in  gure 
 each hearer old type eg repetitions paraphrases and making en
tailments explicit provides a linguistic endorsement on the attention assumption because some
response was generated by the next speaker Each type also has speci c distinct properties in the
way it operates on the discourse model The speci c contribution of each of these types will be
discussed in the remainder of this section
Note here that any next utterance Ui
  by the addressee upgrades the endorsements on each of
%Ui to default See Figure 
 The basis for these conversational defaults will be discussed in
section 

   Repetition
A repetition demonstrates complete hearing of the verbatim content of what was said Clark and
Brennan 	 Consider the example below
  
 r does that income from the certi cate of deposit rule her out as a dependent
  H Yes it does
  r IT DOES
  H Yup that knocks her out 
The caller r in  repeats Hs assertion from  with a phrase  nal fall This repetition
upgrades the endorsement on the hearing and attention assumptions associated with  from
hypothesis to linguistic The realization assumption is upgraded to default since r repeated
what he heard but chose not to provide evidence that he actually understood what H meant The
eect on %U is as follows
%U ENDORSEMENT
attendr U linguistic
hearr U linguistic
realizer U RS U default
Because of the weakest link rule the mutual supposition licensed by UIR is a default
MSP understandr RS U default

However the attention and complete hearing assumptions are no longer defeasible by linguistic
evidence Thus it would be contradictory for r in subsequent conversation to say Oh I didnt
hear you say that or I thought you said that it doesnt rule her out as a dependent
  Paraphrase
As shown in  gure 
 paraphrases and making entailments explicit also upgrade the complete
hearing assumption A paraphrase demonstrates complete hearing by showing that the verbatim
content has been semantically incorporated into the addressees memory Making an entailment
explicit demonstrates complete hearing by showing that the verbatim content has been incorporated
into the addressees memory and that at least one inference has been performed on this content
In addition a paraphrase and making an entailment explicit provide a linguistic endorsement for the
realize assumption of what proposition the paraphraser believes the previous utterance realizes
Paraphrases do this by demonstrating that the content has been semantically incorporated into
memory Consider example 
  H I see Are there any other children beside your wife

 d No
	 H YOUR WIFE IS AN ONLY CHILD
 d right and uh wants to give her some security 
Utterance 	 is said with a phrase  nal fall and modi es the assumptions associated with 
as follows
%U  ENDORSEMENT
attendh U  linguistic
hearhU  linguistic
realizeh U  RS U	 linguistic
In other words h has demonstrated that as far as he is concerned  in S realizes the same
proposition as 	 The eect of this demonstration is to upgrade the realize assumption associ
ated with  Because of the weakest link rule the UIR now licenses a mutual supposition of
understanding with a linguistic endorsement since all of the underlying assumptions are endorsed

as linguistic Thus a paraphrase provides excellent evidence that an agent actually understood
what another agent meant
MSunderstandh RS U  linguistic
  Making Inferences Explicit
IRUs that make inferences explicit in addition to their ability to address the assumptions that
paraphrases do provide evidence of what inferences the speaker of the IRU believes are licensed in
S Explicit entailment IRUs in the attitude locus provide evidence about what is licensed by
the prior utterance The license assumption represents both inferences such as entailments and
inferences based on nonlogical inference rules such as implicatures Consider example  where
h makes an inference explicit in  This inference follows from modus tollens the content
of  and 
 and the content of other utterances in S that make it clear that the tax year
under discussion here is 
  H oh no IRAs were available as long as you are not a participant in an existing
pension

 j Oh I see well I did work I do work for a company that has a pension
 H ahh THEN YOURE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR EIGHTY ONE
The fact that the proposition realized by  was inferrable fromRS U  is represented by the
license assumption which after 
 is endorsed as an entailment as shown below
licenseh U  RS U  entailment
However  upgrades the endorsement on this assumption to linguistic
licenseh U  RS U  linguistic
Making an inference explicit also upgrades the endorsements on the attention complete hearing
and realize assumptions to linguistic These assumptions are upgraded because making an inference
from an utterance presupposes attending to it hearing it and understanding its propositional
content


 Distribution of Types of Attitude IRUs
I presented a model above of how dierent types of IRUs de ned by the hearer old distribu
tional parameters have dierent eects on the assumptions underlying the mutual supposition of
understanding All of these types of IRUs occur in the HG corpus with similar frequency as shown
in  gure 

Repetitions Paraphrases Inferences
Attitude   
Not Attitude 
  
Figure 
 Distribution of Attitude vs Not Attitude IRUs by Hearer Old parameters Attitude 
Adjacent and Other
However if we compare Attitude IRUs to other IRUs  gure 
 shows that Attitude IRUs are more
likely to be repetitions than paraphrases 	   
 p   		 df   They are also more likely
to be repetitions than inferences 	    p   		 df   These repetitions require less
eort than either paraphrases or making inferences explicit but only provide evidence of hearing
the verbatim content rather than any deeper understanding
While it would seem that speakers would repeat when they think only evidence of verbatim hearing
is required I have not discovered any distributional correlates of repetitions that predict when a
speaker might choose to repeat rather than paraphrase or make an inference explicit
It is possible that in the HG corpus much of the information given is fairly straightforward and
hearing is all that is required On the other hand there are very few misunderstandings in the
corpus which seem to be due to mishearing As argued earlier an alternate motivation would be
that Repetition Attitude IRUs are selected in these situations as a very minimal response requiring
little eort They are presented as hearer old information prosodically as well Walker c
which should mean that are allocated a reduced amount of processing time due to their prosodic
realization alone Cutler 
 Cutler and Foss  Nooteboom and Kruyt  Terken and
Nooteboom 

 Summary Understanding
This section has argued that Attitude IRUs in general provide evidence as to the addressees
attitude toward a proposition conveyed by a speaker in a discourse situation S I focused here on
the inference of mutual understanding which is a prerequisite to other goals in discourse and which

can be assumed to always be a shared intention for any conversation Attitude IRUs with phrase
 nal falls can upgrade the assumptions %U associated with each utterance event U making the
inference of mutual understanding less defeasible in the context Section 
 illustrated for each
hearer old category of IRU the assumptions it addresses and the eects on the discourse model
In each case the IRU addresses one or more assumptions that have to be made in order to infer
that mutual understanding has actually been achieved The assumption rather than endorsed as
hypothesis or default is upgraded to an endorsement type of linguistic as a result of the IRU The
fact that dierent IRUs address dierent assumptions leads to the perception that some IRUs are
better evidence for understanding than others eg a paraphrase is stronger evidence of under
standing than a repetition Clark and Schaefer  Section 
 will discuss the extension of the
account given here to the inference of mutual acceptance Section 
 will present distributional
correlates for attitude IRUs
Attitude Acceptance IRUs may simultaneously achieve other eects in addition to the upgrade
function focused on here For example Attitude IRUs can be a rehearsal strategy for the speaker
Consider a situation in which the caller repeats the phone number that the information operator
just gave him This IRU is an eective way to remember the phone number
Attitude IRUs can also maintain a proposition as salient ie simultaneously function as an At
tention IRU This intention is made more plausible by the fact that in this discourse situation
Repetition Attitude IRUs are common but complete hearing doesnt seem to be a problem It is
plausible that Attitude IRUs are used conventionally or that they are intended to merely reect the
speakers attentional state since it is surprising that speakers would provide evidence of complete
hearing when there is little chance that complete hearing wasnt achieved
Finally in previous work we argued that a speaker who produces an Attitude IRU conveys that
she has no reason to want to take control of the dialogue and the current speaker should continue
Whittaker and Stenton  Walker and Whittaker 	 This is a paraphrase of aspects of the
theory presented here one reason a conversant might want to take control is because they dont
understand the content of the utterance Other reasons will be discussed in the following section
For particular instances of Attitude IRUs it is not clear which if any intention is primary and at
tempting to make this distinction in corpus analysis is problematic The DesignWorld experiments
discussed in section 

 will however provide some insight on these multiple eects One eect that
will be tested is whether Attitude IRUs can have a rehearsal bene t even in a situation in which
there is no uncertainty as to whether an utterance is heard understood or accepted

 Acceptance
In section 
 I distinguished the attitudes of understanding acceptance and rejection Section 

presented an analysis of how the mutual supposition of understanding is inferred This section will
extend that analysis to the inference of acceptance
In computational models of discourse the inference of acceptance is usually accomplished via
helpful or cooperative axioms These axioms are based on the simplifying assumption that
helpful agents will adopt other agents beliefs and intentions Cohen and Levesque 	 Litman
and Allen 	 However a problem is that in many situations these assumptions may not be
warranted
Another version of the helpful assumption is Grosz and Sidners conversational default rule CDR
in which the inference of acceptance depends on whether or not the addressee previously believed
P Grosz and Sidner 	 Perrault 	 It isnt clear whether CDR is used by both agents
in planning utterances but if so it is hard to see how it helps an agent engaged in a dialogue If
an agent thinks that another agent previously believed that P then there is no point in making an
assertion that P On the other hand if an agent knows that another agent previously believed that
P then there can be no point in making the assertion since by this assumption the other agent
will not change hisher beliefs This assumption is of course useful in precisely those situations
where an agent can be sure that another agent has no previous beliefs about P but it is not clear
how often agents are actually in this position Examination of naturallyoccurring dialogues in this
work and elsewhere shows the even in situations where the addressee has asked a question as to
whether P she often has beliefs that would support P or P Pollack Hirschberg and Webber
 Whittaker and Stenton  Walker and Whittaker 	
The account presented here departs from previous work in dropping these helpful and coopera
tive simplifying assumptions and providing another way to make inferences about acceptance and
rejection It cannot be assumed that the speaker A always knows enough about Bs mental state
to be able to predict whether or not B will accept As assertion that P The key observation that
supports dropping the cooperative and helpful assumptions is that agents behavior provides
observable evidence for whether or not the intended eect of an utterance has been achieved and
that speakers deliberately provide such evidence to indicate their level of understanding and accep
tance There are two separate issues here  whether or not B accepts As proposal and  how
acceptance and rejection is displayed or negotiated
Modulo motivations of Attention and Consequence that are proposed here and that will be discussed in chapters
	 and 
This is distinct from that fact that A may want plan hisher utterances strategically to improve the chances of
having them accepted This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 	



  Extending the Understanding Inference Rule
In order to extend the treatment of understanding to acceptance there needs to be an extension of
the UIR for inferring the mutual supposition of acceptance of a proposal or assertion in dialogue
Let A and B represent arbitrary members of a population of conversants P i an arbitrary element
of I  an arbitrary member of 
Acceptance Inference Rule AIR
An utterance event U  A B i    MSP acceptB RS U
The dierence between the UIR and the AIR are the underlying assumptions %U For the AIR
acceptance is one of the assumptions   %U associated with an utterance event U as shown
below
%U ENDORSEMENT
attend B U hypothesis
hear B U hypothesis
realizeB U RS U hypothesis
licenseB U LS U entailment  default
accept B U RS U hypothesis
The inference of acceptance is licensed by the response of the hearer B in a way that is similar
to the inference of mutual understanding Whether the conversants mutually suppose that the
AIR is in eect depends on the communication situation Mutual awareness or agreement about
the communiation situation is critical because acceptance is rarely conventionally conveyed by an
utterance such as I believe you or I agree To complicate matters a form such as uh huh that
strictly provides only evidence of attention may support the inference of acceptance I will argue
that the conditions under which the AIR is used is speci c to certain dialogue situations where
agents are attempting to construct a collaborative plan Before considering these arguments
I will  rst examine evidence from the distributional analysis that shows that Attitude IRUs are
prosodically marked Then I will briey discuss how rejection is conveyed before returning to the
inference of acceptance


 Attitude Acceptance IRUs are neither Assertions nor Questions
Ive argued that the primary role of Attitude IRUs is to display evidence of understanding and
acceptance Further evidence for this account is that Attitude IRUs are prosodically distinct from
assertive utterances We briey discussed the fact that Attitude IRUs which indicate a lack of
understanding are realized with Rises Here I will focus on the fact that Attitude IRUs realized
with falls do not sound like assertions
First note that in  gure 
 Falls to Mid are signi cantly more likely to occur on Attitude IRUs
than on IRUs that are not in the attitude locus 	   
 p   	 df   The frequency
of phrase  nal Mids shown in  gure 
 supports the view that Attitude IRUs are marked as
hearer old and salient informationPrince b Prince  Mids mark turnmedial utterances
noncompletion and hearer old or predictable information Since Attitude IRUs are repetitions
paraphrases or inferences from propositions already asserted and currently salient they unarguably
consist of old and predictable information
The rami cations of this for processing is that when a conversant hears an Attitude IRU she can
distinguish it from an assertive utterance In addition the fact that the utterance is marked as
hearer old information means that the utterance requires less processing eort Cutler and Foss

This use of Mid has theoretical rami cations for a theory of intonational meaning Final Mids are
a distinguishing characteristic of the WarningCalling contour Pike  Liberman  Ladd
	 McLemore  However warnings are often repetitions of old information Calling
someone isnt normally informative either often merely the sound of the speakers voice carries all
the information Furthermore both noncompletion and non nality can be treated as special cases
of nonassertion The prevalence of Mid in all these environments supports the hypothesis that
Mids mark nonassertion
Boundary T Rise Mid Low
Attitude    
Not Attitude    
Figure 
 Attitude IRUs have  nal Mid more frequently than Other IRUs
It is not clear however what determines whether an Attitude IRU is realized with a  nal Low or
a  nal Mid One possibility is that the  nal value reects discourse structure lower phrase  nal
tones will be more common at the perceived end of a discourse segment whereas Mids indicating

continuationMcLemore  will occur throughout the rest of a discourse segment Testing this
hypothesis must be left to future work
 Rejection
Previous work has assumed that rejection must be conveyed via denial or logical contradiction
Allwood  Gazdar  Hamblin  However an Attitude IRU realized with a phrase
 nal rise question intonation can also indicate nonacceptance This is encapsulated in the final
rise hypothesis
final rise hypothesis Phrase  nal rises on Attitude IRUs defeat the realize and
license assumptions and thereby defeat the mutual supposition of understanding
The final rise hypothesis corresponds to earlier characterizations of Attitude IRUs with phrase
 nal Rises as querying the whole or some part of the previous utterance of another speaker often
with a note of incredulity Cruttenden 
 An example of an Attitude IRU realized with a
phrase  nal rise which seems to query part of a previous speakers assertion is shown in 


  H And Id like  thousand in a  and a half year certi cate
 R The full  in a  and a half
	 H Thats correct
 R Gee not at my age
In 
 R queries whether she actually heard and understood what H said Formally 
 defeats
the realize and license assumptions for  and 	 is a reassertion The attitude locus for
	 is  and R explicitly rejects Hs proposal in 

In addition even if we restrict our attention to assertive utterances there is an additional class of
rejection IRUs that shows that logical inconsistency is not necessary for rejection Consider 
from Levinson 
U  Theres a man in the garage
U Theres something in the garage
This nal rise hypothesis is specic to IRUs in the attitude locus See McLemore  for an analysis of
phrase nal rises on utterances in general as connecting speakers or connecting turns
Attitude IRUs realized with a Rise Fall are characterized as echo exclamations

In  U is an entailment of U  via existential generalization yet U rejects U  That the
IRU in U can reject U  is surprising How can a logically consistent assertion function to reject
another assertion I will argue that the basis for this type of rejection is a quantity implicature
Grice 
 Horn  Gazdar  and that the implicature depends on the focusopen
proposition structure of U  and U Prince 

Consider the quantity implicature in  which arises from 
U  Is the new student brilliant and imaginative
U Hes imaginative
 Hes not brilliant
In  U  introduces a question as to whether a the new student is both brilliant and imaginative
U is less informative than it could have been and so implicates the denial of brillianta shown
in  I argue that  can be analyzed similarly First note that the implicature shown in  still
arises in the context of the assertion in 
	

	U  The new student is brilliant and imaginative
U Hes imaginative
Thus the implicature is not dependent on the question context given in  Since implicatures
only arise when they are consistent with the context and  is not consistent with 
	U  
	U 
cannot have been added to the context as an assertion before the utterance of 
	U This supports
the analysis of mutual acceptance presented above in which U  is added to the context as an
hypothesis until after U This means that it can be cancelled by an implicature in U The
implicature in U has an endorsement of default which defeats an hypothesis
However one issue remains As we saw in section 
 IRUs in the attitude locus often indicate
acceptance rather than rejection Clearly a less informative U following an assertion U  need not
reject U  The dierence between communicating acceptance and rejection with an IRU in the
attitude locus depends on the exclusion of focus condition in 


 exclusion of focus condition If an utterance U by a speaker B asserts an alternate
instantiation of the salient open proposition contributed to the context by an utterance U 
as uttered by a speaker A and U excludes the focus of U  then U rejects U 
	
The salient open proposition in 
 is the pskeleton of U  Prince 
 Rooth  In U 
the focus is a man whereas in U the focus is something In U  and 
	U  the focus includes
brilliant and imaginative whereas in U and 
	U the focus is only imaginative In each case
U rejects U  because it meets the exclusion of focus condition As further support for the
exclusion of focus condition consider the dierence in foci of the naturally occurring example

 and its alternate 


U  We bought these pajamas in New Orleans for me

U  We bought me these pajamas in New Orleans

U We bought these pajamas in New Orleans
The focus was for me in 
 whereas in 
 focus is most natural on New Orleans 
 can reject

 by excluding its focus but is infelicitous as a rejection of 
 Felicitous rejections meet the
exclusion of focus condition
In sum IRUs can indicate rejection showing that rejection need not be conveyed by denial or
contradiction The basis for this rejection is a quantity implicature dependent on focal structure
The fact that this class of rejection exists provides support for the account of mutual understanding
and acceptance presented above
 Making Plans	 Mutual Suppositions about Beliefs and
Intentions

	  Collaborative Planning Principles
A major constraint on the inference of acceptance is that the conversants must believe that ac
ceptance is required to achieve the overall purpose of the dialogue ie the mutual intentions as
understood at the initiation of the discourse constrain whether any utterance licenses the infer
ence of mutual acceptance The mutual supposition that acceptance is necessary then licenses the
inference of acceptance via the operation of a simple principle of cooperative dialogue
collaborative principle Conversants must provide evidence of a detected discrep
ancy in belief as soon as possible
The collaborative principle is a simpli cation of the collaborative planning principles
of Whittaker and Stenton  and Walker and Whittaker 	 It is an instance of a general

rule incumbent on a cooperative conversant to prevent hisher conversational partner from making
false inferences Joshi  Joshi Webber and Weischedel 

  Collaborative Planning Principles
 Information quality The listener must believe that the information that the speaker
has provided is true unambiguous and relevant to the mutual goal This corresponds
to the two rules A Truth If the listener believes a fact P and believes that fact to
be relevant and either believes that the speaker believes not P or that the speaker does
not know P then interrupt AAmbiguity If the listener believes that the speakers
assertion is relevant but ambiguous then interrupt
 Plan quality The listener must believe that the action proposed by the speaker is
a part of an adequate plan to achieve the mutual goal and the action must also be
comprehensible to the listener The two rules to express this are BEffectiveness	
If the listener believes P and either believes that P presents an obstacle to the proposed
plan or believes that P is part of the proposed plan that has already been satis ed then
interrupt B Ambiguity If the listener believes that an assertion about the proposed
plan is ambiguous then interrupt
The collaborative planning principles distinguish utterances about beliefs assertions from
utterance about intentions proposals and describe under what conditions a conversant should
demonstrate nonacceptance in order to keep default inferences about acceptance or understand
ing from going through An interrupt can be realized by a question which indicates non
acceptance or by a rejection Thus these principles provide speci c guidelines to agents that
determines their language behavior While they do not say what an agent should say in an inter
ruption the speci ed reasons for interrupting can be used to provide the content of an interruption
For example the plan quality effectiveness clause suggests that the content of the listeners
interruption should be reject P where P provides the reason for rejection
The generalization presented in the collaborative principle is that evidence of any discrepancy
in belief should be made apparent Furthermore the convention in the dialogues in the  nancial
advice corpus is that this evidence is given in the attitude locus I will discuss this convention
further in section 

Figure 
 shows how the collaborative principle licenses the infernce of acceptance The inference
of acceptance is a conversational implicature ie a default The fact that it is a conversational
implicature can be seen from the standard diagnostics it is reinforceable cancelable nonde 
tachable and calculable Sadock  Horn  Hirschberg  The inferences shown

in  gure 
 follow if  it is assumed that the collaborative principle is in operation in this
discourse situation and  if the hearer provides no evidence of rejection Once the addressee
has had an opportunity to reject an assertion or proposal and has passed up this opportunity the
mutual supposition of acceptance of RS U is licensed as a default
NEXT ASSUMPTION ENDORSEMENT
Utterance Type ADDRESSED TYPE
ANY NonRejection acceptance default
Next Utterance attention hearing realize license default
Figure 
 Inferences from the Collaborative Principle

	 Collaborative Plans
If we focus on proposals we can use the collaborative principle to show how agents construct
a collaborative plan ie the mutual suppositions about intentions that agents must achieve
to have the beliefs necessary to carry out a collaborative task Schelling 
	 Lewis 
 Clark
and Carlson  Power  Grosz and Sidner 	
Agents can be motivated to achieve a collaborative plan whenever they for whatever reason
have the same goals and think that it is in their own interest to collaborate One way agents can
formulate collaborative plans is through dialogue agents assert facts to other agents and if the
other agents accept these facts then they can be part of a collaborative plan Agents make
proposals to other agents about intentions and if other agents accept these proposals then they
can be part of a collaborative plan
collaborative plan AB Intention 
 MS AB Intend A  B 
  	      
n
 

i MS AB Contribute 
i Intention
 MS AB MaxUtility 
  	      
n Intention
The de nition of collaborative plan depends on the account of mutual supposition MS
presented in chapter  An action 
i contributes to an intention if it is either a substep in a plan
to achieve the intention or it enables achieving a substep Pollack 
 Grosz and Sidner 
 Di
Eugenio  Just as Pollack characterized plans as a set of beliefs and intentions a complex

mental attitude Pollack 	 a collaborative plan is simply a set of mutual suppositions
about intentions and beliefs that are achieved through dialogue
The MaxUtility constraint means that typically agents must have some mutual suppositions about
what beliefs are serving as warrants for their collaborative plan Utility must be maximized over
the combination of all the actions involved in the proposed plan rather than for each individual
action Chapter  discussed how agents achieve a collaborative plan in a simple world like Design
World

	 Evidence for the Attitude Locus
The collaborative principle licenses the inference of acceptance by assuming that Ui
  is the
attitude locus for Ui This means that Ui
  is the addressees opportunity for demonstrating
understanding acceptance or rejection We saw that the collaborative principle embodies the
assumption of the attitude locus and thus will license default inferences about understanding and
acceptance when no evidence of rejection is provided This section uses facts from the distributional
analysis to argue for the attitude locus
The attitude locus can be characterized by the information status parameters of Adjacent and
Other Remember that Adjacent and Other are salience parameters that mean that the IRU is
adjacent to its antecedent and that the antecedent was said by the Other speaker Any utterance
Ui
  which occurs adjacent to another utterance Ui where Ui was said by the Other speaker is
in the attitude locus
The argument that Ui
  is the attitude locus for Ui depends on the  nal rise hypothesis pre
sented in section 
 If the final rise hypothesis is true IRUs with phrase  nal rises are an
unambiguous demonstration of Attitude Thus the location of phrase  nal rises can be used as
an argument about where Attitude is conventionally demonstrated An examination of the distri
bution of phrase  nal rises on IRUs provides support for the attitude locus as shown in  gure


Phrase Final Intonation Rise Fall
Attitude  
Not Attitude  
Figure 
 Distribution of Boundary Tones on IRUs Attitude vs Not Attitude Attitude 
Adjacent and Other Not Attitude  Not Adjacent  Other Fall  Low  Mid

Phrase  nal rises on IRUs are much more likely to occur in the hypothesized attitude locus
characterized by the distributional parameters of Adjacent and Other 	  
  p   		 df  
This provides evidence for the attitude locus because the vast majority of utterances with this
function occur in this locus
Figure 
 also shows that there are three cases of IRUs realized with phrase  nal rises which
are not in the attitude locus These exceptions provide further support for the attitude locus
because each of them is explicitly marked as being out of sequence For example the utterance
of Oh hang in there my friend marks two of them in 


 M  First of all you know ah theres an out t here in Philadelphia that you know that
I put money in at a certain interest and I can I can borrow on it at one percent more
And its a 	 month deal so I have not received any interest on it You know I dont
have to show any interest on it because they have not given me you know any 	s or
anything but
H Oh hang in there my friend
M Im hanging in there
H YOU HAVE A 	 MONTH CERTIFICATE
M Right
H AND THEY HAVE NOT SENT YOU A 	
One question associated with the attitude locus is what happens when the next utterance is an
interruption For example in 
 H interrupts C at 
 to ask for his name

  C Ok harry Im have a problem that uh my  with todays economy my daughter is
working
 H I missed your name

 C Hank
 H Go ahead hank
 C as well as her uh husband
They have a child
and they bring the child to us every day for babysitting
This is while she works
 H um hm
	 C Now were wondering how can we handle this to help them get a tax deduction
At 
 C returns to his narrative apparently picking up exactly where he left o He cospeci es

his daughter with the possessive pronoun her in the phrase her husband and elliptically predicates
with as well as to convey My daughters husband is working Walker and Whittaker 	 used
this example to argue that discourse has a hierarchical structure and that the sequence of utterances

      
 is structurally embedded within 
      
	 This explains why C can continue at

 using ellipses and pronominal anaphora to refer to discourse referents realized further back in
the discourse
However if H had not understood what it was that C was saying in 
 he would have had to make
a choice between interrupting or asking C to clarify or repeat what C said Thus it is plausible
that 
 still demonstrates understanding of the previous utterance The inference of mutual
understanding is a default and can be defeated by subsequent events For example at 
 H
could say Now what were you saying about your daughter

In sum the distributional analysis provides good evidence for the attitude locus and this in
turn provides support for the application of the collaborative principle to infer acceptance in
the absence of evidence to the contrary

	 Cognitive Basis for the Collaborative Principle
Earlier I noted that the attitude locus as the sequential position for displaying understanding
acceptance and rejection has been characterized as a convention of conversation Sacks Scheglo
and Jeerson  Clark and Schaefer  Here I briey present a few arguments suggesting
that there are cognitive processing motivations for the site of attitude locus
First psychological studies on the limits of attentionmemory have found that the verbatim con
tent of an utterance is retained for a very short period of time Sachs 
 Bransford Barclay
and Franks  Anderson  The Bransford etal work also shows that conversants cant
distinguish propositional content from some subset of simple inferences that are derived from that
content The content of an utterance is typically semantically integrated into memory very soon
after the utterance is completed Thus any action which attempts to operate on the verbatim
content of an utterance is constrained to occur very soon after that utterance
Second at the point when an utterance is semantically integrated into memory inferences based on
the propositional content of that utterance may be made and stored in memory Since inferences
are based on salient beliefs most inferences are made at this point
However studies in psychology on belief revision and decision making have shown that inferences
based on facts that are untrue persist even when the original fact has been retracted Tversky and
Kahneman  Ross and Anderson  Thus if an agent misunderstands another agent and


then bases inferences on this misunderstanding she may have trouble rectifying hisher belief state
Similarly if one agent infers falsely that another agent accepted her assertion she may have trouble
retracting all the beliefs that were inferred from that false inference These observations on the
human inference mechanism are incorporated in Harmans principle of positive undermining
also discussed in section  Harman 
 Galliers 	
principle of positive undermining
Only stop believing a current belief if there are positive reasons to do so and this does
not include an absence of justi cation for that belief
An operationalization of this in terms of a belief model means that each inferred belief added as an
inference from a false belief must independently be explicitly challenged in order to be retracted
This shows that conversants should ensure that they have understood and been understood in
the intended way at the time the propositional content of the utterance is initially added to
the discourse model Furthermore if inferences are based on the acceptance of an utterance by
an agent agents will be more ecient if they are sure about what is accepted at the time the
utterance is said In other words there is strong motivation for local management of potential
misunderstandings and disagreements and for signals by conversants as to their beliefs about the
current propositional content
 Attitude in Design World
This section compares a strategy that communicates Attitude explicitly the ExplicitAcceptance
strategy with the AllImplicit strategy The strategies are compared for each task situation and
under dierent assumptions about processing costs as discussed in section 	
Figure 

 shows the discourse action protocol for an ExplicitAcceptance agent Openings and
Closings are left implicit but acceptance is always communicated explicitly Figure 
 shows a
dialogue sequence composed of the discourse actions shown in  gure 

 This shows how a dialogue
between two ExplicitAcceptance agents might go In general each discourse act can be composed
of a number of utterance acts however the ExplicitAcceptance agent realizes each discourse act
with one utterance act Figures 
 and 
 illustrate the relationshiop between the discourse acts
and the cognitive processes for each agent that results in this type of dialogue sequence
I noted earlier that these signals are often IRUs so that their content is not conventionally indicated or presented
as new information Walker c Thus these signals are not as explicit as they might be However the way
acceptance is signalled presumably is motivated by the multiple functions Attitude IRUs can achieve in terms of
updating not only the Acceptance hypothesis but also the assumptions related to Understanding

(REPETITION)
KEY:
PROPOSAL
ACCEPTANCE
CLOSING
REJECTION
CLARIFICATION
OPENING
IMPLICIT
NO SPEAKER CHANGE
SPEAKER CHANGE
EXPLICIT-ACCEPTANCE  STRATEGY
Figure 

 Discourse Action protocol for agents using the ExplicitAcceptance strategy
Agent A Agent B
PROPOSAL 
ACCEPTANCE 
PROPOSAL 
REJECTION 
ACCEPTANCE 
 
PROPOSAL N
ACCEPTANCE N
Figure 
 Sequence of Discourse Acts for Dialogue in 


The ExplicitAcceptance strategy implements just one of a number of possible variations in Attitude
strategies an agent parametrized with the ExplicitAcceptance strategy repeats each proposal as
she accepts it Other variations on the content of accept utterances could be backchannels such
as uh huh paraphrases or making inferences explicit
The ExplicitAcceptance strategy will be compared with the AllImplicit strategy that was discussed
at length in section  The hypothesis that is tested using the ExplicitAcceptance strategy is that

Discourse Act Utterance Act A PROCESS B PROCESS
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Propose AllImp
PROPOSAL propose A B option
MEREASON Put
Check Preconds 
Deliberate
Decide to Accept
Store MS intend 
Store ActEects 
Accept ExpAcc
ACCEPT accept B A intended
ANCE Store MS intend 
Store MS intend 
Store ActEects 
Store ActEects 
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Propose AllImp
PROPOSAL 
propose A B option
Infer Close Put
Infer Open Put
MEREASON Put
Check Preconds 
Deliberate
Decide to Reject
Reject ExpAcc
Figure 
 PART Cognitive Processes for Sequence of Discourse Acts in Dialogue 

 Agent A
is AllImplicit and Agent B is ExplicitAcceptance
Attitude repetitions increase robustness by providing explicit indications of acceptance Due to the
way that AWM is designed the simulation primarily tests whether Attitude IRUs can function as
a rehearsal of the repeated information


  The ExplicitAcceptance Strategy
Excerpt 

 demonstrates the ExplicitAcceptance strategy In each dialogue excerpt each message
is preceded by a gloss of the content of the message IRUs are shown in caps and other messages
are shown in italics Remember that the agents actually communicate with messages in the arti cial
language as shown just after each gloss
The dialogue below is for a dialogue between one ExplicitAcceptance agent and one AllImplicit

Discourse Act Utterance Act A PROCESS B PROCESS
REJECTION propose B A option
MEREASON Put
Check Preconds 
Deliberate
Decide to Accept
Store MS intend 
Store ActEects 
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Propose AllImp
PROPOSAL propose A B option
Infer Acceptance 
Store MS intend 
Store ActEects 
Infer Close Put
Infer Open Put
MEREASON Put
Check Preconds 
Deliberate
Decide to Accept
Store MS intend 
Store ActEects 
Accept ExpAcc
ACCEPT accept B A intended
ANCE Store MS intend 
Store MS intend 
Store ActEects 
Store ActEects 
  
Figure 
 PART Cognitive Processes for Sequence of Discourse Acts in Dialogue 

 Agent A
is AllImplicit and agent B is ExplicitAcceptance
agent The agent EII who uses the ExplicitAcceptance strategy indicates acceptance of a proposal
explicitly and repeats each proposal as she accepts it Agent KIM is an AllImplicit agent 	
  KIM Then lets put the purple couch in the study
 propose agentkim agenteii option putact  agentkim purple couch room 
EII okay  lets put the purple couch in the study
 accept agenteii agentkim intended putact  agentkim purple couch room 
KIM Then lets put the purple chair in the study
 propose agentkim agenteii option putact  agentkim purple chair room 
EII No instead lets put the fuchsia couch in the study
 reject agenteii agentkim option putact  agenteii fuchsia couch room 
 	EII is mnemonic for Explicit attitude Implicit consequence and Implicit attention
	
KIM Then lets put the purple chair in the living room
 propose agentkim agenteii option putact  agentkim purple chair room 
EII Okay  lets put the purple chair in the living room
 accept agenteii agentkim intended putact  agentkim purple chair room 
Each message consists of an utterance intention the speaker the hearer and the content of the
message which is an action or a belief If the message is a proposal then its content is an action
The status of this action is an option that the agents might want to pursue Once the proposal
has been accepted then the status of the action is an intention
For example in Kims proposal shown in 

 the putact is an option that Kim has identi ed
In 

 EII explicitly communicates her acceptance of Kims proposal The acceptance of the
proposal changes the status of the action under discussion from an option option  to an intention
intended The eect on AWM of each Repetition Attitude IRU shown here is to duplicate in
memory the fact that the proposal has been made and accepted In addition the inference that
follows from the acceptance of a proposal that the agent no longer has the piece of furniture used
in the proposal is also duplicated in AWM
EII doesnt always accept Kims proposals In 

 EII rejects Kims proposal and makes a
counterproposal which Kim implicitly accepts in 

 by making a new proposal EII must infer
in this case that Kim has accepted her proposal because no evidence to the contrary was provided
The dialogue continues until the Kim and EII have achieved a collaborative plan The Appendix
includes an example of a complete dialogue between EII and Kim Figures 
 and 
 shows the
relationship between discourse acts utterance acts and cognitive processes for dialogue 


The ExplicitAcceptance strategy is contrasted with the AllImplicit strategy discussed in section
 While the endorsement on acceptance is a default for the AllImplicit agents implicit ac
ceptance and linguistic for the explicit acceptance of the ExplicitAcceptance agent as discussed
in section 
 there is no possibility of misunderstanding or implicit rejection in this arti cial
situation
Sections 

 and 

 discusses the dierences between the two strategies that depend on param
eters of the communication situation such as the communication cost inference cost and retrieval
cost Section 

 discusses the dierences between the two strategies that depend on how the task
is de ned


 ExplicitAcceptance produces Rehearsal Benets

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Figure 
	 ExplicitAcceptance produces Rehearsal Bene ts for AWM above 
 Strategy  is
ExplicitAcceptance with AllImplicit and strategy  is two AllImplicit agents Task De nition 
Standard commcost  	 infcost  	 retcost  	
Figure 
	 shows that as AWM increases we begin to see some bene ts for the ExplicitAcceptance
strategy KS   for AWM of 
 p  	 This is a rehearsal bene t of rehearsing that the
agents have agreed on an action which also has the eect that the eect of that action is duplicated
in memory This rehearsal bene t reduces the number of invalid steps in the collaborative plan and
thus produces bene ts at higher AWM The reason that agents are more likely to make mistakes
at higher AWM is that they are more likely to retrieve information that is inconsistent with the
current state of the world
If communication cost is  inference cost is  and retrieval cost is 			 we still get a bene t for this
strategy at AWM of  and 
 However if retrieval cost is increased to 	 there is no dierence
between this strategy and the AllImplicit strategy ExplicitAcceptance increases the number of
retrievals by displacing score propositions so that they take more eort to retrieve Once the cost
of retrieval is high enough this cost dampens the bene ts of the strategy The next section will
discuss situations in which communication cost dominates the other costs of the interaction



 ExplicitAcceptance can be detrimental if communication is ex
pensive
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Figure 
 If communication is expensive ExplicitAcceptance is detrimental for AWM  
Strategy  is the combination of one ExplicitAcceptance agent with one AllImplicit agent and
strategy  is two AllImplicit agents Task De nition  Standard commcost  	 infcost  
retcost  	
As with all explicit strategies ones that include IRUs if communication cost is high relative to
inference cost performance is lower This is because strategies that include IRUs always use more
messages to communicate the same content IRUs make inferences explicit or tell agents facts that
they already know or that they could retrieve from memory given enough resources Figure 

shows that dierences exist at low AWM values if communication cost is 	 times more expensive
than inference cost and retrieval is free KS   p 	 for AWM   The next section examines
the role of the task in determining when a strategy is bene cial


 ExplicitAcceptance prevents Errors
Section 	 discussed two dierent ways of de ning the task that require a greater level of agreement
or precision These are the ZeroNonmatchingBeliefs and the ZeroInvalid versions of the task The
ExplicitAcceptance strategy has no eect when the task de nition is ZeroNonmatchingBeliefs

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Figure 
 Explicit Acceptance is bene cial for the ZeroInvalid task for AWM   Strategy 
is the combination of one ExplicitAcceptance agent with one AllImplicit agent and strategy  is
two AllImplicit agents Task De nition  ZeroInvalid commcost  	 infcost  	 retcost  	
However the major bene t of the ExplicitAcceptance strategy within the limits of DesignWorld
is in the ZeroInvalid version of the task ie the ExplicitAcceptance strategy helps agents avoid
making mistakes as shown in  gure 
 KS   for AWM   p  	


	 Summary Attitude in DesignWorld
This section has demonstrated that the ExplicitAcceptance strategy does bene t agents even
when communication is not uncertain This is because it improves the robustness of memory for
what the agents have agreed essentially functioning as a rehearsal strategy I have also shown that
the bene ts of the strategy depend on other variables in the communication situation
The dierences in  gures 
	 
 and 
 show that the bene ts of a strategy depend on the
task situation and the relative costs of communication inference and retrieval which can depend
on the communication situation If agents are penalized for invalid steps in their plans then the
ExplicitAcceptance strategy can help them avoid such mistakes

 Attitude	Summary
This chapter presents a theory of the function of Attitude IRUs in supporting mutual supposition
I present an account of the inference of mutual supposition of understanding and acceptance in
which Attitude IRUs make these inferences more robust and less defeasible I showed through the
distributional analysis that Attitude IRUs can be characterized by the two salience parameters
of Adjacent and Other Furthermore I showed that Attitude IRUs tend to be repetitions in this
corpus
The collaborative principle rede nes the notion of cooperativity in situations of coordinated
action In contrast to other accounts Allen and Perrault 	 Cohen  Grosz and Sidner
	 Perrault 	 Litman and Allen 	 here cooperativity means that one must make
conicts or potential problems obvious to ones conversational partner An agent does not need to
accept whatever she is told but the collaborative principle can license the inference of acceptance
whenever no evidence to the contrary is provided in the attitude locus Heeman and Hirst

A collaborative plan is similar to and in many respects compatible with the SharedPlan
formalism of Grosz and Sidner Grosz and Sidner 	 However I dont assume that a collabo
rative plan is a primitive The underlying account of mutual belief as mutual supposition Prince
 Nadathur and Joshi  Lewis 
 Walker b also distinguishes this account from
Grosz and Sidners and the Joint Intention account of Cohen and Levesque Cohen and Levesque
 Another dierence is the incorporation of deliberation via maximizing utility which reects
agents autonomy Even if agents have agreed to carry out a dialogue to do a collaborative task
they do not necessarily accept every proposal that another agent makes Each agent deliberates
about the utility of each proposal from hisher own perspective In addition in the framework pre
sented here okay does not convey acceptance directly Grosz and Sidner 	 Levesque Cohen
and Nunes 	 Cohen and Levesque  because utterances such as okay ne alright yea
are simple variations on the backchannel uh huh which does not communicate anything stronger
than evidence of attention
The account presented here on the relationship between understanding and acceptance predicts
the fact that there is a systematic ambiguity as to whether a form communicates understanding or
acceptance While certain forms only convey attention the fact that more wasnt said can support
the inference of acceptance if the conversants believe that acceptance is necessary for some shared
intention If the conversants dont believe that acceptance is necessary then the inference of
acceptance isnt licensed

In addition section 

 presented results from DesignWorld simulations that demonstrate that
Attitude IRUs have clear bene ts in improving robustness and avoiding errors in planning These
bene ts have an associated expense of an increase in the number of messages which does not
decrease performance unless communication is much more expensive than other operations In
addition redundant messages can cause agents to forget other facts that are relevant to the task and
thus in certain circumstances can be detrimental Whether or not an Attitude explicit strategy is
bene cial depends on parameters of the communication situation such as the cost of communication
and the penalties for making errors or for not agreeing on each aspect of the task


Chapter 
Attention
  Introduction
Attention IRUs manipulate the locus of attention of the discourse participants by making a propo
sition salient A speaker can intend to make a proposition salient only if it is not currently salient
so Attention IRUs are de ned as those IRUs whose antecedents are not currently salient
Making a proposition salient is a vague functional characterization that can have many speci c
eects According to the discourse inference constraint salience constrains which proposi
tions are available for interpretation and reasoning  The Attention IRU in 
b supports inferential
processes

 a Clinton has to take a stand on abortion rights for poor women
b HES THE PRESIDENT
This is a Deliberation IRU Deliberation IRUs make a proposition salient in order to support
deliberation about whether to accept or reject other currently salient propositions For example

b is a reason why the hearer should accept the speakers assertion in 
a
Salient entities also activate or cue retrieval of semantically related propositions or entities Ratcli
and McKoon  Collins and Quillian 
 Anderson and Bower  This could be the
primary function of 
 repeated here from chapter 
 This is a type of domain restriction Roberts b but research on domain restriction has typically focused
on restrictions on the set of discourse referentsD for domains of quantication or anaphora resolution In this case
the domain of propositions P available for inference is restricted


 Frieda YOURE A PSYCHOLOGIST What do you think about this case of a ten year old
boy kidnapping a two year old fg 
This IRU restricts the domain of propositions that are relevant to answering the question It is as
a psychologist that Frieda is asked thus she should formulate her answer using facts relevant in
psychology Ratcli and McKoon  This is an Open Segment IRU which to my knowledge
have not been previously noted in the literature An additional class of Attention IRUs Close
Segment IRUs will be discussed in section 
In the rest of this section I will examine the distributional parameters that de ne Attention IRUs
and their distributional correlates Then I will propose three potential discourse functions for
Attention IRUs In the remainder of the chapter I will discuss each distributionally distinct class
with respect to the hypothesized functions
   Distributional Correlates of Attention IRUs
The class of Attention IRUs is de ned by a single parameter the antecedent for the IRU is Remote
and thus no longer salient see section  Figure  shows the distribution of Attention IRUs
by hearer old category as compared with other IRUs
Repetitions Paraphrases Inferences Unused Presuppositions
Attention 
 
    	
Not Attention 	 
   	 
Figure  Distribution of Attention IRUs by Hearer Old Category
Open Segment Close Segment Other
Attention 
 	  
Not Attention 	 	  
Figure  Open and Close Segment correlated with Attention
In  gure  Inferences are the combination of Entailments and Implicatures The small number of
Attention Repetitions in  gure  is due to the fact that speakers dont remember the verbatim

form of a proposition and that form is determined by context Prince  Thus a proposition
rerealized remotely is unlikely to be realized in the same form The small number of Attention
Inference IRUs is explained by the discourse inference constraint There is no dierence in
the distribution of paraphrases and only Attention IRUs can be Unused by de nition Thus none
of the hearer old distinctions determine dierences in function for Attention IRUs
One distributional characteristic of Attention IRUs is the tendency to occur at loci characterized as
discourse segment boundaries by the discourse theories discussed in chapter  Hobbs  Polanyi
 Grosz and Sidner 
 In section  I discussed criteria for determining whether an IRU
is at a segment boundary This de nes two subclasses of Attention IRUs Open Segment IRUs and
Close Segment IRUs Figure  shows that Open and Close Segment IRUs are more likely to be
Attention IRUs 	    p   		 df  
Thus we can use the distributional analysis to de ne three distributional classes Open Segment
Close Segment and Deliberation where Deliberation IRUs are those Attention IRUs that are not
Open or Close Segment
Neither distributional class nor the characterization of Attention IRUs as making a proposition
salient de ne speci c discourse related functions that Attention IRUs might achieve These eects
may rely on underlying cognitive processes that are not speci c to the interpretation of IRUs or
they may be based on some conventional use of IRU In section  I propose three plausible
functions for these classes Then in the following sections each distributional class will be examined
to determine which of the hypothesized functions the class supports
Deliberation IRUs will be discussed in section  Open and Close Segment IRUs will be discussed
in sections  and  Then in section  the evidence that each distributional class provides for
the hypothesized discourse functions introduced in section  will be reviewed Finally section

 will discuss DesignWorld experiments on discourse strategies that incorporate Deliberation and
Open and Close Segment IRUs
  Discourse Functions of Attention IRUs
This section introduces three hypotheses about more speci c discourse functions of Attention IRUs
Then in the following sections each distributional class identi ed above will be examined to see
whether it can achieve one or more of the hypothesized functions below
Discourse Functions of Attention IRUs
As with other IRUs it is also plausible that the IRU functions to rehearse the proposition that it realizes The
AWM model in DesignWorld always tests this hypothesis

 coordination hypothesis IRUs are a conventional means of signaling discourse structure
In particular IRUs can be used to indicate the opening and closing of discourse segments and
help the hearer infer where the current segment  ts in the overall discourse structure
 discourse inference hypothesis A proposition from a prior context is selected and
realized in the current context because a process in the current context such as inference or
deliberation requires that proposition to be salient
 retrieval cue hypothesis the IRUs main function is as a retrieval cue The content of
the IRU serves as a retrieval cue for the retrieval of propositions in a prior context
The coordination hypothesis is meant to tease apart some of the claims of previous work One
claim has been that the function of Close Segment IRUs is to explicitly signal discourse structure by
marking the Closing of a discourse segment In mixedinitiative dialogue Close Segment IRUs can
be characterized as a bid by the speaker to close the segment Scheglo and Sacks  Hobbs
 The view implicit in the coordination hypothesis is that hearers are trying to infer a
hierarchical discourse structure and so speakers rely on particular conventions to indicate structure
as a way of helping hearers inference processes Thus the coordination hypothesis means that
Attention IRUs are like cue words and have a conventional rather than a cognitive function Since
this function relies on convention the IRU must be recognized as redundant
Another view of how conversants coordinate is possible ie that conversants locally manage topic
transitions and no higher level structure is inferred For example the Close Segment function
of some IRUs does not rely on convention according to Whittaker and Stenton The recognition
that the utterance has no new information is interpreted straightforwardly as an indication that
the speaker has nothing new to say about the subject Whittaker and Stenton  Walker and
Whittaker 	 To avoid boredom the conversation moves on
The discourse inference hypothesis reects the surface function since saying an utterance
makes its content salient According to the discourse inference constraint a proposition can
only be used in inference or deliberation if it is currently salient Recognizing the IRU as redundant
is not necessary to achieve this function
The retrieval cue hypothesis can be contrasted with the discourse inference hypothesis
because it formulates the role of the IRU as a pointer to a previous context Rather than the IRU
alone being functionally related to the current context the IRU indicates that a whole prior context
is functionally related to the current context Unless this retrieval happens automatically the IRU
must be recognized as redundant to achieve this function
	
The retrieval cue hypothesis was also briey discussed in chapter  where I discussed the
relationship between theories of discourse structure and AWM There I suggested that one way in
which AWM could achieve the same eects as Grosz and Sidners stack model of attentional state
Grosz  Sidner  Grosz and Sidner 
 is by formulating a pop to a prior context as
a retrieval from that context If this use of retrieval were developed in more detail then the use of
Open Segment IRUs for coordination would be identical with their use as retrieval cues
The coordination hypothesis retrieval cue hypothesis and discourse inference hy 
pothesis need not be mutually exclusive If both retrieval and inference follow fairly automatically
from making a proposition salient then it is possible that Attention IRUs perform all of these func
tions without being functionally ambiguous
These hypothesized functions will be discussed in relation to the distributional classes given in the
following sections I will conclude that it is not possible to provide unequivocal support for a single
one of these functions but will show that the discourse inference hypothesis is viable for all
three distributional classes Because AWM is too simple to support the coordination hypothesis
this hypothesis cannot be tested in DesignWorld However section 
 presents experiments that
support the discourse inference hypothesis
 Deliberation IRUs
Deliberation IRUs are those Attention IRUs that are neither Open nor Close Segment IRUs This
does not mean that their discourse function might not overlap or be the same as Open and Close
Segment IRUs I will examine this class as distributionally de ned and then see whether it supports
the discourse inference hypothesis the retrieval cue hypothesis or the coordination
hypothesis
Deliberation IRUs are used in contexts evocative of argumentation or logical proof and the IRU
appears to be a premise that is reevoked as part of laying out the structure of the argument Levin
son  Cohen  Sadock  Webber and Joshi  Thus Deliberation IRUs appear
to support the discourse inference hypothesis and occur simply because of the discourse
inference constraint ie both inference and belief revision operate on propositions that are
currently salient
These support and warrant relations de ned in section  are dependent on the type of the
propositions being related and de ne two types of Deliberation IRUs warrant IRUs and support
IRUs In both cases the point of the IRU can be characterized as providing a premise for the

inference of a relation between the IRU and another proposition salient in the current context I
will discuss warrant IRUs in section  and support IRUs in section 
Both warrant and support IRUs may support either the discourse inference hypothesis
or the retrieval cue hypothesis I will leave this question aside while I discuss the examples
and then in section  I will argue for the discourse inference hypothesis Furthermore
in order to argue against the retrieval cue hypothesis I will suggest that the structure of
an argument is often based on accommodation of an inference rule rather than retrieval Lewis
 Thomason 	
  Warrant IRUs
As an example of a warrant relation between two propositions one describing an intention and
the other a belief consider the following excerpt that was part of a discussion about where to eat
lunch

  Listen to Ramesh
 HES INDIAN DH 
The point of the discussion was for the group to agree on an instantiation of X in the proposition
We should eat at restaurant X of type Indian The speaker intended the addressees adoption of the
intention to do  in 
 to contribute to achieving this agreement The IRU Ramesh is Indian
is a warrant for adopting the intention to do  In other words the addressees were meant to
infer that the proposition conveyed by 
 is a reason for adopting an intention to do  This
example supports the discourse inference constraint even though the proposition conveyed
by 
 is already hearer old the inference that 
 is a warrant for 
 depends on saying

 to make that proposition salient
As another example of the warrant relation consider the dialogue in 	 Here M tells H that
she and her husband are both retired in 	 and a number of other facts about their  nancial
situation in successive dialogue from 	 to 	
    H Now what is your income situation
  M Were both retired and our income for the year is about um  about  thousand
  H Have you other securities than stock have you any bonds or certicates
  M Yes yes we do We have some certicates oh about uh    thousand not much we	re
not rich  and we have a house completely paid for have some land in the poconos completely
In the DesignWorld simulation discussed below I will explore the di erence between it being necessary to say

 and it beingmore e cient for the speaker to say 
 than to expect his audience to retrieve the proposition
conveyed by 
 from memory

paid for  and uh that	s actually the extent of our uh
  H Ok On the proceeds of that GM stock
  M yes
  H I	d like to see you put that into two dierent southern utilities

 clarication of southern utilities

  H and those I think that you will nd that that will give you a good return
YOU ARE RETIRED and that is primarily what you are looking for in addition I think that
eventually those stocks will rise as well
Beginning with 	
 H suggests a course of action In 	 he paraphrases Ms assertion from
	 you are retired This paraphrase in this context leads to the inference of a warrant relation
between the paraphrased proposition and the proposed course of action In other words H implies
that X is retired warrants X wants a good return on her investment More precisely let
A  Invest proceeds of GM stock in  dierent southern utilities
P  You are retired
G  Get a good return on your investment
What M is supposed to infer is that  P warrants G In fact Hs statement that is primarily
what you are looking for comes close to making this explicit H asserts that A contributes to
achieving G Since M believes P she may adopt G as a higher level intention and then intend to
do A as a good way of achieving G The warrant relation is based on a dierent information
relation than in 
 in this case the warrant proposition describes which aspect of the situation is
a reason for M adopting a goal of a good return on her investment
 Support IRUs
The support relation holds between two beliefs whenever believing one is a reason for believing
the other as in 
 Owen knows who Percy Sledge is HES AMERICAN
To make sense of  an inference rule must be retrieved or accommodated that All Americans
know who Percy Sledge is Consider the variations on  in 
 a You should know who Percy Sledge is YOURE AMERICAN OR 
b Owen will know who Percy Sledge is HES AMERICAN

In a what is inferred is again that being American is why you should know but additionally
there is an inference that this is why the speaker makes the assertion In the actual context in
which this utterance was said the speaker had presupposed that his audience knew who Percy
Sledge was and was surprised when questioned While in each case a speci c inference rule must
be retrieved or accommodated the exact character of the relation of this rule to deliberation varies
depending on exactly what is asserted Thus b can be easily seen to be part of reasoning about a
future directed intention For example if a goal in the context is nd out who Percy Sledge is and
one of the conversants proposes the intention of Ask Owen then the sequence in b is a reason
why we might want to ask Owen rather than someone else who Percy Sledge is
 Accommodation Inference or Retrieval
Sadock noted that The appropriate contribution to a conversation is often not merely a statement
but one backed up by some evidence For example the appropriate answer to a question such as
a is not merely a yes or a no but rather a reasoned argument such as b
 a Will Bilandic win
b Yes Hes the machine candidate
The response in b relies on the hearer to retrieve or accommodate an inference rule such as If X
is the machine candidate then X will win While Sadock doesnt note that this reasoned argument
often includes IRUs it seems plausible that b could have been known to both conversants
A reasoned argument for adopting a belief or intention can involve any proof strategy or type
of proof rule the hearer must recognize what rule and strategy combination the speaker intends
Sadock  Cohen  Webber and Joshi  Cohen  For example consider the
rule of inference frames in  gure  from Cohen  see also Webber and Joshi 
Sadock points out that any argument can occur in modus brevis form that is only some of the
premises need be made explicit Figure  shows all the possible modus brevis forms for an
argument based on modus ponens
Cohen states that the Missing Major form is the most popular form The Missing Major form is
the one that will be discussed in the remainder of this section This form is also exempli ed by
 where the b is the Minor premise and the Major premise the inference rule must either be
retrieved or accommodated a similar process is operating in the examples in sections  and
 According to Cohen in order to recognize the argument structure the hearer must

Inference Rule Major Premise Minor Premise Conclusion
Modus Ponens P  Q P Q
Modus Tollens P  Q  Q  P
Modus Tollendo Ponens P   Q Q P
Modus Ponendo Tollens P  Q Q  P
Figure  Rule of Inference Frames
Form Given Premises Conclusion
Normal P  Q P Q
Missing Minor P  Q Q
Missing Major P Q
Only Major P  Q assume rest
Only Minor P assume rest
Figure  Modus Brevis Forms of a Modus Ponens Argument
 Identify the missing premises
 Verify the plausibility of these missing premises
If the missing premises are plausible then the hearer believes that she has correctly identi ed the
structure of the speakers argument To carry out the steps above Cohen proposes that the hearer
can try the following strategies in order
  Identify the missing premise within a knowledge base of shared knowledge
  Identify a relaxed version of the missing premise within own private knowledge
  Identify the missing premise within a model of the speakers beliefs
  Judge the beliefs of a hypothetical third party which could be simpli ed as believe it unless
theres reason to strongly doubt from within ones own beliefs

The  rst three strategies rely on retrieval of an inference rule or a premise from various knowledge
bases in memory Thus Cohens formulation is related to the retrieval cue hypothesis the
IRU Minor premise serves as a cue for retrieving the inference rule Major premise
In the case of examples such as 
 this would mean that each rule of the form If a person is
Indian then they know which Indian restaurants are good If a person is Chinese then they know
which Chinese restaurants are good etc are stored explicitly in memory and retrieved as part of
recognizing the argument structure Because this seems implausible this remainder of this section
explores the possibility that a very general rule such as Someone who knows about X should be
consulted about X is applied and that the existence of these general rules supports the accommo
dation of more speci c rules Cohens last strategy can be viewed as a type of accommodation
The remainder of this section argues against the retrieval cue hypothesis as a function for
Deliberation IRUs by providing a sketch of how the inference rules might be accommodated rather
than retrieved
Assume simply that hearers generally deliberate about incoming assertions and attempt to deter
mine support or warrant relations between them If the hearer believes only that the speaker
is using some proof strategy in an argument the hearer can use a suitably modi ed version of the
logical rule of implication introduction given informally in  Allwood Andersson and Dahl

 a Assume A
b Assume B
c Therefore C
d Implication Introduction If A and B then C
This rule allows the hearer to infer or accommodate inference rules albeit with some missing
premises No retrieval of inference rules is needed
Additional support for this idea is that all of the minor premises and the conclusion are salient
in each example in the corpus This is consistent with the discourse inference hypothesis
Furthermore Sadock and Cohen noted that Missing Major was the most common form of modus
brevis but usually the Conclusion is also available in the context Sadock  Cohen  In

 the inference of the warrant relation involves the audience either retrieving or accommodating
Modied to reect the fact that the relation between the premises and the conclusion may be support or
warrant not entailment


a speaker belief that someone who is Indian knows which Indian restaurants are good The salient
propositions are
 a The conversants want to select an Indian restaurant
b Ramesh is Indian
c Listen to Ramesh
It seems very plausible that rather than retrieving a rule such as If X is Indian then X knows
which Indian restaurants are good that the hearer can infer the inference rule If A and B then
C using implication introduction The inference of this rule makes the speakers argument
cohere If the hearer wishes she can then accommodate this inference rule
The implication introduction rule is very general and abstracts away from the type of A B and
C In example 
 A is a goal B is a belief and C is an action and B is a reason why the audience
should intend C The types of the propositions are all that is required to determine whether they are
related by the support relation two beliefs or the warrant relation a belief and an intention
Implication introduction applies whether it is beliefs or intentions that are being deliberated
 Role of Redundancy
IRUs are often used in arguments and most of the time they consist of simple predicative statements
such as Youre his mother Youre a psychologist or You are retired Each of these statements
de nes a set which one can easily imagine as the restrictor in a syllogistic inference rule Thus
it is plausible that both the form of these utterances and the fact that they are IRUs triggers the
application of the implication introduction rule
This view can be contrasted with the retrieval cue hypothesis in which the function of the
IRU is to trigger the retrieval of the inference rule from memory and the IRU is matched against
the left hand side of the inference rule
Cohen argues that using propositions that are already mutually believed ie IRUs helps hearers
identify the argument structure This can only hold for Deliberation IRUs and Armation IRUs
Cohen claims that the redundancy means that the IRU cannot be used as the conclusion of an
inference process so it must be used as a premise Cohens view might be a version of the coor 
dination hypothesis because it requires recognizing the IRU as redundant and this recognition
plays a role in recognizing the argument structure

Another plausible motivation for using IRUs in arguments is to reduce the time devoted to delib
eration As Webber and Joshi point out the hearers recognition of the structure of the speakers
argument is no guarantee that the hearer will accept the speakers argument Webber and
Joshi  However if IRUs are used to support an argument the validity of the support or
warrant propositions is already accepted and this makes it more likely that the hearer will accept
the argument
For example assume that A and B are both necessary and sucient reasons for concluding C
Assume that the speaker asserts C because A and B and the hearer believes that the asserted
relation holds between A B and C but in fact doesnt believe that A and B hold Then the speaker
must provide evidence for A and B In contrast if A and B are IRUs then there is no need for this
recursive step to determine acceptance
 Open Segment
Open Segment IRUs are identi ed by the discourse correlate for Open Segment discussed in section
 Their function will be discussed below with respect to the hypothesized functions in section

  Open Segment IRUs support the Coordination Hypothesis
Open Segment IRUs would apriori seem to be stellar support for the coordination hypothesis
Open Segment IRUs often return to an earlier discussion and so can be analyzed as providing a cue
that the current segment is subordinate to or part of the same segment as that earlier discussion
They may be used when an intention which has not been satis ed is returned to after any type of
intervening segment Example 
 repeated here from section 
 example  illustrates this
with the two IRUs in 
 In this dialogue E has been telling H about how her money is invested
and asks her question in 

     E 
 and I was wondering  should I continue on with the certicates or
   H Well it	s di
cult to tell because we	re so far away from any of them But I would suggest
this  if all of these are   month certicates and I presume they are
   E Yes
   H Then I would like to see you start spreading some of that money around
   E uh hu
   H Now in addition how old are you

 discussion and advice about starting an IRA


  E uh huh and
 a H But as far as the certicates are concerned
 b I	D LIKE THEM SPREAD OUT A LITTLE BIT 
 c THEY	RE ALL  MONTH CERTIFICATES
  E Yes
  H And I don	t like putting all my eggs in one basket  and I would suspect that February
 would be a good time to put it into something that runs for  and a half years That rst one
that comes due Call me on the others as they come due 
In this case it could be argued that the utterances in 
 conventionally indicate a return to
the segment ending with 

 and thus support the coordination hypothesis The repetition
or paraphrase of information that was part of an earlier context helps the hearer determine the
relation of the information and intentions of the current discourse segment with that prior context
Open Segment IRUs also support the discourse inference hypothesis because 
 is in
ferentially related to the two IRUs in 
 Having all your certi cates as 
 month certi cates
constitutes having all your eggs in one basket An alternate course of action is described of spreading
out the certi cates and having some in two and a half year certi cates
Since all of the relevant information from the prior segment is restated in  it seems unlikely
that the IRUs are retrieval cues Thus this example provides no support for the retrieval cue
hypothesis
 Open Segment IRUs support the Discourse Inference Hypothesis
While 
 may be functionally ambiguous the IRU in  supports only the discourse inference
hypothesis
  E I see Oh and also we have uh 			 in the passbook
 H you have what

 E  thousand in a passbook
 H Youre gonna make me cry
discussion of why they have so much in a passbook and what to do about it 
 E Well thatll be  ne I have 	 thousand in in uh money market funds
	 H You have 	 thousand in a money market fund

discussion of why they have so much in a money market fund
 H AND YOU HAVE 	 IN A MONEY MARKET FUND AND  IN A PASSBOOK
Is that everything
 E Oh yes uh thats everything mhm


	 H Ok Lets  rst of all take the money in that passbook Leave only a thousand in
there 
In  H paraphrases two propositions  rst asserted in  and 	 Each of these proposi
tions were plausibly part of two distinct prior segments each subparts of the description of Es
investments  summarizes what E has said so far This example doesnt appear to argue for the
retrieval cue hypothesis because the two IRUs represent exactly what has been discussed and
there are no related propositions to retrieve from the prior segments d to retrieve other proposi
tions which were discussed in the segments in which these propositions were  rst introduced These
utterances do return to the enumeration of Es investments which was in progress when H inter
rupted E at 	 but the segment starting with  is not subordinate to those prior segments
and the information in  is used immediately in  and 
	 Thus the discourse inference
hypothesis is also an adequate explanation of the data
The discussion of 
 and  shows that we cant de nitively select among the three functional
hypotheses on the basis of the distributional analysis However it appears that the retrieval
cue hypothesis is less plausible than the others because there is no evidence that other information
from the context in which the antecedent occurred is needed The following section discusses the
distributional class of Close Segment IRUs with respect the three hypothesized discourse functions
 Close Segment
The  nal distributionally distinct class of Attention IRUs are Close Segment IRUs The simplest
type of closing statement is okay Scheglo and Sacks  A slightly more contentful version
from the  nancial advice corpus is That was my question okay In neither of these cases is the
content of the statement important However Close Segment IRUs often include information that
is important to remember or to understand properly The main points of a proposed course of
action are repeated sometimes with propositional relations like causality made explicit or reasons
why another course of action cannot be taken are given This section explores factors that might
determine which information is repeated in Closing statements As in sections  and  I will
discuss the functional hypotheses presented in section  with respect to this distributionally
de ned class

	
  Close Segment IRUs support the Coordination Hypothesis
One advantage of an IRU as a Closing statement as compared with a less contentful utterance such
as Okay is that the content of the IRU indicates the scope of the closing In a hierarchical model
of discourse the scope of a closing indicates exactly how many of the stacked focus spaces would
be popped o the stack Close Segment IRUs provide support for the coordination hypothe 
sis because their occurrence can be correlated with aspects of the hierarchical model that make
coordination dicult Consider the IRU in 
     R  or uh Does that income from the certicate of deposit rule her out as a dependent
   H Yes it does
   R It does
   H Yup that knocks her out
Now there is something you can do Do you support her in any way
  R Yes I mean she yeah we supply everything heat light food In other words we you
know she pays nothing as far as the uh upkeep of the home
  H The only amount you have spent then is indirect
  R uh
  H There	s nothing direct
  R yea
  H then that you spend
  R Food
  H The rest of her support comes out of her three thousand and social security
  R Yeah whatever clothes she needs er or uh dental care that kind of thing
  H Well the medical and dental care you can deduct provided you can establish that you
have provided more than half support
  R uh huh
  H BUT THE DEPENDENCY YOU CANNOT CLAIM
  R um hm  breath I see Ok uhh Alright the second question
The antecedents for the IRU in  are 
 through  This example supports the coordi 
nation hypothesis because it is plausible that the repetition of the answer in  is intended
to close two segments the current one starting at  now there is something you can do and the
embedding segment starting with the question in 
 The scope of the Closing is clearly indicated
by the content of the IRU because it coheres both propositionally and lexically with the original
question in 
 Halliday and Hasan 
 Morris and Hirst  Hearst 
This example also supports the discourse inference hypothesis because  is related to the
IRU by a type of setbased contrast to be discussed more fully in section  The contrast arises
because dependency medical deductions dental deductions are all members of the set of deductions
The contrast underlies an argument structure relation between  and 	 because  is an alternate


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Figure  Relation of Means and Intentions in Dialogue 
means to achieve the intention underlying the original question Pollack Hirschberg and Webber

This is illustrated more clearly in  gure  which shows a plausible relationship between the utter
ances in  and the underlying intention structure In hierarchical terms  to 	 contributes
to the intention inferred from 
  is related to  because they describe two alternate
ways to achieve the same intention this is marked by the parallel topicalizations in these two
utterances
 Close Segment IRUs support the Discourse Inference Hypothesis
The previous section discussed how Close Segment IRUs may be used conventionally to indicate dis
course structure thereby supporting the coordination hypothesis I also showed that  could
support the discourse inference hypothesis This section discusses another Close Segment
IRU that supports the discourse inference hypothesis
In  C is discussing how to save his daughter and her husband money on their taxes by having his
daughter pay his wife for the child care that his wife provides for their grandchild The amount of
payment under discussion is two thousand dollars The fact that his daughter could get 		 dollar


tax credit is  rst established in 	        discussed again in 
 and  nally paraphrased
in 	
 	 H Right The maximum amount of credit that you will be able to get will be 		 that
THEY will be able to get will be 		 dollars on their tax return
 C 		 dollars for the whole year
 H Yeah itll be 	 percent
 C Um hm
 H Now if indeed they pay the 			 dollars to your wife thats great
 C um hm

 H So we have  hundred dollars

discussion how to avoid paying taxes on the ' 			 his wife would then have

	 H You could do that too
If the 			 went into the I R A then youd be completely protected
and youd not pay a tax on it
and THEY WOULD GET A 		 DOLLAR CREDIT
The Closing statement in 	 summarizes and thereby ends the discussion of how to avoid
paying taxes on the 			 dollars potential income Thus this example supports the coordination
hypothesis The summary in 	 also reintroduces the fact that his daughter would get a tax
credit this is the result of the whole discussion and the answer to the callers original question
Thus this example parallels that in  However the discussion in  is continued in 	
	  C um hm
 H Theres a child care credit right on the form
In 	 H continues discussing the credit reintroduced as part of the Closing statement in 		
We cannot determine whether the credit was discussed in 		 because H intended to say more
about it in 	 or whether the fact that C merely backchannels in 	 prompts H to say more
or whether both the form and content of 	 shows that H assumes that the course of action
has been agreed and that points of execution can now be discussed Because it is possible that
H reintroduced this proposition in order to talk about it in 	 this example also supports the
discourse inference hypothesis
	 is classied as a Closing statement on the basis that 
 is a presentational there sentence


In sum Close Segment IRUs do not unambiguously support either the coordination hypothesis
or the discourse inference hypothesis However none of the Close Segment IRUs appear to
require the retrieval cue hypothesis
 Retrieval Discourse Inference or Coordination
In section  I introduced three dierent hypotheses about the more speci c discourse functions
of Attention IRUs In sections   and  I discussed the various distributionally identi ed
classes of IRUs with respect to the hypothesized discourse functions
Open Segment IRUs are best explained by either the discourse inference hypothesis or the
coordination hypothesis Close Segment IRUs are also best explained by the discourse in 
ference hypothesis or the coordination hypothesis The retrieval cue hypothesis was
not plausible for these IRUs because no other information from the prior context was relevant to
the current intention Deliberation IRUs can be explained by either the discourse inference
hypothesis or the retrieval cue hypothesis In sum none of the hypotheses about discourse
function are eliminated but the discourse inference hypothesis is a viable explanation in
every case
The fact that it is not possible to distinguish the coordination hypothesis from the discourse
inference hypothesis suggests that perhaps Open and Close Segment IRUs simultaneously
achieve both functions and that in some circumstances the speaker may be primarily concerned
with one function while in other circumstances the speaker is primarily concerned with the other
The speakers intentions might be determined by aspects of the task that are not measured here
eg whether the hearer is already familiar with the task structure or the degree of complexity of
the task
One  nal consideration is whether the function of Attention IRUs depends on recognizing them as
redundant According to the discourse inference hypothesis they need not be recognized as
such According to the coordination hypothesis some IRUs are conventionally used to help
the hearer recognize the discourse structure task structure Use of this convention requires the
hearer to recognize redundancy However it is possible that that coordination would happen without
recognition simply because these IRUs propositionally and lexically cohere with a previous segment
If retrieval doesnt happen automatically Ratcli and McKoon  then the retrieval cue
hypothesis is dependent on the assumption that IRUs are recognized as redundant
Figure  shows that Attention IRUs are not marked as hearer old information in the same way
that Other IRUs are Other IRUs tend to be realized with phrase  nal Mid 	    p   	


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Attention  	
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Figure 
 NotAttention as a Predictor of Mid
Therefore  gure  provides weak evidence against the retrieval cue hypothesis However
I have not shown that Attention IRUs cannot be distinguished from utterances consisting wholly
of new information It is possible that prosodic contour and not boundary tones are used to mark
IRUs as hearer old information It is also plausible that IRUs are recognized as redundant
independently of their prosody
In addition if the coordination hypothesis were true it would be plausible that Open and Close
Segment IRUs would also be marked with cue words that have been claimed to indicate discourse
structure An examination of cue words on Open Segment IRUs such as now okay but and on
Close segment IRUs such as so then well shows that neither of these classes of IRUs are reliably
marked with such cues Polanyi and Scha  Grosz and Sidner 
 Schirin  Hirschberg
and Litman  However it is possible that the IRUs are such good coordination cues that no
other cues are needed Thus this is weak evidence against the coordination hypothesis
In sum an examination of the corpus does not rule out any of the hypotheses discussed here
Furthermore due to the simplicity of DesignWorld the simulation results discussed in section 

cannot eliminate any of the hypothesized functions However the simulation results will show that
the discourse inference hypothesis is viable
 Attention in Design World
The coordination hypothesis cannot be tested in DesignWorld because the discourse structure
is too simple There are no ambiguities as to which segments are currently open and which should
be closed This means that the potential return and subordination eects of Open statements
and the scoping eects of Closing statements cannot be tested Closing statements cannot help the
agent infer the task structure because both agents know the structure of the task Furthermore the
retrieval cue hypothesis cannot really be tested in DesignWorld because agents know which
inferences rules to use and what facts to use in meansend reasoning DesignWorld can provides a
testbed for the discourse inference hypothesis and the discourse inference constraint


In DesignWorld Attention strategies include Attention IRUs those whose antecedents are no
longer salient As with other DesignWorld strategies the range of possible Attention strategies is
limited One set of limitations comes from the domain and the methods that can be developed for
selecting the content of IRUs The strategy for selecting propositions to realize as Open Segment
and Deliberation IRUs is to use those that the speaker is actively using in reasoning and vary how
many of these propositions are realized explicitly The hypothesis is that IRUs allow the other agent
to duplicate the speakers reasoning process with less eort The speakers IRU can potentially save
the hearer the processing involved with  retrieving facts from memory that are to be used in
reasoning  the reasoning required to determine that those facts should be retrieved and 
drawing potentially relevant inferences Using the speakers own reasoning as the basis for selecting
the content of IRUs can be contrasted with using a model of the hearers reasoning For simplicity
no user modeling was attempted
Another set of limitations comes from the structure of the discourse As shown in  gure 
each primitive putact has an implicit or an explicit Opening Proposal Acceptance and Closing
statement Attention IRUs cannot occur in the Acceptance position since by de nition none of the
examples of Attention IRUs consist of salient information This leaves possible Attention loci as
Opening Proposal or Closing
Because Opening statements are juxtaposed with Proposals see  gure  we would not expect the
eects of IRUs in an Opening statement to be dierent than those at the beginning of a Proposal
The only dierence will be that Proposals include dierent types of information than those in
explicit Opening statements The information in Opening statements is general information that
might be useful in meansend reasoning about the putact intention for that segment IRUs as part
of proposals consist of information speci cally related to the proposal that is made
Three strategies were tested  the OpenBest strategy includes the next best option that the
speaker has identi ed during meansend reasoning in an opening statement at the beginning of
each PutAct segment  the ExplicitWarrant strategy includes facts that are warrants for the
proposal with each proposal and  the MatchedPairPremise strategy includes IRUs in proposals
that can be used as premises for making matched pair inferences in the matched pair version of
the task No Close Segment IRU strategies are discussed here because there is no bene t for them
in the DesignWorld task and because section  presents results of Close Segment IRUs that
make inferences explicit
Section 
 will show that strategies incorporating Open Segment IRUs are not bene cial The
conclusion is that if the task is easy enough making propositions salient is not useful IRUs should
be targeted on achieving speci c inferences Section 
 will present DesignWorld results showing



that deliberation IRUs can reduce retrieval costs simplify deliberation and achieve a high level
of agreement as evaluated by the zero nonmatching beliefs evaluation function Section 

will show that when inferential complexity is increased as in the matched pair task making
premises salient increase agents ability to make inferences

  Open Segment in DesignWorld
The simplest Opening statement is
Say A B Open Achieve AB Design Room
A naturallyoccurring utterance most similar to this would be Lets gure out how to do the rst
room which could be left out of the dialogue because an utterance such as Lets put the red couch
in the rst room would license the inference that the speakers intention is to work on the  rst
room In other words a proposal to Put AB RedCouch Room Later can be easily inferred
to be an action that contributes to the goal Achieve AB Design Room and there is no
need to have this goal made explicit beforehand
Strategies with Open statements such as these were tested and shown to have no bene t in Design
World because both agents know the structure of the task Thus they will not be presented here A
variant will be presented below which was hypothesized to potentially have more bene t because
it includes Open Segment IRUs with propositional content such as those found in the corpus
   OpenBest Strategy IRUs for MeansEnd Reasoning
Figure  shows the discourse action protocol for Open Best agents These agents leave Accep
tance and Closing implicit but produce explicit Opening statements which consist of additional
information at the Opening of each discourse segment This additional information consists of an
IRU that could be used in meansend reasoning for the current segment The OpenBest strategy
is illustrated by the Opening statement of OPnc in  and the the Opening statment by OPnc
in 
  OPnc AgentBILL has a green couch
 say agentopnc agentopnc bel has  agentbill green couch 
OPnc Then lets put the green rug in the study
 propose agentopnc agentopnc option putact  agentbill green rug room
OPnc AgentKim has a purple couch
 say Agentopnc agentopnc bel has  agentkim purple couch 

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KEY:
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ACCEPTANCE
CLOSING
REJECTION
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NO SPEAKER CHANGE
SPEAKER CHANGE
(OPEN  BEST)
Figure  Discourse Action protocol for agents using the Open Best strategy
OPnc Then lets put the green lamp in the study
 propose agentopnc agentopnc option putact  agentkim green lamp room 
The IRUs used in the OpenBest strategy are based on the options identi ed by an agents means
end reasoning The IRU that is included is that the agent has another high scoring piece that
could potentially be used in the room being designed Figure  shows what a sequence of discourse
acts might be for a dialogue between two OpenBest agents
Figure  shows the discourse acts utterance acts and the cognitive processing for the two agents
for the dialogue excerpt in 
This Opening strategy is compared with the AllImplicit strategy described in chapter  example

 The results of simulations using this strategy are discussed below
  Open Best Strategy is Detrimental
Figure 	 shows that the OpenBest strategy provides no bene ts over the AllImplicit strategy
even when communication inference and retrieval are free KS NotSig at all AWM The inclusion

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Figure  Sequence of Discourse Acts for Two OpenBest Agents as in Dialogue 
of the IRUs apparently makes agents forget facts that would have been just as useful as those made
salient by the IRUs
In addition  gure  shows that if communication inference and retrieval have some cost then
the OpenBest strategy is detrimental The increased number of messages and the displacement of
facts used in deliberation have the largest eect at higher values of memory but can be seen by
AWM of  KS of  and above   p  	
That this detrimental eect is related to the cost of retrieval can be seen by increasing that cost as
shown in  gure  where the detrimental eect is even more pronounced KS   for AWM 
and above p  	
The OpenBest strategy is also detrimental if the evaluation function is zero invalid or zero 
nonmatching bel but the dierence graphs are not presented here Rather strategies which are
bene cial will be discussed in the following sections and contrasted with the OpenBest strategy

 Deliberation IRUs in Design World
DesignWorld focuses on achieving agreement about intentions rather than beliefs so Deliberation
IRUs in DesignWorld are warrant IRUs The following sections will  rst describe a strategy that
includes warrant IRUs and then present the results of evaluating that strategy in dierent task
situations


Discourse Act Utterance Act A PROCESS B PROCESS
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Open Open Best
OPENING say A B bel	 Store bel	
Infer Open Put
Store bel	
PROPOSAL propose A B option	
MEREASON Put
Check Preconds 	
Deliberate
Decide to Accept
Store MS intend 	
Store ActEects 	
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Open Open Best
OPENING say B A bel
 Store bel

Infer Acceptance 	
Store MS intend 	
Store ActEects 	
Infer Close Put
Infer Open Put
Store bel

PROPOSAL propose B A option
MEREASON Put
Check Preconds 
Check Matches
Deliberate
Decide to Accept
Store MS intend 
Store ActEects 
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Open Open Best
  
Figure  Cognitive Processes for Sequence of Discourse Acts in Dialogue  Agent A and B are
Open Best Agents
  The ExplicitWarrant strategy
The ExplicitWarrant strategy includes a warrant IRU along with every proposal ie every
proposal includes Points information as shown below
	
cost - opnc-opnc2 bill-kim C= 0 , I = 0 , R = 0
Attention/Working Memory
CO
M
PO
SI
TE
 S
co
re
 D
iffe
re
nc
es
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-2
00
-1
00
0
10
0
20
0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 	 Open Best is not Bene cial Strategy  is two OpenBest agents and strategy  is two
AllImplicit agents Task  Standard commcost  	 infcost  	 retcost  	
Say A B Points RedCouch 	
Propose A B Put AB RedCouch Room Later
The ExplicitWarrant strategy is representative of the Deliberation IRUs discussed in section 
because the points information is used by the hearer to deliberate about whether to accept or reject
the proposal Thus in this particular case the fact that the red couch is worth 	 points is meant to
be used in reasoning about whether to adopt the intention of putting the red couch in room This
parallels 
 where the fact that Ramesh is Indian was meant to be used as a reason for adopting
an intention to listen to Ramesh Figure  shows the discourse action protocol for explicit
warrant agents
In  both agents use the ExplicitWarrant strategy The warrant IRUs are shown in caps
  IEI Putting in the green rug is worth 
 say agentiei agentiei bel score  option putact  agentbill green rug room 
IEI Then lets put the green rug in the study
 propose agentiei agentiei option putact  agentbill green rug room

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Figure  OpenBest can be Detrimental Strategy  is two OpenBest agents and strategy 
is two AllImplicit agents Evaluation Function  composite cost commcost   infcost  
retcost  	
IEI Putting in the green lamp is worth 
 say agentiei agentiei bel score  option putact  agentkim green lamp room  
IEI Then lets put the green lamp in the study
 propose agentiei agentiei option putact  agentkim green lamp room
Figure  provides an abstraction of the dialogue in  Figure  shows the discourse acts the
utterance acts and the cognitive processes for both agents for dialogue  The rest of this section
will discuss the results of comparing the ExplicitWarrant strategy with the AllImplicit strategy
 Explicit Warrant reduces Retrievals
Dialogues in which one or both agents use the ExplicitWarrant strategy are more ecient in certain
discourse situations As shown in  gure 
 the ExplicitWarrant strategy is detrimental at AWM
of  for the standard task if retrieval from memory is free KS    p  	
However contrast the case discussed above where retrieval is free with the dierences in scores
shown in  gure  when retrieval is one tenth the cost of communication and inference Here by

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Figure  Open Best increases Retrievals Strategy  is two OpenBest agents and strategy 
is two AllImplicit agents Evaluation Function  composite cost commcost   infcost  
retcost  	
AWM values of  we see an improvement in scores because the beliefs necessary for reasoning are
made available in the current context with each proposal KS for AWM of  and above   p 
	 At AWM parameter settings of 
 where agents can search a huge belief space for beliefs to
be used as warrants the saving in processing time is substantial
 Explicit Warrant is no benet if Communication is Expensive
Figure  shows that if communication is expensive eg 	 times as much as inference or retrieval
then the ExplicitWarrant strategy is not bene cial KS for AWM  to    p 	
This is because providing explicit warrants increases the number of utterances required to perform
the task it doubles the number of messages in every proposal If communication is expensive
compared to retrieval communication cost can dominate the other bene ts
 Explicit Warrant Achieves a High Level of Agreement

EXPLICIT WARRANT STRATEGY
KEY:
PROPOSAL
ACCEPTANCE
CLOSING
REJECTION
CLARIFICATION
OPENING
IMPLICIT
NO SPEAKER CHANGE
SPEAKER CHANGE
(EXPLICIT WARRANT)
Figure  Discourse Action protocol for agents using the ExplicitWarrant strategy
Agent A Agent B
PROPOSAL 
PROPOSAL 
REJECTION 
PROPOSAL 
 
PROPOSAL N
Figure  Sequence of Discourse Acts for Two Explicit Warrant Agents in Dialogue 
The ExplicitWarrant strategy is also bene cial in achieving a high degree of agreement This
is shown when the task is ZeroNonmatchingBeliefs  gure  shows that the ExplicitWarrant
strategy is bene cial even if retrieval is free KS   for AWM from  to  p  	 The bene ts
are because the warrant information that is redundantly provided is exactly the information that
is needed in order to achieve matching beliefs about the warrants for actions under discussion The
strategy virtually guarantees that the agents will agree on the reasons for carrying out a particular
course of action

Discourse Act Utterance Act A PROCESS B PROCESS
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Propose Include Warrant
PROPOSAL say A B bel	 Store bel	
Infer Open Put
Store bel	
propose A B option	
MEREASON Put
Check Preconds 	
Deliberate
Decide to Accept
Store MS intend 	
Store ActEects 	
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Propose ExpWarr
PROPOSAL say B A bel Store bel
Infer Acceptance 	
Store MS intend 	
Store ActEects 	
Infer Close Put
Infer Open Put
Store bel
propose B A option
MEREASON Put
Check Preconds 
Deliberate
Decide to Accept
Store MS intend 
Store ActEects 
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Propose ExpWarr
  
Figure  Cognitive Processes for Sequence of Discourse Acts in Dialogue  Agent A and B
are Explicit Warrant Agents
For agents with high AWM the ExplicitWarrant strategy is also bene cial when the task is fault
intolerant KS   for AWM  and 
 p  	 This is due to the fact that agents with
high AWM tend to make mistakes about which pieces they still have since they dont distinguish
between outdated beliefs and recent beliefs The belief deliberation component relies on the fact
that agents are unlikely to retrieve beliefs that are inconsistent with recent events however agents
with high AWM can do so If the belief deliberation component were modi ed so that temporal
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Figure 
 If Retrieval is Free ExplicitWarrant is detrimental at AWM of  Strategy  of
two ExplicitWarrant agents and strategy  of two AllImplicit agents Evaluation Function 
composite cost commcost   infcost   retcost  	
information was considered when deliberating about beliefs then the ExplicitWarrant strategy
would no longer be bene cial for the ZeroInvalid task
 Summary Explicit Warrant
The most striking result of the evaluation of the explicit warrant strategy is that the bene ts
of the strategy are highly situation speci c Whether the strategy is good or bad depends on
parameters of the task situation This shows that there is no task independent way of de ning
cooperative behavior Cooperative strategies are speci c to the communicative situation and should
be adaptable to the situation at hand Furthermore the experiments clearly show that IRUs are
not bene cial simply for rehearsal The bene ts of the ExplicitWarrant strategy are greatest when
the strategy speci cally targets aspects of the task at hand

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Figure  Retrieval costs Strategy  is two ExplicitWarrant agents and strategy  is two All
Implicit agents Evaluation Function  composite cost commcost   infcost   retcost 
	

 Increasing Inferential Complexity Attention IRUs
  The MatchedPairPremise strategy
As discussed earlier there is a version of the task called the matched pair task that increases
inferential complexity The Attention strategy targeted at improving performance on the matched 
pair task is called the MatchedPairPremise strategy agents using this strategy make premises
salient that could potentially be used to infer matched pair goals A proposal in the MatchedPair
Premise strategy consists of a statement about another matching piece along with a proposal
Say A B Has A GreenCouch
Propose A B Put AB GreenChair Room Later
The information about matching pieces is made explicit even though the other agent could retrieve
this information In addition this doesnt mean that agent A has already inferred a matchedpair
matched pair inferences depend on current intentions In order for the agents to achieve a matched
pair with a green chair and a green couch the proposal about the green chair would have to be

cost - iei-iei2 bill-kim C= 10 , I = 0 , R = 0
Attention/Working Memory
CO
M
PO
SI
TE
 S
co
re
 D
iffe
re
nc
es
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-2
00
-1
00
0
10
0
20
0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure  If Communication is Expensive Communication costs can dominate other costs in
dialogues Strategy  is two ExplicitWarrant agents and strategy  is two AllImplicit agents
Evaluation Function  composite cost commcost  	 infcost  	 retcost  	
accepted as well as a proposal about the green couch and the matched pair inference would have
to be made by both agents
The MatchedPairPremise strategy is illustrated by the proposal made by agent IBI in 
  IBI AgentBill has a green couch
 say agentibi agentibi bel has  agentbill green couch
IBI Then lets put the green rug in the study
 propose agentibi agentibi option putact  agentbill green rug room
IBI AgentBill has green couch
 say agentibi agentibi bel has  agentbill green couch
IBI Then lets put the green lamp in the study
 propose agentibi agentibi option putact  agentkim green lamp room
Figure 	 shows the discourse action protocol for a Matched Pair Premise agent Openings
Closings and Acceptances are left implicit but Proposals are structured using the MatchedPair
Premise strategy Figure  shows a dialogue sequence composed of the interaction of a two
MatchedPairPremise agents Figure  shows the dialogue sequence the utterance acts and the
cognitive processes for dialogue  between two MatchedPairPremise agents

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Figure  Beliefs Match with ExplicitWarrant Strategy  is two ExplicitWarrant agents and
strategy  is two AllImplicit agents Evaluation Function  zero nonmatching beliefs comm
cost  	 infcost  	 retcost  	
 Salient Premises for Matched Pairs improves Performance
As usual the MatchedPairPremise strategy will be compared with the AllImplicit strategy Fig
ure  shows that the MatchedPairPremise strategy is bene cial at low AWM by increasing
agents ability to make matched pair inferences KS   p  	 KS   p  	
This result contrasts sharply with the negative results for the OpenBest strategy The Matched
PairPremise strategy includes IRUs which are not guaranteed to be useful for making matched
pair inferences they are only likely to be useful The OpenBest strategy was similar in including
IRUs reminding other agents of the existence of high scoring pieces However in this situation
the strategy improves performance The improvement is due to the slightly increased inferential
complexity of the matched pair task

(MATCHED PAIR PREMISE)
KEY:
PROPOSAL
ACCEPTANCE
CLOSING
REJECTION
CLARIFICATION
OPENING
IMPLICIT
NO SPEAKER CHANGE
SPEAKER CHANGE
MATCHED PAIR PREMISE STRATEGY
Figure 	 Discourse Action protocol the MatchedPairPremise strategy
Agent A Agent B
PROPOSAL 
PROPOSAL 
REJECTION 
PROPOSAL 
 
PROPOSAL N
Figure  Sequence of Discourse Acts for Two MatchedPair Premise Agents in Dialogue 
 Salient Premises for Matched Pairs increases Retrievals
Because the agents are carrying out the standard version of the task in addition to the matched 
pair optional goals they still must retrieve score propositions when they deliberate their own
options or proposals made by the other agent Figure  shows that the MatchedPairPremise
strategy increases the overall number of retrievals This is because the propositions which are said
in order to increase the likelihood of inferring a matched pair displace the warrant propositions
beliefs about the scores of pieces Consequently more eort is required to retrieve them The
	
Discourse Act Utterance Act A PROCESS B PROCESS
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Check Future Match
Propose use MPP
PROPOSAL say A B bel	 Store bel	
Store bel	
Infer Open Put
propose A B option	
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Decide to Accept
Store MS intend 	
Store ActEects 	
MEREASON Put
Check Matches
Check Future Match
Deliberate
Propose use MPP
PROPOSAL say B A bel
 Store bel

Infer Acceptance 	
Store MS intend 	
Store ActEects 	
Infer Close Put
Infer Open Put
Store bel

propose B A option
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Decide to Accept
Store MS intend 
Store ActEects 
MEREASON Put
Check Matches
Check Future Match
Deliberate
Propose use MPP
  
Figure  Cognitive Processes for Sequence of Discourse Acts in Dialogue  Agent A and B
are MatchedPairPremise Agents
following section describes a strategy that attempts to address this problem by also including IRUs
for score propositions

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Figure  The MatchedPairPremise strategy increases the number of Matched Pair inferences
Strategy  is the two MatchedPairPremise agents and Strategy  is two AllImplicit agents Task
 MP commcost  	 infcost  	 retcost  	
 There are tradeos between Retrieval and Communication
In an attempt to develop a strategy that would combine the bene ts of the MatchedPairPremise
strategy with the reduction in retrieval of the ExplicitWarrant strategy a second strategy for
use in the matched pair task was tested This strategy is the MatchedPairPremiseWarrant
strategy a proposal in this strategy includes both a premise for a potential matched pair inference
and the warrant associated with that potential matched pair inference This is illustrated by IBSIs
proposal in 
 and  in 
  IBSI AgentBILL has a fuchsia rug
 say agentibsi agentibsi bel has  agentbill fuchsia rug 
IBSI Putting in the fuchsia rug is worth 
 say agentibsi agentibsi bel score  option putact  agentbill fuchsia rug room 
IBSI Then lets put the fuchsia couch in the study
 propose agentibsi agentibsi option putact  agentbill fuchsia couch room
IBSI Then lets put the fuchsia rug in the study
 propose agentibsi agentibsi option putact  agentbill fuchsia rug room

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Figure  The MatchedPairPremise strategy increases number of retrievals Strategy  is the
two MatchedPairPremise agents and strategy  is two AllImplicit agents Evaluation function 
composite cost commcost   infcost   retcost  	
As shown by the proposal by IBSI in  IBSI appears to be convinced by this extra information
into proposing to use the fuchsia rug and thereby achieving a matched pair
Figure  shows that at LOW AWM  and  this strategy succeeds at increasing agents ability
to get matched pairs KS   p  	
Like the MatchedPairPremise strategy the MatchedPairPremiseWarrant makes premises salient
that are likely to be useful but not guaranteed to be so Unlike the Open strategies that were
tested both of these strategies are helpful In this situation unlike the situation in which the Open
strategies were tested the inferences are more dicult to make Thus a strategy that is only likely
to help can be bene cial
In order to see whether including the additional score information means that retrieval is reduced
as it is in the ExplicitWarrant strategy  gure 
 compares retrievals only with a retrieval cost
of 	 for MatchedPairPremise strategy with the MatchedPairPremiseWarrant strategy As the
 gure shows including the warrants does reduce the amount of retrieval However as before in

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Figure  The MatchedPairPremiseWarrant strategy increases the number of Matched Pair
Inferences Strategy  is two MatchedPairPremiseWarrant agents and strategy  is two All
Implicit agents Evaluation function  MP commcost  	 infcost  	 retcost  	
situations in which communication is costly the reduction in retrievals might not be worth the
additional communication cost

 Summary Attention in DesignWorld
The DesignWorld experiments discussed in this section were based on the discourse inference
hypothesis I tested an opening strategy called OpenBest which makes premises salient that
might be bene cial in meansend reasoning This strategy was shown to be not bene cial Section

 presented the explicit warrant strategy in which agents include the warrant for their
proposal along with every proposal This strategy was shown to be bene cial in achieving matching
beliefs for the warrant for proposals even when retrieval is free as might be expected In addition
this strategy reduces retrieval costs and thus provides a bene t whenever retrieval is not free
Finally section 
 presents a strategy used in the matched pair version of the task This
strategy makes premises explicit that might be useful in makingmatched pair inferences Unlike the
OpenBest strategy the MatchedPairPremise strategy increases agents ability to make matched

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Figure 
 Strategy  is the MatchedPairPremiseWarrant strategy and Strategy  is the
MatchedPairPremise strategy Evaluation function  MPALL commcost  	 infcost  	
retcost  	 The MatchedPairPremiseWarrant strategy reduces retrieval
pair inferences In sum the main results are that Attention IRUs are bene cial when they are
targeted speci cally at particular inferences when inference is complex or when retrieval isnt free
 Attention	 Summary
This chapter discussed the function of Attention IRUs Attention IRUs are de ned by the infor
mation status location parameter of Remote Their function is to make a proposition salient and
the de ning parameter simply picks out cases of IRUs whose antecedent is not currently salient
Section  describes three hypotheses about the underlying cognitive processes which motivate
Attention IRUs the coordination hypothesis the retrieval cue hypothesis and the dis 
course inference hypothesis Althought the analysis of the corpus does not eliminate any of
these hypotheses it shows that the discourse inference hypothesis is viable as the function of
all distributional types of Attention IRUs I argued that the function of Attention IRUs follows from
the discourse inference constraint which states that inferences are derived from currently
salient propositions Because interpretation is highly dependent on what is salient conversants

coordinate what is salient Coordinating what is salient for both conversants reduces uncertainty
about which inferences both conversants can derive If agents were logically omniscient or if every
thing agents knew was always salient and available then there would be no need for coordination
and no need for Attention IRUs
Note also that Open Segment IRUs such as 
 appear to function similarly to the Deliberation IRU
in 
 In each case a proposition is made salient to be used in reasoning In the case of 
 the
proposition is used in meansend reasoning whereas in 
 the proposition is used in deliberation
Except for these dierences in the type of reasoning there seems little reason to distinguish between
these two types of Attention IRUs
Section 
 tests the discourse inference hypothesis for Open Segment and Deliberation IRUs
and showed that Attention IRUs can be bene cial in three situations  when the content of the
IRU consists of information that is targeted at speci c inferences that the agent is performing at
that point in the discourse  when inferential complexity is increased and  when retrieval is
not free


Chapter 
Consequence
  Introduction
In chapter  I proposed that the function of Consequence IRUs is to support inferential processes
There are two classes of Consequence IRUs First some make an inference explicit from available
premises such as the inference in c in the context of a and b
 a If John goes to France hell miss Barbaras birthday
b John is de nitely going to France
c THEN JOHN WILL MISS BARBARAS BIRTHDAY
This type of Consequence IRU is called an InferenceExplicit IRU These are de ned by the single
distributional parameter that the hearer old relation of the IRU to its antecedent is a type of
inference such as an implicature entailment or other type of commonsense inference The IRU
makes an inference explicit that was implicit in what had already been said
The second type of Consequence IRU are Armation IRUs as shown in 
 previously characterized
as supporting the inference of rhetorical contrast Horn 

 I like you Lizzy I dont know why I like you But I LIKE YOU CS 
Unlike the InferenceExplicit IRUs the content of an Armation IRU such as that in 
 is already
explicit in the context I will argue below that the armation of I like you is related to underlying
processes of inference and deliberation

Section  will discuss Armation IRUs and section  will discuss InferenceExplicit IRUs These
IRUs have little in common in terms of function Armation IRUs have not been implemented in
Design World but DesignWorld experiments for InferenceExplicit IRUs when agents are logically
omniscient or inference limited and when inferential complexity is increased will be discussed in
section 
 Armation IRUs
Armation IRUs function simultaneously at two levels intentional and informational Moore and
Pollack  Walker a At the intentional level speakers arm propositions for multiple
reasons At the informational level it appears that Armation IRUs meet an information structure
constraint of rhetorically contrasting with another salient proposition
Example 
 illustrates a common schema for Armation IRUs in which a proposition Q is asserted
then a proposition P which rhetorically contrasts with Q is asserted then Q is armed The
armation of Q is typically prefaced with the discourse particle but which conventionally implicates
that there is some contrast between P and Q
Armation IRUs are not easily identi able according to taxonomic criteria The occurrence of
but is a cue for Armation IRUs but some Armation IRUs are not prefaced by but Figure 

shows how Armation IRUs distribute in terms of hearer old and salience parameters The
 gure shows that Armation IRUs are not taxonomically selected by any of these parameters
Armation IRUs are selected by the occurrence of but Argument Opposition and FocusOpen
proposition constructions that rely on a Salient Set
Unlike Deliberation IRUs the proposition realized by an Armation IRU is frequently already
salient Figure 
 shows that the antecedents of  Armation IRUs are not currently salient
but  occur in the same turn as their antecedent and  of these are actually adjacent to their
antecedent  The remainder of this section will address the following issues in the analysis of
Armation IRUs
  Are there semanticpragmatic felicity conditions on Armation IRUs and how should they
be characterized
  Why is P asserted and why Q is armed
  Does the hearer need to recognize why P was asserted for the Armation to be felicitous
  What cognitive eects might the Armation have
 AdjacentSelf IRUs occur in the same turn and are adjacent to their antecedents

First in section  I will discuss a pragmaticsemantic felicity condition on Armation IRUs
proposed in previous work Ward  Horn  Ward 	 I will suggest that this condition
needs to be extended to account for the full range of Armation IRUs Then in section  I will
consider possible intentions that a speaker of an Armation IRU might have I will argue that the
communicative intention underlying Armation IRUs is to support inferential processes and the
deliberation of beliefs and intentions Because the function of Armation IRUs is complex and
because there is no natural use for Armation IRUs in DesignWorld DesignWorld experiments
on Armation IRUs are not reported here
  Rhetorical Contrast
	   Argumentative Distinctness
As briey discussed in section  semanticpragmatic felicity conditions on Armation IRUs have
been proposed in previous work Armation IRUs are related to a verbpreposing construction in
 called Proposition Armation  rst discussed by Ward 
 Tchaikovsky was one of the most tormented men in musical history In fact one wonders how
he managed to produce any music at all BUT PRODUCE MUSIC HE DID WFLN Radio
Philadelphia Wards 
 Ward 	
The proposition produce music he did is an IRU because manage is a semifactive predicate which
presupposes the proposition realized as the complement of manage Tchaikovsky produced music
Karttunen  Gazdar 
Ward argues that this verb preposing subset of Armation IRUs are felicitous because they can
convey a particular propositional attitude on the part of the speaker one of surprise or unexpect 
edness Ward  p  However Horn  points out that the surprise condition is not
necessary since  is perfectly felicitous
 Its unfortunate that its cloudy in San Francisco this week but CLOUDY IT IS " so we
might as well go listen to the LSA papers
Horn generalizes Wards account to nonpreposed cases of armation and claims that the condition
that characterizes felicitous armation is rhetorical contrast Horn suggests that the typical
schema for Armation IRUs is concessionarmation I concede P and arm Q where Q may
follow logically from P but contrasts rhetorically with it Furthermore both presuppositions and

entailments may be felicitously though redundantly armed if the armatum can be introduced
with but rather than and since but supports the conventional implicature that there is some
contrast between P and the informationally redundant armation Q
Horn proposes that many cases of rhetorical contrast can be characterized via the argumen 
tative distinctness condition Horn  Anscombre and Ducrot 
 argumentative distinctness condition
An informationally redundant armation Q will be discourse acceptable if it counts
as argumentatively distinct from P in the sense that where P counts as an
argument for a conclusion R Q represents or argues for an opposite conclusion R
This formulation predicts when armation is not felicitous as shown in the examples from Horn
and Ward in 	 and when it is as exempli ed by those in 
	 a It isnt odd that dogs eat cheese fandbutg THEY DO eat cheese
b I know why I love you fandbutg I DO
c He doesnt regret that he said it fandbutg HE DID SAY IT
d He won by a large margin fandbutg WIN HE DID
 a Its odd that dogs eat cheese but THEY DO eat cheese
b I dont know why I love you but I DO
c He regrets that he said it but HE DID SAY IT
d He won by a small margin but WIN HE DID
For example d meets the condition of argumentative distinctness since P He won by a small
margin can argue for an R such as the relative lack of a popular mandate for Mr X while the Q
of his winning per se win he did argues for the opposite conclusion Horn 
Horn also points out that the condition of argumentative distinctness captures only a subset of the
full range of cases involving rhetorical contrast since  involves rhetorical contrast which is not
due to either surprise or argumentative distinctness Horns 
 a Im unhappyhappy they red him but FIRE HIM THEY DID
Note that the embedding verbs here are factives Gazdar 
	
b Im sorryglad I said it but SAY IT I DID
Horn suggests that perhaps examples like  support rhetorical contrast through the sociolinguistic
edict that the speaker must try to avoid negative face Brown and Levinson 
The argumentative distinctness condition is a good starting point for a semantic and pragmatic
condition on felicitous armation but leaves several issues open In what follows I will  rst make
this condition more precise so it is clearer what cases it covers and then suggest extensions to the
characterization of rhetorical contrast
First it is not clear what it means for P to count as an argument for R Horn  The
relation between P and R cannot be entailment or speakers that produced armations would be
contradictory Second the argumentative distinctness condition must be a condition on the hearer
 the hearer must recognize that P and Q present arguments for opposition conclusions and 
the hearer must be able to accommodate some R R such that P counts as an argument for R
and Q counts as an argument for R Lewis  Finally there must be some restrictions on
which R R can be accommodated Below we will consider a restriction that the R R must be
evoked in the discourse situation
Some additional precision may be gained by noting that the argumentative distinctness condition
represents an argument schema that can be subsumed under the Only Minor schema of Sadocks
modus brevis shown in  gure  If we reformulate argumentative distinctness as a type of
modus brevis we see that the condition is met when there are two inferences supported in the
context The  rst consists of the minor premise P and major premise P  R supporting the
conclusion R The second consists of the minor premise Q major premise Q  R supporting the
conclusion R
One possible inference rule is a trivial one of P  P or Q  Q Thus we might also want to
consider cases where P argues directly against Q rather than against an accommodated R In
addition since the inference rules of P  R and Q  R cannot be rules of entailment the
inference rules in question must be commonsense default or heuristic inference rules We will show
below that both support and warrant relations can be the basis for these inference rules
As in the modus brevis cases discussed in section  the hearer must be able to recognize the
argument structure based on these default rules of inference This means that it must be fairly
easy to recognize or accommodate the fact that the rule applies or that the speaker thought that
that the hearer would think that the rule applies Cohen  With Armation IRUs like
Deliberation IRUs the relevant inference rule may be currently salient or the hearer may retrieve
or accommodate it

The following sections use the modus brevis formulation to argue for other ways of de ning
rhetorical contrast in addition to the argumentative distinctness condition Section  will then
discuss the range of intentions that motivate Armation IRUs
	  SetBased Contrast
Many cases of Armation IRUs are felicitous without requiring the hearer to retrieve or accommo
date speci c inference rules For example armation is felicitous whenever there is a setsupported
contrast In  Viv is talking about a recent vacation to Mexico where due to a drought the hotel
had trouble supplying water consistently to all the rooms
 We always had water in that room
I think we were the only ones
WE NEVER RAN OUT OF WATER
hot water we ran out of
but WE ALWAYS HAD WATER Viv 	
Viv repeats her main point that we always had water three times and each repetition is supported
by a dierent set First fWe the othersg is enumerated with the armation and negation of having
water Then a second set fhot water cold waterg is enumerated with the armationnegation of
running out of it The sets are evoked in the context by the use of the term the only ones and by
the topicalization of hot water Prince a
Similarly the armation in example  is supported by a set of relevant retirement plans fIRA
Keogh Plang
 	 H Is he selfemployed
 L Yes
 H Im sorry i missed that
 L Yes he is
 H Ok Well why not start for him a Keogh plan You cant get an IRA after 	 but
YOU CAN GET A KEOGH PLAN
The set fIRA Keogh Plang is evoked by the parallel open propositions in  The fact that you
cant get an IRA after 	 doesnt necessarily argue against You can get a Keogh Plan at the logical

level Rather fIRA Keogh Plang are alternate ways of achieving the same goal of avoiding paying
taxes
In  the participants must have agreed by utterance  that the R cannot claim his mother as
a dependent This proposition is armed by H in  It doesnt seem to be necessary to infer
an RR as opposite conclusions from  and  since R could have both deducted the medical
and dental care as well as claim his mother as a dependent
  
 R  or uh does that income from the certicate of deposit rule her out as a
dependent
  H yes it does
  R it does
  H yup that knocks her out
now there is something you can do do you support her in any way
discussion about whether r supports his mother
 H well the medical and dental care you can deduct provided you can establish that
you have provided more than half support

 R uh huh
 H BUT THE DEPENDENCY YOU CANNOT CLAIM
 R um hm breath I see
ok uhh alright the second question
The armation contrasts with  because dependency and medical and dental care are members
of a set of deductions This set is evoked by the use of the topicalizations in  and  and is
easily recognized by the hearer
These are all classic examples of set based contrast de ned by Prince as an inference arising
under the following conditions Prince b Prince 

  There is an open proposition OP taken to be salient shared knowledge
  The OP is predicated on the members of a set of entities
  the variable in the OP is instantiated dierently for each member
  the dierence in the instantiation is considered relevant
In the case of  the OP is you cancant get a Y and the set of entities that the proposition is
predicated on is fIRAs Keogh plansg The variable in the OP armationnegation is instantiated

dierently for each member of the set and the dierence in the instantiation is relevant precisely
because a way of putting aside money for retirement is what is under discussion
When the setcontrast condition is met but may not be needed as a marker of contrast In 
the  rst armation of We never ran out of water was not prefaced by but The contrast here was
induced by the phrase the only ones similar to the use of the only in 
 from Schirin 

  See this one right here
 Hes smart
 He himself dont think hes smart
 but hes smart
 He came in rst in plumbing

 out of a hundred thirty  ve
 He was the only Jewish kid
 HE CAME IN FIRST
The armation in 
 is neither surprising nor argumentatively distinct Prefacing  with a but
completely changes the meaning and indicates that 
 and  are somehow concessive While
there seems little to concede here 
 is easily characterized as a case of setbased contrast in which
the one child under discussion is contrasted with the one hundred and thirty  ve children in his
class
These examples show that Princes characterization of the conditions for contrast provide an envi
ronment for felicitous armation that is independent of the argumentative distinctness condition
	  Lack of Support
There are an additional class of examples in which the the conceded proposition P does not seem
to argue against either the armed proposition Q or any interesting R that could be inferred from
Q Consider  said by a speaker hiking through the woods
 Something has been through here
I dont know if it was a deer or what
but SOMETHING HAS
Since the argumentative distinctness condition leaves potential R and R completely open a pos
sible default inference rule is something has been through here Q  I know what it is R The

assertion of P I dont know if it was a deer or what defeats the inference of R While this inference
rule is possible it does not seem plausible and the armation is felicitous without consciously
accommodating the suggested RR when reading  The same argument holds for  asserted by
a passenger in a vehicle in response to the drivers comment that the heavy trac was unexpected
 Theres something on re up there
I cant see whats on re
but SOMETHING IS LW 

In  a possible R is Ill tell you whats on re The assertion of P I cant see whats on re argues
for  R Again this inference rule does not seem convincing Furthermore the original assertion of
Something is on re already argues for  R if we assume that speakers provide as much information
as possible that is currently relevant Quantity Maxim In other words if the speaker had known
what was on  re she would have said so at the beginning rather than asserting the less informative
Theres something on re up there
Another way of viewing these examples is that concession and armation function at the metalin
guistic level The relation between P and Q then is that P fails to provide support for the assertion
of Q nevertheless the speaker is asserting Q Examples of this type are characterized by verbs
referring to typical sources of evidence for propositions eg see hear say as well as mental state
verbs such as know remember Consider 
  M So I just put that on the little part there on that new form there

 H Well youll have to list that as interest earned and then you can knock that
amount o somewhere on schedule B
Theres a line for it I dont remember what the line number is but ITS THERE
The statement that H doesnt remember the line number simply fails to provide support for the
fact that there is a line number but it doesnt argue against the existence of the line Perhaps R
is a proposition such as you will be able to locate the line number But the original assertion of
theres a line for it would have supported R
Thus while it is possible in many cases to come up with a possible pair of default inference rules
these rules may not be plausible as ones that the hearer would recognize and it is not clear that
the speaker intended the hearer to do so I will return to these examples in section  when I
discuss the intentions underlying the assertion of P and subsequent armation of Q

	  Information Structure Constraints
In order for the argumentative distinctness condition to hold the hearer must be able to
retrieve or accommodate two inference rules P  R and Q  R Horn and Ward argued that the
reason that 		 is infelicitous is that no such rules are possible
		 He won by a large margin fandbutg WIN HE DID
However if we imagine a situation in which the hearer was part of the competition for a promotion
and now must work for the winner then 		 is much better If the R of he humiliated you is made
explicit in the dialogue as in 	 then the armation becomes completely felicitous
	 He won by a large margin
He humiliated you
But HE DID WIN
This suggests that we need an additional condition on the application of argumentative distinctness
that the inference rules in question must be salient in the context or easily evoked or accommodated
In sections  and  I argued that the argumentative distinctness condition was not nec
essary for armation but so far it appears to be a sucient condition for felicitous armation
However information structure provides an additional critical constraint As discussed above 	a
is felicitous Surprisingly 	b and 	c are not
	 a Its unfortunate that you failed but you did
b  You failed unfortunately but YOU DID
c  Unfortunately you failed but YOU DID
d You failed Its unfortunate that you failed but YOU DID
What is the dierence The proposition P realized by 	b and 	c is identical to that in 	a and
thus should be argumentatively distinct as well The only dierence is that in 	a the proposition
you failed is backgrounded in the  rst clause and the lexical items unfortunate and did are both
marked as focal by pitch accents Both syntactic structure and prosody contribute to establishing
a focusopen proposition information structure where the focus is a propositional attitude In the
case of 	a this structure is UNFORTUNATEP but TRUEP


In 	b and 	c the proposition P is part of the focus because it is not subordinated and must
receive a pitch accent The lexical item unfortunately sounds parenthetical rather than focal The
eect is that P cannot be felicitously armed in an adjacent clause Note that 	d shows that
even if the proposition was previously asserted the armation is still felicitous as long as it is not
asserted in the concessive clause
Further evidence against the suciency of the argumentative distinctness condition is provided by
the asymmetry in the pairs below
	 a John managed to win but IT WAS DIFFICULT
b John managed to win but HE DID WIN
In 	a the contrastive structure is TRUEwinning but DIFFICULTwinning In 	b even
though manage to X conventionally implicates the diculty of Xing this implicature does not
provide the basis for a DIFFICULTwinning but TRUEwinning rhetorical contrast Presuppo
sitions of a proposition are inferences from a proposition but not part of the focal structure of the
proposition
These examples support the conclusion that there is an additional information structure constraint
on felicitous armation and that it is possible to arm propositions that are in the background in
a previous utterance with appropriate prosody Further elucidation of these constraints must be
left to future work
 Deliberation and Inference
The previous section discussed the semanticpragmatic felicity conditions on felicitous armation
These constraints hold at the information structure level This section proposes speaker intentions
underlying Armation IRUs What I would like to explain is why the speaker asserts the concessive
proposition P as well as armingQ The intentions that I argue for are  to support deliberation
 to defeat undesired inferences and  to indicate commitment to an asserted proposition These
intentions do not map isomorphically onto the information structure classes of Armation IRUs
Moore and Pollack 
	  Coherence of Beliefs
In chapter  I introduced the attitude assumption
Levinson noted that some presuppositions and even entailments may be reinforceable with heavy stress Levin
son 	

attitude assumption
Agents deliberate whether to accept or reject an assertion or proposal made by
another agent in discourse
Because of the attitude assumption speakers want to strategically provide information which
they believe will make it more likely that other agents will accept their assertions and proposals
Increasing the likelihood of acceptance is related to the underlying deliberation process This is
reected in the coherence assumption repeated here from section 
coherence assumption
Beliefs and intentions that are subject to deliberation are evaluated for their coherence
with other beliefs via the relations of support and warrant
The coherence assumption explains why P is asserted P is asserted to ensure coherence via
consistency in beliefs by defeating unintended inferences to indicate the basis for assertions or
proposals or to compare two possible bases for intentions or two possible bases for beliefs
But once P is asserted why is Q armed The affirmation assumption below posits a plausible
function for the armation of Q
  affirmation assumption Repeating a proposition is a weak type of support that pro
vides evidence of the speakers commitment to the truth of the proposition
The affirmation assumption means that the occurrence of an armation is a cue that the speaker
believes that she must provide additional support for a proposition Q recently asserted This
speaker belief could be motivated by the perception that a currently salient proposition P argues
against Q Ward 	 Horn  In other words if a proposition Q is armed in a context C
something in C must either support or warrant an opposite conclusion or fail to support or warrant
Q This would motivate example  as defeating the commonsense inference that torment leads
to unproductivity by arming productivity The following section will discuss how these examples
are related to deliberation
	 Supporting or Demonstrating Deliberation
According to the attitude assumption both beliefs and intentions are deliberated If the atti 
tude assumption didnt hold then there would be no need to support assertions or to provide
warrants for proposals Often the best support or warrant that a speaker can provide is an affir 
mation of the relevant fact in the face of other information Armations motivated by support

are characterized by verbs referring to typical sources of evidence for propositions being deliber
ated eg see hear say as well as mental state verbs reecting deliberation know remember
Armations motivated by warrant refer to intentionality costs or bene ts of a course of action
In  the speaker perceives a need to support the assertion that something is on  re The concessive
clause concedes lack of support and the armation clause demonstrates her commitment to the
truth of her assertion despite the fact that she can provide no evidence to support her claim
Typically the kind of evidence the speaker would like to have to support the assertion of Q is made
explicit in the context In  the speaker stated that visual support was desirable In  H is
searching his memorybelief structure
The most convenient way to represent the structure of examples such as  is with a relation of
not support since the assertion of I dont know why I like you does not strictly argue against
I like you A similar example was given in  In example 	 the relevant relation seems to be
not warrant
	 He didnt make a pro t from doing it but HE DID IT
Deliberating over alternate courses of action can take many kinds of information into account In
	 the speaker concedes that eciency might dictate one course of action but preference warrants
another
	 I dont like to go down that way  It may be shorter  but I DONT LIKE IT L 	
The source of the argument structure in 	 is intentional rather than informational Dierent
types of information structure can also be related to deliberating intentions For example in 
the fact that a plausible alternate is not possible You cant get an IRA after 	 is an argument
for getting a Keogh plan In 	
 the Armation is only indirectly related to the concession at
the information structure level but provides the basis for comparing possible intentions in what
follows
	
 H Sure if you pay o they give you all kinds of numbers that if you pay the the mortgage
o early you p you make a principle payment now you save umpteen dollars in inter
est Thats great but THEYRE TALKING ABOUT DOLLARS Lets compare comparable
things Lets compare the percentage The percentage that youre making on your money if
it exceeds  ! you dont pay o the mortgage
In 	 J demonstrates what supporting information she is using to deliberate whether to  le a tax
return

	 H Jennifer I understand what youre saying and Im sorry I have to tell you that I really
am
J Well Im I have more faith in you than what he told me
HE SAID I DIDNT HAVE TO FILE
BUT THEN YOU JUST TOLD ME I DO
H Yes and I wouldnt want to see you get in trouble
J has received verbal advice from two dierent sources and the IRUs provide evidence that the
source of these two opposed beliefs is what is determining the result of deliberation It appears
that Js intention is to make explicit how she is resolving the inconsistency between two pieces of
linguistic evidence
	 Negative Face as Preference
Horns negative face examples such as  are not well characterized by the argumentative distinct
ness condition However these can be subsumed under the coherence assumption if we augment
the endorsement types for beliefs to reect agents preferences Kahneman Slovic and Tversky
 Galliers a
  preference assumption Agents beliefs are partially determined by their preferences
about what to believe which may have a nonlogical or nonutility basis
Then a combination of the attitude and preference assumptions motivate  where what
is relevant is that the speaker believes that the hearer may not want to accept the assertion of
P preferring to believe  P It is possible that P in  conicts with the hearers view of herself
as extremely intelligent or that the acceptance of P would lead the hearer to infer a number of
conclusions which she would prefer not to derive Factive predicates for other relations that express
the diculty of accepting a proposition are odd strange surprising amazing Im sorry that Its
a wonder that and all of these also license armation
	 Defeating Inferences
The argumentative distinctness condition suggests that one of the speaker intentions un
derlying Armation can be to defeat inferences If the relationship between P and Q can be
This may show that it is important to include source information as an endorsement type on supporting beliefs
Galliers  Cohen 	 On the other hand perhaps J must demonstrate her reasoning precisely because it is
dicult to choose between two oppositing beliefs that are both supported by a linguistic endorsement
		
characterized by argumentative distinctness where P counts as an argument for a conclusion R
and Q argues for an opposite conclusion R one intention that the speaker could have is to defeat
the inference of either R or R Q is armed in order to defeat the inference of R or to make it
clear that Q holds despite the fact that R doesnt follow
We discussed argumentationbased inferences but defeating plausible inferences of generaliza 
tion is also possible Consider 	 and 	
	 Sabine doesnt make syntax mistakes in English maybe in German BUT NOT IN EN
GLISH LL 
	 The agent they have right now is pretty cute It cant do much but ITS CUTE LW


In neither of the discourses that these examples are drawn from were the conceded propositions
of Sabine may make syntax mistakes in German or The agent cant do a lot controversial or up
for discussion Rather in 	 it seems that the speaker intends to keep the hearer from inferring
something like Sabine doesnt make syntax mistakes at all and in 	 the capabilities of the agent
under discussion is related to its appearance by a setrelation of desirable attributes The speaker
believes that if she asserts that the agent is cute the hearer may infer falsely that the agent is
both cute and can do a lot or that it is cute because it can do a lot
A diagnostic for whether a felicitous armation depends on defeating inference is to paraphrase the
concessive assertion P and the armation Q with Dont think I mean not P and Q For example
in 	 the paraphrase would be Dont think I mean that Sabine doesnt make syntax mistakes in
German or in English This diagnostic distinguishes the defeating inference Armations from the
coherence armations Examples such as  cannot be paraphrased as Dont think I mean that
I can see what is on re and that something is
Generalization inferences are similar to examples which bound a scale Horn  Hirschberg
 ie dont infer too much in either direction of a scale
	  b Are there ah  I dont think the ah brokerage charge will be ah that excessive
 h No theyre not excessive but THERE ARE CHARGES
In 	 a scale is evoked of no charges some charges excessive charges The armation bounds
the scale of charges to be less than some charges but more than no charges This bounding the
scale type of armation is also demonstrated by the examples in 
	
 a Its snowing more gently but its still snowing Horn 
b This happens to me sometimes not too often but it does  Van Pelt
c Theres also another kind of turtle in here with a red belly They are pretty rare but
they ARE in hereTinticum
	 Salience and Rehearsal
A  nal possibility is that Q is armed in order to make Q salient However there is only one
sentence after the  rst assertion of Q so by our criteria Q is still salient at the point where it
is armed It is plausible that Q is armed because the last thing a speaker says in a turn is
more salient than earlier assertions and the speaker wishes to leave Q salient because Q is the
main point It is also plausible that armation simply increases the frequency of a proposition
in memory Both of these eects follow automatically from the recency and frequency eects of a
memory model like AWM hold without any recognition by the hearer and are a general function
of all types of IRUs rather than being speci c to Armation IRUs
 Summary
Armation IRUs are subject to information structure constraints and can be characterized at the
information level independently of the speakers intention in producing the Armation They
provide evidence that the reasoning process of human beings is aected by their desires and by the
desire to maintain coherence among all their beliefs Harman 
 Galliers 	 Speakers take
care to ensure that hearers dont draw inconsistent inferences In addition Armation IRUs show
that the hearers attitude toward a proposition can be a reason not to accept or believe a proposition
even when this attitude has a nonlogical basis Experiments which test the proposed functions of
Armation IRUs will not be reported here The DesignWorld experiments for Consequence will
test the InferenceExplicit IRUs to be discussed in the following section
 Inference
Explicit IRUs
While the analysis of Attitude and Attention IRUs uses factors related to the utterance context
InferenceExplicit IRUs are classi ed as such based solely on the hearer old relationship between
the IRU and its antecedent The types of hearer old information discussed in section  are
repetition paraphrase entailment implicature and presupposition InferenceExplicit
	
IRUs are those which make an inference explicit the content of the IRU is derivable as an entailment
or an implicature based on linguistic form
The class of InferenceExplicit IRUs is not homogeneous One distributional factor that seems to
important is whether the antecedents of the IRU are currently salient This distinction de nes two
major subclasses of InferenceExplicit IRUs these will be discussed in the following sections
  InferenceExplicit IRUs with Salient Antecedents
A premise for an inference is salient if its antecedent location was Last Same or Adjacent
While apriori we would not expect InferenceExplicit IRUs to be distributionally dierent than
Paraphrases  gure  shows that the antecedent for a InferenceExplicit IRU is more likely to be
salient 	    p   	 df  
InferenceExplicit IRUs Paraphrase IRUs
Salient  
Not Salient  
Figure  Distribution of InferenceExplicit IRUs as compared with Paraphrases according to
whether their antecedents are currently salient Salient  Adjacent or Same or Last Not Salient 
Remote
This distributional fact provides evidence for the discourse inference constraint because
in most cases when there is explicit evidence that an inference was derived from an assertion in
conversation the antecedent premises are currently salient
	   Some InferenceExplicit IRUs are Attitude IRUs
InferenceExplicit IRUs whose antecedent was said by the other speaker and which are adjacent to
their antecedent are a subset of Attitude IRUs with an additional eect of making an inference
explicit As shown in  gure   out of the  InferenceExplicit IRUs with salient antecedents
are also Attitude IRUs
An example of a InferenceExplicit IRU that is in the attitude locus is given in 	
   What did you do with the house in north Jersey
 A I sold it
See  for the denition of these parameters
	
Attitude IRUs Not Attitude
InferenceExplicit IRUs Salient Ants  
Figure  Distribution of InferenceExplicit IRUs with Salient antecedents as Attitude IRUs and
Not Attitude Attitude  Adjacent  Other
 H No was it rented after you moved out

 A No
 H Give me the sequence here
You built a house in south Jersey  yrs ago
 A Yes
 H Was that rented
	 A No I was using it as a summer home
 H ah THEN AT ONE TIME YOU HAD  HOMES
 A Right
Here H makes the inference explicit that if A owned a home in north Jersey and a home in south
Jersey simultaneously and neither home was rented then A had two homes As response in 
indicates that she treats this as a demonstration by H that he had made this inference Thus in
this case the InferenceExplicit IRU also functions as an Attitude Acceptance IRU
	  InferenceExplicit IRUs Ensure that an Inference is made
As shown in  gure  there are  InferenceExplicit IRUs with salient antecedents that are not
Attitude IRUs In these the speaker explains or draws out an inference based on hisher own
previous contribution The inference is presumably made explicit in order to ensure that the other
conversant makes the inference For example consider 
  C See my comment was if we should throw even the 			 dollars into an I R A or
something for her

other eects of the hypothetical course of action


 H As far as your wife is concerned shes entitled to an IRA for  However in 
These are elaborations in Hobbs  Mann and Thompson 	
	
its  percent SO SHED HAVE A MAXIMUM IF SHE RECEIVED TWO THOUSAND
DOLLARS OF THREE HUNDRED THAT SHE PUT INTO IT
 C um hmm
In this case H makes the inference explicit that  percent of two thousand dollars is 		 dollars
It is plausible that H thought that by making the inference explicit he would save C making the
calculation and that this would be more ecient since he had already calculated the amount It is
also possible that H thought that C was not capable of making the calculation while talking on the
radio It is not very plausible that H thought that C was not capable of making the calculation at
all In the worst case C could make the calculation if given time to access a pocket calculator
	  Does Sequential Locus matter
Consider the CloseSegment locus of the InferenceExplicit IRU in 
a
 	 H Right The maximum amount of credit that you will be able to get will be 		
that they will be able to get will be 		 dollars on their tax return
 C 		 dollars for the whole year
 H Yeah itll be 	
 C um hm
 H Now if indeed they pay the '			 to your wife thats great
 C um hm

a H SO WE HAVE 		 DOLLARS

b Now as far as you are concerned that could cost you more

c Remember youre gonna have  thousand worth of income

d Whats your tax bracket 
In 
a H sums up the conclusion of the previous segment which is that pursuing a potential
course of action could result in a gain of 		 dollars Even though the inference recapitulates what
was made explicit earlier the bene t of this strategy could arise from rehearsing the consequences
of a given action or from indicating that this consequence is relevant for the following segment In
 the fact that is repeated will be used in deliberation in the following segment where a dierent
hypothetical course of action is discussed
Earlier H had said that in 	
 the percentage deduction was 
 percent
	
Does it matter that this IRU occurs at the transition to a new segment IRUs may be a cue to dis
course structure The potential multiple functional interpretation of IRUs which are distributionally
located at discourse segment boundaries was also discussed in chapter  where I conjectured that
they may be used to indicate task structure when the task structure is unclear to one of the conver
sants In  however H is focusing on deliberation structures of one course of action as compared
to another and rehearsing the eects of one course of action is an equally valid explanation
 InferenceExplicit IRUs with NonSalient Antecedents
Figure  shows that there are 
 cases of InferenceExplicit IRUs with NonSalient Remote
antecedents If the discourse inference constraint is to hold then these inferences must
have been made when the premises were salient Therefore it is not clear whether making an
inference explicit when the premises are no longer salient functions dierently than a paraphrase
or a repetition I will argue that the intentions underlying the Remote InferenceExplicit IRUs are
the same as those for Attention IRUs
Five of the Remote InferenceExplicit IRUs are introduced into the context and then used as a
premise in reasoning For example in  the IRU makes an inference explicit which is then
used for deliberating alternate courses of action
   J  and Im entitled to a lump sum settlement which would be between 
		
and 		 or a lesser life annuity and the choices of the annuity um would be  
per month That would be the maximumwith no bene ciaries
  H You can stop right there take your money
  J Take the money
	 H Absolutely
 J How would
 H YOURE ONLY GETTING 		 A YEAR At 			 no trouble at all to get 	
percent on 			 bucks 
H interrupts J at  and tells her to take your money To provide a warrant for this course of
action H makes an inference explicit in  This inference follows from what she has told him
in  namely Youre only getting 		 dollars a year Presumably given enough time J could
calculate that ' a month for  months amounts to a little over '		 a year In addition
to making the inference explicit and thus potentially saving J this calculation the juxtaposition
of this fact against the advice to take the money licenses the inference that the fact that she is
only getting 		 dollars a year is a warrant for adopting an intention to take the money The
	

motivation for Hs utterance and the adoption of the advice relies on the assumption that J is
deliberating about the utility of performing certain actions as opposed to others The relevant
comparison needed to support deliberation that it is easy to get 	! on  thousand dollars is
also made explicit
The other Remote InferenceExplicit IRU occurs in a summary at the end of a discourse segment
This may function to coordinate a discourse segment closing as discussed in chapter 
The function of reintroducing a proposition into the context and closing a discourse segment are
both functions that are discussed as functions of Attention IRUs in chapter  So Remote Inference
Explicit IRUs may function exactly like remote repetitions or paraphrases In order to explore
the distinction between making an inference explicit while the premises are salient and making the
inference explicit when the premises are no longer salient DesignWorld experiments test Inference
Explicit IRUs in both of these situations These experiments are reported in section 
 Recognition of InferenceExplicit
InferenceExplicit IRUs are identi ed for the purposes of analysis by the fact that they make
inferences explicit However the fact that the analyst can identify the utterance as a Inference
Explicit IRU is separate from whether in fact the hearer recognizes that the utterance makes an
inference explicit While my intuition is that hearers do recognize the InferenceExplicit relation
between the InferenceExplicit IRU and its antecedents there is little evidence to support this
intuition
One source of evidence is that there are no cases where the inference that is made explicit is argued
about ie InferenceExplicit IRUs are never controversial assertions
Another source of evidence is that a plausible strategy is for the speaker to explicitly mark an
utterance as inferrable whenever she thinks the hearer cannot recognize the inference relation
Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg 	 Polanyi and Scha  Schirin  This could be done
via use cue words or prosody InferenceExplicit IRUs are not reliably marked as inferrable by
prosody Walker c Cue words that might mark an inferential conclusion are then and so
but these only occur on  out of  InferenceExplicit IRUs and the inferences are not ones that
are especially dicult
	
 Summary
A functional distinction between types of InferenceExplicit IRUs is whether the antecedents for the
IRU are salient or not A second distinction among IRUs with salient antecedents is whether the
speaker of the IRU said the antecedent or whether the antecedent was said by the other conversant
InferenceExplicit IRUs normally have salient antecedents When the antecedent is both Adjacent
and produced by the Other speaker then InferenceExplicit IRUs also function as Attitude IRUs
The distributional analysis cannot distinguish those cases where the speaker made an inference
explicit to help the other conversant make an inference and when the inference is made explicit as
a demonstration that the speaker made the inference
When InferenceExplicit IRUs have Remote antecedents they function like Attention IRUs In
order to test whether this is the case DesignWorld experiments will test InferenceExplicit IRUs
in two dierent situations when the antecedents of the InferenceExplicit IRU are currently salient
and when they are not
 Consequence in Design World
As I pointed out in section  only a limited number of inference types are possible in Design
World In the simplest version of the DesignWorld task there are three types  meansend
reasoning ie what actions can be performed to achieve the task and  act eect inferences ie
once an agent uses a piece of furniture in the task then that piece of furniture is no longer available
 inference of acceptance of a proposal when acceptance is implicitly communicated
As discussed before processing can be datalimited or inference limited The variations in AWM
provide a datalimit on inference because agents can only make inferences on facts that are currently
salient Limitations in meansend reasoning are a result of datalimitations Every strategy that is
tested in DesignWorld is tested against variations in AWM from  to 

In addition as discussed in section  inferencelimited processing is possible by parameterizing
agents inference capabilities Agents can be parameterized so that  they are all inference
agents ie logically omniscient or  they are half inference agents or  they are no 
inference agents The inferences that are limited are the acteect inferences
DesignWorld also supports two other versions of the Standard task which increase inferential
complexity MatchedPair and MatchedPairTwoRoom as discussed in section  These tasks
require making inferences about when two actions will achieve a matched pair in addition to the
standard task and are the only inferences in DesignWorld that require multiple premises The two
	
task variations supports exploring the eects of inferenceexplicit IRUs that have salient antecedents
as opposed to those with remote antecedents The task variations and the MatchedPairInference
Explicit strategy are discussed in section 
The purpose of the simulations is to explore the interaction of discourse strategies with these
inference related parameters As discussed in section  within the limits of the DesignWorld
domain and the discourse structure there are a limited number of strategies available In addition
to the limits on types of inferences there are only a limited number of discourse positions where
inferences can be made explicit These discourse positions are Proposal Acceptance or Closing
As discussed in section  inferences in the corpus are most often made explicit while their
antecedents are salient Thus inferences that follow from the acceptance of a proposal can be
made explicit either as part of the Acceptance or as part of an explicit Closing statement for the
segment Since there seems little dierence between making an inference explicit in these two
situations a discourse strategy of making an inference explicit in a Closing was tested This is the
CloseConsequence strategy Section  discusses this strategy and applies it in two situations
when agents are inference limited and when they are not
The MatchedPairInferenceExplicit strategy makes inferences explicit as part of a proposal One
of the constraints on inferences that are part of a proposal is that the inference follows from the
acceptance of a prior proposal This is because no inferences follow from a proposal until it is
accepted The matched pair inference explicit strategy is presented in section  and
results of testing this strategy are given in sections  and  The strategy is tested in
situations in which an inference is made explicit when its premises are salient and when they are
not
  CloseConsequence Strategy Making Inferences Explicit
The discourse strategy of making an inference explicit in a closing statement is called the Close
Consequence strategy This strategy of making inferences explicit at the close of a segment parallels
the naturally occurring example given in  In both cases an inference is made explicit that follows
from what has just been said and the inference is sequentially located at the close of a discourse
segment
Figure  shows the discourse action protocol for a CloseConsequence Openings and Acceptances
are left implicit but Closing is always communicated explicitly Figure  shows a dialogue se
quence composed of the interaction of a CloseConsequence agent Agent B with an AllImplicit
agent Agent A
	
(MAKE INFERENCE EXPLICIT)
KEY:
PROPOSAL
ACCEPTANCE
CLOSING
REJECTION
CLARIFICATION
OPENING
IMPLICIT
NO SPEAKER CHANGE
SPEAKER CHANGE
CLOSE  CONSEQUENCE STRATEGY
Figure  Discourse Action protocol for agents using the CloseConsequence strategy
Agent A Agent B
PROPOSAL 
CLOSING 
PROPOSAL 
REJECTION 
PROPOSAL 
 
PROPOSAL N
CLOSING N
Figure  Sequence of Discourse Acts in Dialogue 
 for an AllImplicit agent A and a Close
Consequence agent B
An excerpt of a dialogue where agent CLC uses the CloseConsequence strategy is shown in 

Agent CLC is a CLoseConsequence agent CLC makes explicit closing statements on the com
pletion of the intention associated with a discourse segment In addition to the explicit close
statement as shown in 
 CLC makes the acteect inference explicit that follows from what
	
was just agreed upon For example in 
 CLC makes the inference explicit that since they
have agreed on putting the green rug in the study Bill no longer has the green rug
  BILL Then lets put the green rug in the study
 propose agentbill agentclc option putact  agentbill green rug room
CLC So weve agreed to put the green rug in the study
 close agentclc agentbill intended putact  agentbill green rug room
CLC agentbill doesnt have green rug
 say agentclc agentbill bel has n	t  agentbill green rug
BILL Then lets put the green couch in the study
 propose agentbill agentclc option putact  agentbill green couch room
Figure  shows the relationship between the underlying cognitive processes and the discourse and
utterance acts for an dialogue excerpt given in 
 between an AllImplicit agent and a Close
Consequence agent
Discourse Act Utterance Act A PROCESS B PROCESS
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Propose AllImp
PROPOSAL propose A B option	
MEREASON Put
Check Preconds 	
Deliberate
Decide to Accept
Store MS intend 	
Store ActEects 	
Close Cl C
CLOSING close B A intended	
Infer Acceptance 	
Store MS intend 	
Store ActEects 	
Close Put
say B A bel Store Bel
Store Bel
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Propose AllImp
PROPOSAL propose A B option
  
Figure  Cognitive Processes for Sequence of Discourse Acts in Dialogue 
 Agent A is All
Implicit and Agent B is CloseConsequence
The following sections report results from testing the close consequence strategy in two dierent

discourse situations Section  discusses the results of evaluating this strategy with logically
omniscient agents Section  presents experiments that test the close consequence strategy
when agents are inferencelimited
 CloseConsequence for Logically Omniscient Agents
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Figure 
 CloseConsequence Detrimental at Low AWM Strategy  is the combination of an
AllImplicit agent with a CloseConsequence agent and Strategy  is two AllImplicit agents Task
De nition  Standard commcost  	 infcost  	 retcost  	
	  CloseConsequence Detrimental at Low AWM
Figure 
 shows a dierence plot for dialogues with CLC CloseConsequence and the AllImplicit
agent Kim and two AllImplicit agents Bill and Kim The  gure shows that the CloseConsequence
strategy is detrimental at lower AWM KS   p 	 even if all processing is free This
strategy displaces facts about which furniture pieces the agents have which lowers the number of
pieces that they are able to include in their plan and thus has a detrimental eect at lower AWM
However the strategy is beneficial at high AWM settings KS
  	 p  		
Why does CloseConsequence help at high AWM The bene t of this strategy is in reducing the
number of invalid steps When agents can retrieve large amounts of information they sometimes

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Figure  Processing Costs can Eliminate Bene ts Strategy  is the combination of an All
Implicit agent with a CloseConsequence agent and Strategy  is two AllImplicit agents Task
De nition  Standard commcost   infcost   retcost  	
retrieve information that is inconsistent with recent events such as agreements to use a piece of
furniture as part of the task CloseConsequence has the eect of rehearsing act eects as shown
by the eects on As processing of utterance  in  gure 
The dierence plot in  gure  shows that CloseConsequence is more detrimental if we take the
costs of processing into account Here communication cost is  inference cost is  and retrieval
cost is 	 The distributions show that the close consequence strategy is worse at AWM of 
       KS  	 p  	 In addition once processing costs are taken into account this strategy
is no longer bene cial at high AWM the cost of extra communication outweighs the bene ts of
avoiding invalid steps
	 CloseConsequence Detrimental if Communication is Expensive
Figure  shows that when communication cost is high the extra communication required by the
CloseConsequence strategy is detrimental KS   for all AWM p  	 This is similar to
Only AWM of  has a signicantly di erent distribution in the positive direction

the results we achieved for the ExplicitAcceptance strategy A strategy can be bene cial due to
rehearsal eects only as long as the cost of communication is not too high
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Figure  CloseConsequence is Detrimental if Communication is Expensive Strategy  is the
combination of an AllImplicit agent with a CloseConsequence agent and Strategy  is two All
Implicit agents Task De nition  Standard commcost  	 infcost  	 retcost  	
	 CloseConsequence Benecial for ZeroInvalid Task
If the task is the faultintolerant ZeroInvalids task then the CloseConsequence strategy is ben 
eficial at AWM settings of  and above Figure  demonstrates that strategies which include
Consequence IRUs can increase the robustness of the planning process by decreasing the frequency
with which agents make mistakes KS for AWM of  and above   p  	
However the bene ts of a strategy must be de ned relative to a particular communicative situation
Figure 	 shows that the CloseConsequence strategy is detrimental when the task requires agents
to achieve matching beliefs on the warrants for their intentions KS  	 p  	 This
is because IRUs displace other facts from AWM In this case agents forget the scores of furniture
pieces under consideration which are the warrants for their intentions Thus here as elsewhere
we see that IRUs can be detrimental by making agents forget critical information

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Figure  Close Consequence is bene cial for ZeroInvalids Task Strategy  is the combination
of an AllImplicit agent with a CloseConsequence agent and Strategy  is two AllImplicit agents
Task De nition  ZeroInvalid commcost  	 infcost  	 retcost  	
In sum this section has shown that even when agents are logically omniscient the CloseConsequence
strategy can be bene cial by reducing the frequency of errors In task situations that are fault
intolerant CloseConsequence is very bene cial However if communication is expensive Close
Consequence is detrimental Section  presents the results of experiments testing the Close
Consequence strategy with inferencelimited agents
 CloseConsequence for InferenceLimited Agents
We saw in section  that a discourse strategy of making inferences explicit is bene cial even
for logically omniscient agents when the task is the fault intolerant ZeroInvalid task We would
expect that if agents dont make all the inferences that follow from their beliefs that this strategy
would be even more bene cial This section validates that prediction
Two variations of inference limited agents were tested  no inference severely inference lim
ited agents who dont make any inferences that follow from their beliefs and  half inference
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Figure 	 CloseConsequence is detrimental for ZeroNonmatchingBeliefs Task Strategy  is
the combination of an AllImplicit agent with a CloseConsequence agent and Strategy  is two All
Implicit agents Task De nition  ZeroNonmatchingBeliefs commcost  	 infcost  	 retcost
 	
half the time these agents dont make act eect inferences These inference limitations were dis
cussed more fully in section  and the performance of inference limited agents using the all 
implicit strategy was shown in section  in  gures 	 and  The experiments reported
in this section tested whether the close consequence strategy is bene cial for inferencelimited
agents
	  CloseConsequence benecial for NoInference agents
One experiment tested no inference agents who used the close consequence strategy as com
pared with no inference agents who didnt Strategy  in  gure  is a dialogue between
two no Inference agents employing the close consequence strategy Strategy  is two no 
inference agents using the AllImplicit strategy As we might have expected  gure  shows
that the strategy of making inferences explicit is bene cial in cases where agents dont make these
inferences KS  	 for all AWM p  	
The performance of these agents is shown alone in gure 

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Figure  CloseConsequence is bene cial for NoInference agents Strategy  is the two no 
inference CloseConsequence agents and Strategy  is two no inference AllImplicit agents
Task De nition  Standard commcost   infcost   retcost  			
	 CloseConsequence helps NoInference agents perform like Logically Omni
scient Agents
Another experiment compared two no inference agents using the CloseConsequence strategy
with logically omniscient agents using the AllImplicit strategy Figure  plots the score dif
ferences The  gure shows that when both no inference agents employ the CloseConsequence
strategy they actually perform as well as logically omniscient agents at low AWM and better at
high AWM KS    p  	
This demonstrates that situations exist in which no inference agents might be preferred over
logically omniscient agents eg those where a large number of inferences may be drawn from
a fact when only one is intended or relevant In this case the CloseConsequence strategy in
combination with no inference agents may be vastly more ecient
	 CloseConsequence not benecial for HalfInference agents

cost - clc-0-clc2-0 bill-kim C= 1 , I = 1 , R = 0.01
Attention/Working Memory
CO
M
PO
SI
TE
 S
co
re
 D
iffe
re
nc
es
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-2
00
-1
00
0
10
0
20
0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure  CloseConsequence can make NO Inference agents perform as well as ALL inference
agents At AWM   there are NO signi cant dierences when Strategy  is two NO Inference
CloseConsequence Agents and Strategy  is two ALLInference AllImplicit agents Task De nition
 Standard commcost   infcost   retcost  	
Figure  is a dierence plot between dialogues between two half inference AllImplicit agents
and dialogues between one half inference CloseConsequence agent and one half inference
AllImplicit agent In this case only one agent used the CloseConsequence strategy because the
results shown in  gure  indicate that if both agents use the CloseConsequence strategy then
even No Inference agents perform like logically omniscient ones
The  gure shows that if both agents are half inference agents then the CloseConsequence
strategy has no eect KS   for all AWM NS Since there is no signi cant dierence between
the performance of half inference agents and all inference agents there may be no eect
because performance may be at near ceiling in these situations
 Increasing Inferential Complexity Consequence IRUs
In order to investigate the role of InferenceExplicit IRUs in more complex inferential situations
the simulation was designed so that the task can be varied to increase inferential complexity This
is done by de ning a version of the task in which agents must also try to achieve matchedpair

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Figure  No Bene t for CloseConsequence Strategy  is the combination of a half inference
AllImplicit agent with a CloseConsequence agent and Strategy  is two half inference All
Implicit agents Task De nition  Standard commcost   infcost   retcost  	
goals as discussed in section  Achieving these goals requires making inferences about when two
actions will achieve a matched pair
In order to explore the eects of inferenceexplicit IRUs that have salient antecedents as opposed
to those with remote antecedents DesignWorld supports two versions of the matched pair task
In this task in addition to performing the Standard task the utility of an action can be increased
if it contributes to an optional goals of a matched pair A matched pair is two furniture items of
the same color
In one task MatchedPair the pieces of furniture that the matched pair consists of must be in the
same room In the second version of the task MatchedPairTwoRoom the pieces of furniture
that the matched pair consists of must be in dierent rooms The premises for inferences about
matched pair goals are what actions the agents have agreed to do with the resulting inference
based on inferred acceptance that an act is intended In the MatchedPair task the premises for
the matched pair inferences are either currently salient or inferrable from currently salient beliefs
In the MatchedPairTwoRoom task the premises for the matched pair inferences are not likely to

be salient because they are based on agreements that were made while the agents were discussing
the other room
	  The MatchedPairInferenceExplicit strategy
The MatchedPairInferenceExplicit strategy makes an inference explicit that is used as a premise
in a matched pair inference Figure  shows the discourse action protocol for a MatchedPair
InferenceExplicit agent Openings Acceptances and Closings are left implicit but each proposal
includes an extra utterance which makes an inference explicit
(MP INFERENCE EXPLICIT)
KEY:
PROPOSAL
ACCEPTANCE
CLOSING
REJECTION
CLARIFICATION
OPENING
IMPLICIT
NO SPEAKER CHANGE
SPEAKER CHANGE
MATCHED PAIR INFERENCE EXPLICIT STRATEGY
Figure  Discourse Action protocol for agents using the MatchedPairInferenceExplicit strat
egy
Figure  shows a dialogue sequence composed of the interaction of two MatchedPairInference
Explicit agents
The MatchedPairInferenceExplicit strategy is exempli ed by both agents IMI and IMI in 
where Consequence IRUs are shown in caps
  IMI Then lets put the green rug in the study
 propose agentimi agentimi option putact  agentbill green rug room 
IMI We agreed to put the green rug in the study
	
Agent A Agent B
PROPOSAL 
PROPOSAL 
PROPOSAL 
REJECTION 
PROPOSAL 
 
PROPOSAL N
Figure  Sequence of Discourse Acts for two Matched Pair Inference Explicit Agents as in
Dialogue 
 say agentimi agentimi intended putact  agentbill green rug room 
IMI Then lets put the green lamp in the study
 propose agentimi agentimi option putact  agentkim green lamp room 
IMI Then lets put the green couch in the study
 propose agentimi agentimi option putact  agentbill green couch room 
IMI No instead lets put the purple couch in the study
 reject agentimi agentimi option putact  agentkim purple couch room 
IMI Then lets put the green couch in the study
 propose agentimi agentimi option putact  agentbill green couch room 
IMI We agreed to put the purple couch in the study
 say agentimi agentimi intended putact  agentkim purple couch room 
IMI No instead lets put the purple chair in the study
 reject agentimi agentimi option putact  agentkim purple chair room 
IMI Then lets put the green couch in the living room
 propose agentimi agentimi option putact  agentbill green couch room 
IMI We agreed to put the green couch in the living room
 say agentimi agentimi intended putact  agentbill green couch room 
IMI Then lets put the green table in the living room
 propose agentimi agentimi option putact  agentkim green table room 
IMI We agreed to put the green couch in the living room
 say agentimi agentimi intended putact  agentbill green couch room 
IMI No instead lets put the green chair in the living room
 reject agentimi agentimi option putact  agentbill green chair room 
IMI Then lets put the purple rug in the living room
 propose agentimi agentimi option putact  agentkim purple rug room 
IMI Then lets put the green table in the living room
 propose agentimi agentimi option putact  agentkim green table room 
In    	 and  all make an inference explicit related to what actions are intended These
inferences follow from the implicit acceptance of the proposals given in    and  respectively In

this situation agents always make these inferences IMI chooses to make these inferences explicit
when IMI has inferred that a matched pair is possible
Figure 
 shows the relationship between the underlying cognitive processes and the discourse
and utterance acts for an excerpt of a dialogue between two Matched Pair inference Explicit agents
such as that in  Because this is the matched pair version of the task agents check for matches
to calculate potential score increases from achieving matched pairs before deliberation In order to
do this Check Matches procedure they must retrieve from memory what actions they have already
agreed upon The already agreed intentions are the premises for making a matched pair inference
The task structure for each room represents a discourse segment if we use task structure to approx
imate discourse structure Grosz  Grosz and Sidner 
 Sibun  In the dialogue in
 the task is MatchedPair and IMI makes inferences explicit whose premises are in the current
discourse segment In the dialogue shown in  the task is MatchedPairTwoRoom and IMI
makes inferences explicit whose premises were in the previous discourse segment At most AWM
settings the inferences made while reasoning about the task for the previous segment would no
longer be salient
  IMI Then lets put the green rug in the study
 propose agentimi agentimi option putact  agentbill green rug room 
IMI Then lets put the green lamp in the study
 propose agentimi agentimi option putact  agentkim green lamp room 
IMI Then lets put the green couch in the study
 propose agentimi agentimi option putact  agentbill green couch room 
IMI No instead lets put the purple couch in the study
 reject agentimi agentimi option putact  agentkim purple couch room 
IMI Then lets put the green couch in the study
 propose agentimi agentimi option putact  agentbill green couch room 
IMI We agreed to put the purple couch in the study
 say agentimi agentimi intended putact  agentkim purple couch room 
IMI Then lets put the purple rug in the living room
 propose agentimi agentimi option putact  agentkim purple rug room 
IMI We agreed to put the green lamp in the study
 say agentimi agentimi intended putact  agentkim green lamp room 
IMI No instead lets put the green chair in the living room
 reject agentimi agentimi option putact  agentbill green chair room 
IMI We agreed to put the purple couch in the study
 say agentimi agentimi intended putact  agentkim purple couch room 
IMI Then lets put the purple chair in the living room
 propose agentimi agentimi option putact  agentkim purple chair room 

Discourse Act Utterance Act A PROCESS B PROCESS
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
PROPOSAL propose A B option	
MEREASON Put
Check Preconds 	
Deliberate
Decide to Accept
Store MS intend 	
Store ActEects 	
MEREASON Put
Check Matches
Deliberate
Propose MP IE
PROPOSAL say B A intended	 Store intended	
Infer Acceptance 	
Store MS intend 	
Store ActEects 	
Infer Close Put
Infer Open Put
Store intended	
propose B A option
MEREASON Put
Check Preconds 
Check Matches
Deliberate
Decide to Accept
Store MS intend 
Store ActEects 
MEREASON Put
Deliberate
Check Matches
Propose MP IE
  
Figure 
 Sequence of Discourse Acts for Dialogue in  between Two MatchedPairInference
Explicit agents
In  
  and 	 make inferences explicit of what actions are already intended These inferences
followed from the implicit acceptance of the proposals given in   and  respectively
Section  showed a sample dialogue for two AllImplicit agents in the matched pair version of
the task The performance of two agents using the matched pair inference explicit strategy
will be compared with the performance of two AllImplicit agents for both the MatchedPair task
and the MatchedPairTwoRoom task in the following sections AllImplicit agents can generally

do quite well at achieving matched pairs thus the strategies to be discussed below must consistently
achieve more matched pairs than the AllImplicit agents to perform better on the task
	 Matched Pairs with Salient Antecedents
This section discusses the performance of agents using the MatchedPairInferenceExplicit strategy
in the MatchedPair version of the task as illustrated in the dialogue in  In this situation
inferences are made explicit while they are currently salient because they are meant to be used as
premises for the inference of a matchedpair
As shown in  gure  the strategy is not bene cial The only AWM setting where the distributions
are signi cantly dierent is at AWM of  KS   p  	
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Figure  MatchedPairInferenceExplicit not bene cial for MatchedPairStrategy  is two
MatchedPairInferenceExplicit agents and Strategy  is two AllImplicit agents Task De nition
 MP commcost  	 infcost  	 retcost  	
These results show that making an inference explicit need not be bene cial even in the context
where it can be used as a premise for another inference In contrast the next section will show that
the MatchedPairInferenceExplicit strategy is bene cial for the MatchedPairTwoRoom version
of the task

	 Matched Pairs with NonSalient Antecedents
This section presents results on evaluating the matched pair inference explicit strategy in
the matched pair two room version of the matched pair task In this situation the matched
pair inference premise is made explicit in a situation in which it is not currently salient This
situationstrategy combination parallels the subset of inference explicit IRUs in the corpus where
the antecedents are not currently salient These were discussed in sections  and 
The dierence plot in  gure  for matched pair points shows that this strategy is eective in
increasing agents ability to make matched pair inferences As the  gure shows agents using this
strategy get increasingly more points from matched pairs as AWM increases The dierences in
the distributions are signi cant at AWM of 
 and 
 KS

  	 p  	
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Figure  MatchedPairInferenceExplicit bene cial for MatchedPairTwoRoom Strategy 
is two MatchedPairInferenceExplicit agents and Strategy  is two AllImplicit agents Task 
MatchedPairTwoRoom commcost  	 infcost  	 retcost  	
Thus the MatchedPairInferenceExplicit strategy is bene cial when inferential complexity is in
creased and when agents are datalimited on the premises that they can use for inferences Making
an inference explicit is most bene cial in this situation when the inference which was made in an
earlier discourse segment is made salient in the current segment to support other inferences If

the inference is currently salient the strategy has no bene cial eect in terms of helping agents to
make inferences
	 Summary Consequence in DesignWorld
The DesignWorld experiments discussed here tested two processing aspects of Consequence IRUs
The CloseConsequence strategy experiments discussed in section  showed that even when
agents are logically omniscient that the CloseConsequence strategy can be bene cial in helping
agents avoid mistakes This is basically a result that it is helpful to rehearse facts that keep one
from making mistakes When agents are inferencelimited making inferences explicit are especially
bene cial as we would expect Surprising however section  showed that inferencelimited
agents can perform as well as logically omniscient agents if they have the right conversational
partner and hence shows the power of strategies that include IRUs
The MatchedPairInferenceExplicit strategy makes inferences explicit that are then used as the
premises for matched pair inferences This strategy was tested in two situations one in which the
inference has been made and is currently salient and one in which the inference has been made
but is not currently salient The strategy was bene cial only when the inference was not currently
salient thus we expect that in these cases making the inference explicit functions much like other
cases of making premises salient at the point that they will be used by the other agent in reasoning
ie in a similar way to an Attention strategy This strategy can be compared with the Explicit
Warrant strategy discussed in chapter  which also makes premises explicit when they are to be
used In the ExplicitWarrant strategy however the premises are used in deliberation
The results are interesting with respect to the distinction between datalimited and inferencelimited
processing discussed earlier Norman and Bobrow  While various cognitive processes may be
datalimited attention or inferencelimited meansend reasoning and reasoning about the eects
of actions the data here demonstrate that no matter how much attentional capacity an agent has
if she doesnt make the correct inferences then she cannot achieve a high level of performance at
least not without the right conversational partner However as we have also seen even agents that
are logically omniscient will have less than perfect performance when they are attention limited
IRUs help agents improve their performance in both cases
 Consequence	Summary
This chapter argued that inference in discourse is constrained by the discourse inference con 
straint ie propositions must be currently salient to be premises for inferences This is supported


by the distributional analysis showing that InferenceExplicit IRUs unlike Paraphrases typically
have salient antecedents
The DesignWorld simulations in section  showed that even when agents are logically omni
scient making inferences explicit can help when tasks are faultintolerant or have higher inferential
complexity The simulations also supported the discourse inference constraint by showing that IRUs
can be bene cial in these situations at lower AWM settings when agents are attention limited
Furthermore DesignWorld experiments were conducted to test the dierences between Inference
Explicit IRUs with salient or remote antecedents The MatchedPairInferenceExplicit strategy
makes inferences explicit either when their antecedents are salient or when their antecedents are
remote depending on the version of the matched pair task The strategy was shown to be bene cial
when the antecedents for the inference are remote In this situation the IRU can help agents make
other inferences that are dependent on that inference as a premise The ExplicitWarrant strategy
discussed in chapter  has a similar bene cial eect when the task requires beliefs about warrants
to be shared
The distributional analysis discussed the fact that in many cases where inferences are made explicit
it would appear that the inference was already made In these cases InferenceExplicit IRUs may
also function similarly to Attitude or Attention IRUs

Chapter 
Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis investigates the interaction of resource bounds with speakers language behavior through
an examination of informationally redundant utterances IRUs IRUs are apparently inef
 cient since their information content is already believed by all conversants in a dialogue I argue
however that their function can be explained by a model of dialogue in which conversants are au
tonomous and resourcelimited The resource limits that Ive investigated are limited attentional
capacity and limited reasoning capacity
In chapter  I proposed a theory of the function of IRUs based on categorizing IRUs by three com
municative functions Attitude Consequence and Attention Then I claimed that Consequence
and Attention IRUs are related to limited inferential and limited attentional capacity and that
Attitude IRUs are also partially attributable to these limits Attitude IRUs are the externaliza
tion of attitudes toward propositions conveyed eg acceptance or rejection of an assertion
Conversants externalize their attitudes for at least two reasons  their autonomy means that
acceptance cannot be automatically assumed and  their resource bounds introduce uncertainty
as to what they are currently attending to and what they have inferred from what has been said
The remainder of the thesis supports and elaborates the theory and provides empirical support for
the claims
This chapter summarizes the methodological and theoretical contributions and then proposes fu
ture work Section  summarizes the methodological contributions and section  summarizes
the theoretical contributions Section  discuss speci c results from the distributional analysis
and section  reviews the results from the Design World simulations Section  will suggest
potential computational applications of the results presented here Finally section 
 will discuss
the limitations of the results possible extensions to the results and other future work

  Methodological Contributions
Theoretical research on discourse models is plagued by the gap between surface form and discourse
function The problem is that the function of an utterance is determined by many factors such as
the context of the utterance its syntactic and prosodic realization cultural conventions and the
shared beliefs of the conversants The discourse analyst typically has only partial access to these
factors and is faced with the diculty of determining their interaction
If the discourse analyst attempts to ascribe intentions to the speaker often many ascriptions are
possible These ascriptions can at best be well founded hypotheses about the speakers mental
state Furthermore utterances can realize multiple intentions and it is usually not clear which
if any of the possible hypothesized intentions were the primary motivation of the speaker The
analyst who relies on intuitions about intention may be surprised to discover that the intuition
changes on another occasion of analysis
In order to avoid some of the most commonmethodological problems this thesis uses two empirical
methods discussed in detail in chapters  and 
The  rst empirical method is distributional analysis a quantitative method based on coding ut
terances according to a range of distributional factors and then using these factors in multivariate
analysis Factors are chosen which are  objectively de ned  posited to be a surface correlate
of or a constraint on the hypothesized discourse functions These factors measure characteristics
of both utterances and contexts
Here 	 IRUs were selected from a naturally occurring corpus of problem solving dialogues The
distributional analysis suggests hypotheses about function and provides empirical support for a
model for the function of IRUs Each IRU was coded according to  coding factors These coding
factors were used both to determine classes of IRUs and subclasses within these taxonomy They
were also used to argue that these classes had particular discourse functions Types of IRUs de ned
by one type of coding factor such as sequential location are examined in many dierent contexts
before positing a discourse function In many cases statistically signi cant correlations were found
between forms and contexts
In this case the distributional analysis was done completely by hand In the future with the advent
of new online corpora this type of analysis should be much easier to perform
The theory of IRU function suggested by the distributional analysis included processing claims
which are dicult to support by a distributional analysis alone Thus the second method involved

testing the parameters of the model via a computational simulation environment called Design
World
DesignWorld is  rst of all an implementation of the key aspects of the theory The following
section discusses the theoretical model that DesignWorld was based on Implementations usually
demonstrate the plausibility of a theory but DesignWorld is parametrizable so that complex inter
actions between dierent parameters of the model can be tested The parameters included the task
de nition agents cognitive limitations and discourse strategies The use of simulations allowed
me to support the major claim of the thesis about the relationship of resource limits to agents
language behavior
 Theoretical Contributions
The primary contribution of the thesis is a theory of the function of IRUs in dialogue IRUs have
not been systematically investigated in previous work and many accounts assume that they are
infelicitous and thus require a special mode of analysis to interpret The major claim of the thesis
is that IRUs make sense if we adopt a model of discourse processing that reects conversants
resource bounds
Research in the Gricean tradition would lead one to expect that IRUs would be infelicitous or
would be interpreted on the basis of recognizing their infelicity as discussed in section  I have
shown that it is possible to interpret IRUs with standard interpretation mechanisms as long as we
acknowledge agents resource bounds The claim that IRUs support the discourse inference
constraint is not identical to Gazdars claim that tautologies are felicitous because they add
inferences to the discourse model All utterances add inferences to the discourse model so IRUs
are not unique on that account and testing whether inferences are added does not determine when
IRUs will be felicitous as opposed to infelicitous The only type of IRU that does not occur in
the corpus are cases of a speaker repeating his or her own proposition in the same form with the
same prosody adjacent to the original assertion Any variation is acceptable Even cases of such
repetition which probably occur in other contexts are interpretable without resorting to Gricean
reasoning by assuming that the speaker really means a proposition that is repeated while still
salient
The claimed relationship between IRUs and resource bounds required positing and supporting an
account of the underlying resourcelimited cognitive processes and representations used in discourse
processing While much current work focuses on the relationship between resourcebounds and
reasoning about action Dean and Boddy  Bratman Israel and Pollack  Pollack and
	
Ringuette 	 to my knowledge there has been no other work on the relationship of resource
bounds to language behavior The eects of utterances on another agents mental state are context
dependent uncertain unobservable and highly dependent on the other agents resource limitations
The theoretical framework for discourse processing is developed in chapter  and extended and
supported throughout the rest of the thesis Chapter   speci es a psychologically plausible
model of attentionworking memory  speci es a model of belief deliberation  integrates
the two models by proposing the discourse inference constraint ie that inference and
deliberation only operate on salient beliefs  extends the model of belief deliberation to a model
of deliberating about mutual beliefs mutual suppositions and  uses this as the theoretical
framework for the underlying cognitive processes that motivates the proposed functions of IRUs
The model of AttentionWorking Memory AWM produces both recency and frequency eects
for propositions asserted in discourse with very simple mechanisms section  AWM is based
on a proposal by Landauer  but Landauers model was extended and speci ed to support
complex behavior in discourse Speci c extensions are
 The cognitive objects stored in AWM are propositions
 No explicit links are maintained between propositions
 Belief change is a result of storing new beliefs rather than deleting or negating old beliefs
 Both internal cognitive processes and external processes store propositions in AWM with the
eect that both retrieval and reasoning duplicate items and store them in a new con guration
in memory
Assumption  means that associations between beliefs are only a result of the proximity resulting
from the fact that two beliefs were processed near one another in time Other associations between
beliefs are the result of speci c strategic retrieval processes The eect is that AWM models
the principle of positive undermining so that beliefs persist even when their supports are
degraded Harman 
 Tversky and Kahneman  Ross and Anderson  Galliers 	
Assumption  produces associative eects via a simple model which does not require positing
dierent types of memory for dierent types of beliefs ie semantic vs episodic memory
In the DesignWorld simulations AWM produces the desired eects of limited attentional capacity
It is used there to show that attentionlimited agents behave dierently and bene t from dierent
communication strategies than agents who are not resource limited
In chapter  I propose a formulation of Grosz and Sidners stack model of Attentional State in
discourse in terms of AWM The motivation is to show that a simple reformulation of the stack

model makes it much more cognitively plausible The reformulation of push and pop as the eect of
storage and retrieval operations in AWM makes predictions about what kinds of discourse behavior
increase or decrease processing load and makes sense of cases of Attention IRUs where items on
the top of the stack as the result of a pop are not treated as salient by the conversants
Section  presents a model of belief and intention deliberation Deliberation provides a basis
for the acceptance and rejection of assertions and proposals and dierent types of language
behavior aect the degree to which a belief is epistemically entrenched Gardenfors 	
Deliberation and inference processes are posited to depend on what is currently salient This
assumption links the AWM model with deliberation and is encapsulated in the discourse infer 
ence constraint Communication is a strategic process targeted at deliberation Galliers 	
and this strategic process must take agents resource limits into account
In section  the model of belief deliberation is extended to model deliberation about what is
mutually believed Since the eects of utterances are not directly observable mutual beliefs are
recast as mutual suppositions Endorsement on supporting beliefs reect the fact that inferences
about what other agents accept are defeasible and are more or less supported by evidence made
salient in the discourse at the time of the assertion or proposal
In chapter 
 the distributional analysis of Attitude IRUs is used to investigate how acceptance
and rejection are communicated The analysis of Attitude IRUs provides support for and develops
the account of mutual supposition based on an analysis of the variation in the surface form of
Attitude IRUs The analysis of Attitude IRUs that convey acceptance shows that the dierence in
form aects the defeasibility of the mutual supposition The fact that one type of Rejection IRUs
reject by an implicature shows that assertions are only added to the context as hypotheses until
after the hearer has an opportunity to reject
Then section 
 shows how the theory of Attitude IRUs can be used directly to model the process
by which agents construct collaborative plans Conditions on when an agent should convey
acceptance or rejection is presented in the collaborative planning principles which
proscribe what is collaborative communicative behavior
The resulting account is similar to that of Power  Grosz and Sidner 	 and Cohen and Levesque 
The dierence is that I focus on the dialogue process by which agents communicate that they ac 
cept and reject other agents proposals or assertions I assume that agents retain their autonomy
throughout a dialogue and that each step of a collaborative plan is negotiated Agents au
tonomy is tied to the theory of belief and intention deliberation discussed in chapter  The role of
intention deliberation is included in the de nition of a collaborative plan by specifying that

both agents must assure themselves of the utility of the resulting plan In Grosz and Sidner 	
and Cohen and Levesque  once an agent agrees to a SharedPlan or a Joint Intention it
has agreed to accept the initiating agents proposals for each step of the plan Thus there is no
deliberation of each proposal
In chapters  and  attentionlimited belief deliberation is proposed as the mechanism underlying
Deliberation IRUs and Armation IRUs These IRUs make premises salient that are the basis of
an inference or that are used to decide whether to accept or reject proposals and assertions
Chapter  also discusses Open Segment and Close Segment IRUs There I investigate the evidence
that these are used as conventional signals about discourse structure I show that another hypothesis
is also plausible namely that they are motivated by the same mechanisms as Deliberation IRUs
Chapter  discusses the class of IRUs that make inferences explicit I show that these can be
motivated by an account of limited inference where the IRU ensures that the inference is made
However some cases of InferenceExplicit IRUs also seem to be motivated by the need to make
an inference salient that is relevant to the current purpose despite the fact that the inference has
already been made
The support for the theory from the distributional analysis will be discussed in section  Speci c
results from the DesignWorld simulations will be discussed in section  Then section 
 will
discuss future work
 Distributional Analysis Summary
The functional analysis of IRUs was based on the distributional analysis A summary of the speci c
results for each class of IRUs is discussed in the following sections
  Attitude Distributional Analysis
Figure  summarizes the distributional correlates of Attitude IRUs On the taxonomic level the
distributional analysis is used to argue that Attitude IRUs are characterized by the two informa 
tion status parameters of Adjacent and Other these de ne the attitude locus
The distributional analysis shows that both acceptance and rejection are typically displayed
in the attitude locus and this provides support for the collaborative principle the col 
laborative principle can then be used to specify the conditions under which default inferences
about understanding and acceptance are licensed
Acceptance and rejection can both be conveyed by Attitude IRUs but they dier in terms of

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Figure  Overview of the Taxonomy of IRUs
prosodic features Attitude Accept IRUs tend to be prosodically marked with a phrase  nal Mid
tone which is a surface cue that the speaker is treating the content of the IRU as hearer old
information This means that the Attitude Accept function is in all likelihood recognizable from
surface prosodic cues The theoretical rami cation is that it may not be necessary for the hearer
to recognize redundancy by any logical process
There are two types of Attitude Reject IRUs One type are realized with phrase  nal rises and
apparently simply query the previous assertion The second type reject the previous assertion by
an implicature and to my knowledge have never been noted before The implicature arises when
the exclusion of focus condition is met ie the speaker excludes the information focus of
the assertion in the IRU The fact that rejection can be conveyed by implicature provides support
for the theory of mutual supposition proposed in section  and elaborated in section 
 because

an assertion can be defeated by an implicature only if the assertion is added to the context as an
hypothesis until after the opportunity for acceptance or rejection has passed
 Attention Distributional Analysis
Figure  summarizes the results of the distributional analysis for Attention IRUs Attention
IRUs are characterized by the single distributional information status parameter of Remote If the
antecedent for an IRU is remote then the proposition realized by the antecedent is unlikely to be
salient Thus the function of the IRU can be to make that proposition salient
Attention IRUs have few distributional correlates except that they are not marked as hearer 
old information by phrase  nal prosody However more speci c subclasses of Attention IRUs are
de ned by other distributional correlates In section  I described the criteria for deciding that
an Attention IRU is an Open Segment or a Close Segment IRU To my knowledge Open Segment
IRUs have never been noted before The observation that they exist and the characterization of
their function resulted from the distributional analysis of IRUs
Close Segment IRUs had been noted before eg the observation that summaries often occur at
the end of discourse segments Whittaker and Stenton  The observation that IRUs are often
used to support Deliberation had not been made although both work in RST and Cohens work on
argumentation had noted that propositions that the hearer already believed or would  nd plausible
make good justi cations Mann and Thompson  Cohen 
 Consequence Distributional Analysis
Figure  summarizes the distributional analysis of Consequence IRUs There are two taxonomic
classes of Consequence IRUs InferenceExplicit and Armation
InferenceExplicit IRUs are identi ed by the single distributional factor that the hearer old
relation between the IRU and its antecedents is either Implicature or Entailment The distri
bution of InferenceExplicit IRUs provides evidence for the hypothesized discourse inference
constraint introduced in chapters  and  The argument is based on the fact Paraphrases and
InferenceExplicit IRUs both realize entailed information but InferenceExplicit IRUs are much
more likely to have salient antedents Thus whenever we have evidence that inferences are being
drawn the antecedents for those inferences are currently salient
InferenceExplicit IRUs are not marked as hearer old information by phrase nal prosody Thus

either the speaker believes they are new information ie the inference has not been made or that
they should be treated as new information
Armation IRUs contrast rhetorically with an adjacent utterance and cooccur with the cue phrase
but Contrast is supported because the IRU and an adjacent utterance would lead to conicting
defaults or because there is a focusopen proposition structure based on a salient set Armation
IRUs typically have salient antecedents and are often prosodically marked as hearer old information
by a  nal Mid tone Their cooccurrence with a verb of perception or mental state such as see hear
remember contributes to a theory of belief and intention deliberation because they indicate typical
sources of evidence and counterevidence for propositions being deliberated
 Design
World Simulations Summary
The second empirical method was to test hypotheses about the function of IRUs with DesignWorld
simulations
One general result is that unbounded resources can be a disadvantage When agents are parametrized
to have the capability of searching all of memory as they carry out the task the increased retrieval
and inference costs may far outweigh any potential increase in performance In addition in certain
situations accessing all of memory can be detrimental because agents dont distinguish recent in
formation from information that is out of date There seems to be a cognitive bene t of forgetting
facts that are no longer valid that interacts with the general cognitive detriment of forgetting
A key result is that there is a complex interaction between strategies task parameters and agent
properties This interaction supports the argument that IRUs are not a component of a generally
cooperative strategy a bene cial strategy must be targeted at the particulars of the situation
For example Chapter  discussed strategies that help agents who have low attentional capacity
in section 
 while section 
 presented results from a strategy that helps agents with high
attentional capacity avoid mistakes To my knowledge there has been no previous work which has
been able to demonstrate that particular discourse strategies are bene cial in some situations and
not in others this area deserves further exploration
Another interesting general result across all the strategies is that IRUs can be detrimental because
they may displace propositions from memory that are potentially more useful than the proposition
that the IRU realizes Thus despite any potential rehearsal bene ts of important or potentially
valuable information strategies in which IRUs are not targetted at the current purpose are not
bene cial Even in cases where IRUs can be bene cial the bene t must outweigh the potential
detriment of displacing facts that could be useful now or at a later point in the task


The following sections will discuss the simulation results for each of Attitude Consequence and
Attention In each case a strategy was designed based on the distributional analysis and this
strategy was compared with the AllImplicit Baseline strategy
  Attitude Simulations Summary
Strategy Agent Params Task Params Costs Bene cial
comminfret
ExplicitAccept AllInference Standard 			 AWM  

ExplicitAccept AllInference Standard 			 AWM  
ExplicitAccept AllInference Standard 	 NOT SIG
ExplicitAccept AllInference Standard 		 NOT AWM  
ExplicitAccept AllInference Zero NM Bel 			 NOT SIG
ExplicitAccept AllInference Zero Invalids 			 AWM  
Figure  Summary of Attitude Strategy Simulations Strategy  is always AllImplicit Evalua
tion with composite cost If strategy  is bene cial the AWM range is given If strategy  is
not Bene cial then it is Detrimental and the AWM range is given NOT SIG is no dierences
found
The results from DesignWorld for Attitude IRUs presented in section 

 are summarized in  gure
 In general Attitude IRUs are bene cial for rehearsal unless communication is too expensive or
the cost of retrieval is too high The  gure shows that ExplicitAcceptance has a rehearsal bene t
in the standard situation when retrieval is free or a thousandth the cost of communication and
inference When the cost of retrieval is 	 there are no signi cant dierences between Explicit
Acceptance and AllImplicit
This result only holds at higher AWM because it is at higher AWM that agents have sucient
capacity to retrieve large numbers of beliefs and thsu can confuse outdated beliefs with recent
beliefs making more mistakes as a result Thus the result in this case is due to the speci c
assumptions of the belief change mechanism Nevertheless the result shows that Attention IRUs
can have rehearsal bene ts whenever the information they contain or the information inferrable from
their content must be remembered Thus the simulations provide an alternate simpler explanation
of the bene ts of Attitude IRUs in situations where understanding and acceptance are not at issue
The simulations also show that IRUs should be used with care since they can be detrimental if the
cost of communication is high enough When communication is very expensive 	 the Explicit
Acceptance strategy is detrimental
In the faultintolerant zero invalids task in which mistakes are heavily penalized rehearsal is

again bene cial The ExplicitAcceptance strategy keeps agents from making mistakes at AWM
values of  and greater
ExplicitAcceptance has no eect in the task situation which required matching beliefs about the
warrants for actions It is not surprising that it isnt bene cial since the information in an Explicit
Acceptance is not related to warrants for actions However there was a possibility that this strategy
would be detrimental by displacing warrants from memory It is possible that this displacement
occurs but is oset by the concomitant rehearsal bene t discussed above
The theoretical model of Attitude IRUs posits that they can provide positive evidence of un
derstanding Clark and Schaefer  and license the inference of acceptance However the
simulations show that another simpler rehearsal bene t is possible and that this bene t distin
guishes the use of an utterance like okay to indicate acceptance from the repetitions used in the
simulation
 Attention Simulations Summary
Strategy Agent Params Task Params Costs Bene cial
comminfret
OpenBest AllInference Standard 			 NOT SIG
OpenBest AllInference Standard 	 NOT AWM  
ExplicitWarrant AllInference Standard 	 NOT AWM 
ExplicitWarrant AllInference Standard 	 AWM  
ExplicitWarrant AllInference Standard 			 NOT AWM        
ExplicitWarrant AllInference Zero NM Bel 			 AWM        
ExplicitWarrant AllInference Zero Invalids 			 AWM 

MP Premise AllInference MatchedPair 			 AWM 
MP Premise AllInference Standard 			 NOT SIG
MP Premise AllInference Standard 			 NOT AWM  
MP Prem Warr AllInference MPALL 			 AWM 
Figure  Summary of Attention Strategy Simulations Strategy  is always AllImplicit Evalu
ation with composite cost If strategy  is bene cial the AWM range is given If strategy  is
not Bene cial then it is Detrimental and the AWM range is given NOT SIG is no dierences
found
Figure  summarizes the results of the simulations of Attention strategies in DesignWorld Overall
the results showed that Attention IRUs can be bene cial when the content of the IRU consists of
information that is targeted at speci c inferences that the agent is performing at that time when
inferential complexity is increased and when retrieval is not free

The experiments on Open Segment and Deliberation IRUs test the hypothesized discourse infer 
ence constraint and were presented in section 
 The Open Segment strategy was OpenBest
which makes premises salient that might be bene cial in meansend reasoning for the putact in
tention associated with a discourse segment This strategy was not bene cial in the standard task
situation despite the fact that it included information which might have been useful This was
because the information displaced other information which would have been just as useful
I conjecture that if strategies were designed in which the production and content of Open Segment
IRUs was more precisely controlled they would be bene cial Potention ways of producing this
precise control will be discussed in section 

The MatchedPairPremise strategy is very similar to the OpenBest strategy but it was tested
in the matched pair task which increases inferential complexity over the standard task See
section 
 The MatchedPairPremise strategy increased agents ability to make matchedpair
inferences and was bene cial As shown in  gure  the MatchedPairPremise strategy is only
bene cial for the inferentially more complex matched pair version of the task In the standard
task there are no signi cant dierences if all processing is free Even worse if processing has
associated costs then the strategy is detrimental for AWM  
The Deliberation strategy that was tested is called the ExplicitWarrant strategy and was presented
in section 
 In this strategy agents include the warrant for their proposal along with every
proposal This strategy was shown to be bene cial for the ZeroNonMatchingBeliefs task because
it makes the information available that is needed to achieve matching beliefs for the warrant for
proposals The strategy is bene cial even when retrieval is free as might be expected In ad
dition this strategy reduces retrieval costs and thus provides a bene t whenever retrieval is not
free However if communication is much more expensive than retrieval then this strategy is not
bene cial
 Consequence Simulations Summary
The DesignWorld simulations discussed in section  and summarized in  gure  show that
even when agents are logically omniscient strategies that make inferences explicit can be bene cial
There are two situations that show this In the  rst situation we showed that the CloseConsequence
strategy meant that agents are less likely to forget that they have done particular acts so they are
less likely to have invalid steps in their plans
In the second situation making inferences explicit is bene cial because the task has a higher level
of inferential complexity In this situation although agents can make all the inferences from their

Strategy Agent Params Task Params Costs Bene cial
comminfret
CloseConseq AllInference Standard 			 AWM 
NOT AWM 
CloseConseq AllInference Standard 	 NOt AWM 
CloseConseq AllInference Standard 			 NOT AWM  	
CloseConseq AllInference Zero Invalids 			 AWM  
CloseConseq AllInference Zero NM Bel 			 NOT AWM 
CloseConseq NO Inf NO Inf Standard 			 AWM  	
CloseConseq NO Inf NO Inf Standard 	 AWM  	
CloseConseq NO Inf NO Inf Standard 			 AWM  	
CloseConseq NO Inf AllInf Standard 			 AWM   NS
CloseConseq HalfHalf Standard 	 NOT SIG
MP InfExplic AllInference MatchPair 			 NOT SIG
MP InfExplic AllInference MatchPairR 			 AWM 


Figure  Summary of Consequence Strategy Simulations Strategy  is always AllImplicit
Evaluation with composite cost If strategy  is bene cial the AWM range is given If strategy
 is not Bene cial then it isDetrimental and the AWM range is given NOT SIG is no dierences
found
salient beliefs the necessary beliefs might not be salient Making the inference explicit makes it
one of the salient beliefs Thus this simulation support the discourse inference constraint
by showing that IRUs are bene cial when agents are attention limited
In addition  gure  shows that when agents are inference limited that making inferences explicit
is bene cial This is exactly what we would expect More signi cantly if their conversational
partner uses a strategy of making inferences explicit NoInference agents can do just as well as
logically omniscient agents This shows that in situations in which inference is highly unconstrained
a strategy such as CloseConsequence could be very bene cial by indicating exactly which inference
should be made
Finally the results include testing the dierence between InferenceExplicit IRUs with salient or
remote antecedents by comparing the matched pair task with the matched pair two room
task The MatchedPairInferenceExplicit strategy makes an InferenceExplicit either when its an
tecedents are salient or when its antecedents are remote depending on the version of the matched
pair task The strategy was shown to be bene cial when the antecedents for the inference are
remote ie the matched pair two room task In this situation the InferenceExplicit IRU can
help agents make other inferences that are dependent on that inference as a premise The Explicit
Warrant strategy discussed in chapter  has a similar bene cial eect when the task requires beliefs
	
about warrants to be shared Thus this result provides support for the claim that inference 
explicit IRUs that are realized remotely from their antecedents function in much the same way
as Attention IRUs
The following section discusses possible applications of the results and then section 
 will discuss
the limitations of the current results and future work
 Possible Applications of the Results and the Methods
In this section I will discuss four application areas of the results and the theory In many cases I
am actually discussing applications of the platform and the methods
	  Expert Advice Systems
The dialogues use as the corpus for the distributional analysis were  nancial advice dialogues in
which the talk show host was the expert advice giver and the callers sought advice on how to invest
their money Thus the analysis of discourse strategies are probably strategies that are best suited
to expert advice systems Various strategies tested here could be designed into systems like this
that rely on natural language generation eg the ExplicitWarrant strategy in which the expert
provides a warrant for the advice could be included with some idea of the situations in which
it might be most useful One situation identi ed here is where it is important for both agents to
agree on the reasons behind a course of action In other situations other parameters might also be
relevant
	 Intelligent Tutoring Systems
Another potential computational application of the results here are to systems for explanation and
learning Generally the advice or tutoring given by these systems is supported by an underlying
reasoner in which every step of the reasoning process is available A major problem with these
systems is determining what information to say and what information to leave out but this is
exactly one of the dimensions explored in this work
In chapter  I investigated when making inferences explicit is bene cial While this only provides
a single data point it would be possible to use and extend the results here For example a way
to measure and vary the complexity of the domain could be devised and additional DesignWorld
experiments could provide data on which strategies are most eective

	 Spoken Language Interfaces
Another potential application area is in the design of dialogue strategies for systems where there is
uncertainty in communication such as current speech recognition systems Current systems have
two modes full paraphrase and no feedback It seems that the amount of feedback required to
avoid errors that are dicult to recover from depends in all likelihood on an interaction between
the complexity of the task the degree to which it is faulttolerant and the degree of uncertainty
in communication Another set of DesignWorld experiments could be de ned which varied these
parameters and investigated when dierent types of feedback were most useful
	 Protocols for Distributed Agents
A  nal potential application area is in the design of communication protocols for multiprocessor
environments with heterogenous capabilities The experiments discussed here investigated the ben
e ts of strategies for inferencelimited and attentionlimited agents Agents with other capabilities
could also be designed and the methods used here could demonstrate when certain communication
protocols are useful and when they are not
 Limits of the Results and Future Work
There are a number of speci c limitations of the results with respect to the theory argued for
here First a number of theoretical claims related to Attitude were not tested In particular in
section 
 I argued that Attitude IRUs mainly serve to demonstrate understanding and accep
tance One way to test this hypothesis is to make communication uncertain in DesignWorld or
to have implicit rejection be a possibility Under these conditions demonstrating understanding
and acceptance would detect errors in communication at the point where they happen potentially
avoiding costly repair and replanning Brennan and Hulteen  This hypothesis has not been
tested because an evaluation of it depends on a way to introduce errors that might actually occur
and the speci cation of reasonable recovery strategies neither of which are the topic of this the
sis Carletta provides a theory of recovery strategies in dialogue that could be used to extend the
work presented here Carletta  but testing hypotheses of how AttitudeExplicit strategies
are related to uncertainty in communication and the possibility of rejection must be left to future
work
In addition I have not tested the dierences between dierent types of Attitude IRUs or discovered

which factors may determine how acceptance is communicated eg by saying nothing producing
a backchannel such as uh huh repeating paraphrasing or making an inference explicit
Another limitation of the results here is that it was not possible to distinguish among the various
hypotheses presented in chapter  about the mechanisms underlying the functionality of Attention
IRUs There I simply argued that the discourse inference hypothesis was a viable hypothesis
that could explain all types of Attention IRUs However the discourse structure and control struc
tures in DesignWorld do not support testing the coordination hypothesis and the retrieval
cue hypothesis In order to test these hypotheses one of the agents would have to be ignorant
of the structure of the task and there should be some ambiguity about which facts or inference
rules are retrieved upon understanding an utterance Since DesignWorld has only one possible
task structure there is no ambiguity as to what should be done at a particular point in interaction
Another limitation is that DesignWorld only supports testing simple hypotheses about the rela
tionship of inference limitations to discourse strategies In section  I discussed some simple
ways to vary inferential capacity and then showed that there were discourse strategies that were
bene cial for inference limited agents A more complex system of inference in which it was possible
to systematically vary the likelihood that an inference would be drawn with a certain amount of
resource would allow me to extend the results here and explore additional hypotheses about when
it is bene cial to make an inference explicit
Earlier I mentioned that one of the more interesting results of the simulation is that there is a
complex three way interaction between agents cognitive limitations discourse strategies and the
de nition of the task Much more work could be done to explore aspects of this interaction What
has been shown is that IRUs are generally bene cial in tasks where a higher degree of agreement
or perfection are required when there is limited inference or when there is a high cost to retrieval
or retrieval is unreliable Even with the current set of results it would be possible to examine the
tradeos between dierent costs and bene ts in a more systematic fashion and thus provide better
insights into the types of interactions between discourse strategies agents cognitive limitations and
task parameters

  Limits of the Strategies Tested
The primary limitation of the results is that only discourse strategies related to IRUs were tested
Some of the strategies that include IRUs may actually represent more general strategies For
example the MatchedPairPremise strategy includes information at the beginning of the segment
that the speaker believes will be useful for achieving the intention of a segment This information

doesnt have to be already known and it would be possible to design and test a general strategy
such as this based on the hypothesis that in some circumstances it might be more useful to start
out a segment by saying the facts that are considered relevant rather than letting those facts come
out over the course of the discussion
A similar argument could be constructed for Deliberation and Armation IRUs Both of these
classes are related to argument structure and providing evidence for conclusions or justi cations
for beliefs or courses of action The use of IRUs for this purpose was exempli ed by the Explicit
Warrant strategy IRUs may make especially good warrants nonIRUs can be warrants as well
Thus another set of experiments could be designed which tested the bene ts of always including
warrants and attempted to determine under which situations one should do so
Another range of experiments would involve testing agents with dierent capabilities While some
results were based on dialogues where one agent used one strategy and the other agent used another
no situations were tested in which one agent had unlimited attentional capacity and the other agent
was extremely attention limited or one agent had unlimited inferential capacity and the other agent
was inference limited I would also expect these factors to interact with which agent has most of
the information about the task Walker and Whittaker 	 In many expert systems there
are dierences between agents about what knowledge they have It would be extremely simple to
perform these tests with the current system but this was not the focus of the work presented here
Another limitation is that the strategies tested were always compared with the AllImplicit strategy
but there may be interesting dierences and interesting interactions between IRU strategies as well
A way of testing this will be discussed in the next section
Finally it would be possible to extend the system so that the eect of text structure and dierent
thematisations could be explored Currently the agents communicate with a propositional language
and there is no representation of information such as information focus or center For example
a sample hypothesis would be that the encoding or retrieval cue for propositions is either the
information focus or the center of an utterance and that this is one way agents deal with their
limited attentional capacity Another hypothesis would be that the reason that many utterances
consist in large part of hearer old information because humans cannot process very much new
information at a time The hearer old information in an utterance is the glue that makes it
possible to process the new information Some versions of these hypotheses might be testable in
a suitably modi ed version of the current system in which processing could be made easier by
dierential marking of hearer old and new information


 IRUs in PlanBased Generation and Recognition Systems
In this work agents communicate in an arti cial language and each utterance intention is explicitly
communicated IRUs are the content of these utterances and an IRU can be the content of the
utterance intentions of accept open close or say In each of these cases the content of the
utterance is asserted in memory and the utterance intention is used by the listener to decide what to
do next But how could we recognize the utterance intention for an IRU if it wasnt communicated
directly
This is a type of planinference or planrecognition studied by many researchers in discourse Allen
 Sidner and Israel  Sidner  Litman and Allen 	 Carberry  In Chapter
 I mentioned that the axioms and planrecognition heuristics in these planbased systems disallow
the occurrence of IRUs or suggest that IRUs be interpreted as indirect speech acts Perrault 	
Instead I have argued that the interpretation of IRUs does not require resorting to an inference
process based on their noninformativeness
There are however several dierent ways in which the treatment of IRUs might be incorporated into
speechact based accounts One way is to introduce a new speech act for each type of IRU In order
to generate IRUs the system would reason about generating these new speech act types Then
in the plan recognition system IRUs would not be recognized as inform speech acts but rather
as one of the newly introduced speech act types This treatment depends on recognizing IRUs as
redundant in order to eliminate inform as a possible recognized plan This could possibly be done
by prosody but in other cases could involving checking a large number of possible inferences
Another way in which IRUs could be incorporated into these systems is to change the level of
granularity of the primitive act de nition Thus rather than the uttering of a single proposition
constituting an act a schema for multiple propositions might be reasoned about in which an IRU
was part of the schema and communicated because of the relation that it bears to other propositions
that are conveyed at the same time  The details of this treatment is beyond the scope of this thesis
but the incorporation of IRUs in messages in the DesignWorld system presented in chapter  and
used throughout the thesis actually approximates the multiple proposition schema briey sketched
here
A  nal way in which at least the Attention IRUs could be incorporated into a speechact based
system is by changing the de nition of the felicity conditions for an inform to reect the distinction
between salient and hearer old propositions advocated here The new felicity conditions would
mean that inform utterances are felicitous if the proposition realized by that utterance is not
 Cawsey PC Spring
 includes redundant propositions in explanations when the explanation would seem
incoherent without them Cawsey 


currently salient The plangeneration heuristics then can generate an inform and the plan
inference heuristics can recognize an utterance as an inform as long as their content is not currently
salient However testing the details of this account must be left to future work

 Adaptability Learning and Optimization of Strategies
One limitation of the simulation design is that DesignWorld agents are parametrized as to discourse
strategy and each discourse strategy must be designed into the system Furthermore an agent with
a strategy uses that strategy persistently without reection In other words an agent always does
the same discourse level action for each discourse sequence de ned situation Finally agents carry
out these strategyde ned behaviors without using any knowledge of their conversational partners
There are at least three ways in which these limitations could be addressed First it would be
possible to have strategies based on an agents own reections Second it would be possible to
have strategies based on a model of the conversational partner Third it might be possible to
automatically evolve complex strategies based on a set of primitive strategies through the use of
techniques such as genetic algorithms Each of these extensions will be discussed in the following
sections

  Reective Strategies
In the current version of DesignWorld agents are parameterized for strategy in a rather rigid way
For example if an agents strategy is to include extra information in a proposal the agent will
always include that information in a proposal However the results discussed in sections 
 and
 show that this strategy is most bene cial when the extra information that is included is not
currently salient or would be costly to retrieve This suggests that better versions of some of the
strategies could be designed in which Attention IRUs are only produced when their content is not
currently salient
This leaves open the question of how agents determine when a proposition is not currently salient
for another agent One heuristic way to do this is to have an agent use its own mind as an
approximation of the other agent An agent knows which propositions are salient for it and an
agent can keep track of the amount of processing it took it to retrieve a fact or deduce a conclusion
This information could be used as an an estimate of the amount of processing it would require for
the other agent to produce the same result Joshi  Joshi Webber and Weischedel  If
the cost of communicating the fact or the inference is less than this processing estimate then the
agent would include the IRU


One aspect of this form of reective strategy is already incorporated into the current system
Agents select from among the facts currently in use in their own meansend reasoning process to
decide which facts to include as IRUs in the open best and matched pair based strategies This
selection process could be based instead on a model of what information would be most useful to
the other conversant This is the topic of the next section

 Using a Model of the Conversational Partner
DesignWorld agents do not currently maintain information about what other agents know or what
their capabilities are so that the agent strategies do not rely on such information There are several
types of information about the other agent or the history of the interaction that agents could use
to adapt their strategies to their conversational partners First agents might keep track of what
information they believe their partners know andor have currently salient Second if agents kept
information about discourse strategies they could recognize which discourse strategy the other
agent is using and modify their own strategy accordingly Third an agent might notice when
another agent makes mistakes say by proposing an action whose preconditions are not met and
adjust its own strategy accordingly Finally without tracking any particular aspect of the partners
behavior an agent might randomly try variations in strategies and keep track of the scores achieved
with those strategies adjusting strategies to those that seem to work best with that partner
Another aspect of modeling the conversational partner might be to design strategies that take the
timing in interaction into account Timing information may be used by agents to determine when
to elaborate on what they have previously asserted for example by paraphrasing what they have
said or by making an InferenceExplicit
It would be possible to set up DesignWorld experiments that would test whether it is useful to
model the other conversant For example one could compare a strategy that relies on ones own
reasoning as the basis for selecting the content of IRUs such as the strategies discussed above with
strategies that require maintaining a model of the user and making predictions based on reasoning
about this model
Because score propositions are the only type of warrant propositions used in deliberation no selection process is
needed to determine what to include in the explicit warrant strategy If the system were extended so that other
kinds of warrants or supports were possible then a similar strategy of selection based on ones own reasoning would
be possible


 Optimization and the Development of Complex Strategies
All of the current DesignWorld strategies consist of changing the way that one discourse level
action is performed eg whether an opening is done implicitly or explicitly or whether a warrant is
included in a proposal These choices are always binary a strategy either always includes an explicit
opening or it never includes one Section 
 suggested one way of varying the binary aspect
of these strategies based on the agents reection about their own reasoning processes Another
possibility would be to take a godlike view of agents behavior and attempt to optimize it by using
a technique such as genetic algorithms that randomly create new strategies as combinations of old
ones and use the performance measure in DesignWorld to decide which strategies will be kept
through successive generations Goldberg  The remainder of this section discusses in more
detail how this might be done
Genetic algorithms GAs are a stochastic learning and optimization technique that relies on two
things  it must be possible to code the parameters of the optimization problem as as a vector
string  a payo function must be de ned for the performance of the algorithm and this is asso
ciated with each parameter vector string In DesignWorld the parameters of the algorithm are the
agent parameters These include what strategies are accessible to an agent the agents inferential
capacity and the agents attentional capacity The payo function is the performance measure for
DesignWorld The fact that performance is dependent on assumptions about processing costs will
be discussed further below
Application of GAs involves  steps 
 De ning an original population
 Testing the  tness of this population
 Reproducing a new generation modeling a notion of survival of the  ttest Then use this
new generation to repeat steps  and 
An original population is de ned that consists of a random selection of vector strings representing
a large enough subset of total population The problem is then attempted with the members of this
original population and population members are replicated in the next generation in proportion
to the degree of success that they had New vector strings can be introduced into the population
by mating two existing vector strings with subsets of parameters randomly traded between the
mating strings After a number of generations the optimal parameter string should dominate the
population Below I will consider the speci cs of a DesignWorld experiment using this method

Parameter Name Parameter Values
AttitudeExplicit 	  
InferenceExplicit 	  
OpenBest 	  
ExplicitWarrant 	  
Inference Capacity No Half All
Attentional Capacity        

Figure  Possible Genes for a DesignWorld Genetic Algorithm Experiment
Parameter Agt Pars Agt Pars Agt Pars Agt Pars
AttitudeExplicit 	   	
InferenceExplicit 	  	 	
OpenBest 	 	 	 	
ExplicitWarrant 	 	 	 	
Inference Capacity All All Half No
Attentional Capacity    

Figure 
 Possible Original Population for a DesignWorld Genetic Algorithm Experiment
Imagine that the parameters of the algorithm were the strategies of the agents that we have seen
We could set up a genetic algorithm experiment in which the probability of using a strategy was
represented by parameter values that would take on discrete settings between 	 and  For sim
plicity lets consider  dierent strategies as represented in the table below and assume that they
are either on or o as in the current implementation We let inferential capacity take the three
discrete settings we used in chapter  and attentional capacity range from  to 
 as in all the
experiments presented
An original population of agents randomly selected as a combination of these parameters could be
as shown in  gure 

The next step is to test the  tness of this population of agents Since  tness has to do with the
scores that the agents achieve in dialogue each agent carries out N dialogues with each of the other
agents In previous experiments N was 		 Each agent in a dialogue gets the score that is the joint
score for the dialogue Assuming that each agent participates in the same number of dialogues we
can simply sum performance over all the dialogues with all the other agents to get an individual
agents  tness Then we sum performance over all the agents to get a total  tness measure

Reproduction is based on the notion of survival of the  ttest An agents  tness divided by
the populations overall  tness gives the likelihood that that agent will be replicated in the next
generation For example if agent A represents 	! of the total  tness and agent B represents
! of the total  tness then a copy of A is twice as likely to appear in the next generation We
then randomly select a subset of the replicated population and mate agents in the subset by
crossover which consists of randomly exchanging some parameter settings between agents This
introduces new types of agents into the population It is also possible to have mutations as part of
reproduction which would involve randomly changing a parameter setting at some low frequency
After some number of generations the idea is that we would get a stable population of agent types
that dont change from one generation to another
One remaining issue with conducting such an experiment in DesignWorld is the fact that the  tness
of an agent has been shown to depend on features of the situation environment such as the cost
of communication inference and retrieval and the de nition of the task In order to use GAs these
environmental features would have to be  xed for the duration of some number of dialogue runs
Fitness over a range of situations might be desirable so we might want to de ne performance as
performance over a range of situations
The bene ts of the GA method are that if a novel situation arises we can set the situation pa
rameters generate a population and then see if any of the currently de ned strategies work well in
that situation
The experiment described here is similar to the TitForTat experiments Axelrod  One issue
with the design is the fact that each agents  tness is determined by summing their performance
with all the other agents in the population This procedure loses information about eective
combinations of strategies but one of the  ndings of the experiments so far is that particular
combinations of agents perform better than other combinations Fitness is dependent on ones
conversational partner Perhaps over successive runs pairs of agents might form stable populations
precisely because their interaction is bene cial Another possibility would be that the population
members are teams of agents ie the pairs of agents who do the task together
 Summary
This thesis focused on explaining the phenomenon of IRUs a type of action in dialogue which
appears patently inecient Ive argued that the occurrence of IRUs can be explained by positing
that cognitive agents are resource bounded actors
	
The approach that Ive taken is to argue for an account in which the meaning of an IRU is emergent
from underlying processing constraints The account here makes minimal assumptions about the
use of convention in determining the meaning of IRUs and avoids positing that the interpretation
of IRUs relies on reexive Gricean reasoning about violations of the maxim of quantity While
it is possible that Gricean reasoning is used in the interpretation of IRUs Ive shown that it is also
possible to interpret IRUs without resorting to this type of reasoning
The eects of limited processing on agents behavior is currently an active area of research Kono
lige 
 Pollack and Ringuette 	 Bratman Israel and Pollack  but models of limited
processing have not previously been used to explain agents discourse behavior Ive shown that
discourse strategies that include IRUs are bene cial under speci c assumptions about agents re
source limitations Thus the main contribution of the thesis is in linking discourse behavior to
underlying cognitive limitations

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